























The Japanese Empire, like other empires, had a potential for extreme group-
destructive violence. This potential was unleashed at times between 1937 and 1945 as 
the Japanese military, engaged in wars fought, ostensibly, for the liberation and 
reconstruction of an ‘Asia for the Asiatics’, embraced measures which paradoxically 
allowed for the elimination of substantial parts, and sometimes the whole, of Asian 
population groups in specific areas. Despite the genocidal undercurrents of this 
violence, Imperial Japan has not typically been included within genocide and mass 
violence scholarship. Furthermore, because the emergence of extreme violence in the 
Empire was a turbulent and chaotic process, as opposed to a pre-meditated master-
plan for the annihilation of a race, as popular understandings of genocide would 
suggest it should be, area specialists have eschewed involvement with this 
conceptual field. I address this neglect in this thesis. Using a methodological 
approach derived from consideration of more recent scholarship which has explored 
genocide and mass violence in European empires, I aim to trace the genocidal 
characteristics of violence in the Japanese Empire. In particular, I analyse this 
violence as part of a dynamic process of radicalisation and escalation. I show that, 
while Imperial Japan does not neatly conform to models of genocide based on 
conceptualisations which place it as essentially synonymous with the Nazi’s ‘final 
solution’, the insights of genocide scholarship are useful to understanding how, in 
the absence of an overarching intention to destroy Asian peoples, genocidal violence 
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In the West there is England, 
In the North, Russia. 
My countrymen, be careful! 
Outwardly they make treaties, 
But you cannot tell 
What is at the bottom of their hearts. 
There is a Law of Nations, it is true, 
But when the moment comes, remember, 









                                                             
1 Song of Diplomacy, c1880s, in George Bailey Sansom, The Western World and Japan: A Study in the 
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NOTE TO THE READER  
 
 
East Asian names are given in the conventional manner, with family name preceding 
given name, except for those scholars, such as Akira Iriye, who have written their 
names in the Western tradition in their books. Japanese words and names have been 
transliterated using the current standard of Romanization. Exceptions include Tojo 
Hideki, rather than Tōjō Hideki and Kempeitai instead of Kenpeitai. Differences may 
also appear in quotations from sources that use an older style. Chinese names and 
places have been transliterated in accordance with the Hanyu Pinyin Romanization 
system, except for famous names, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Yangtze, and Kwantung 
Army.  
For brevity in the text, I have used abbreviations for archival sources from the outset.  
Thus:  
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG) 165, 
Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Office of the Director 
of Intelligence (G-2), Military Intelligence Division (MID), Entry 79 – Formerly 
Security-Classified Intelligence Reference Publications (“P” File) Received from 
US Military Attachés, Military and Civilian Agencies of the United States, 
Foreign Governments, and Other Sources, 1940–1945: Southeast Asia Translator 
and Interrogation Center (SEATIC) Publication, No. 182 
will appear as:   
NARA, RG 165, G-2, MID, Entry 79: SEATIC: Publication, No. 182.  
Full citations are given in the bibliography and abbreviations are included in the list 
of abbreviations. Where I have consulted some collections at several archives, for 
example, the exhibits from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE) and documents from the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), 
these will be referenced as follows:  
- IMTFE: Exhibits, No. #, ‘Brief Description of Item’. 
- ATIS: [Bulletin, Current Translations, Enemy Publications, Interrogation 
Reports, or Research Reports], No. #, ‘Brief Description of Item’. 
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The Japanese Empire was, arguably, one of the most violent manifestations of 
imperialism in the twentieth century. In the pursuit of imperial objectives which by 
the 1940s had come to involve grand strategies for the liberation and reconstruction 
of Asia, the Japanese military paradoxically committed widespread atrocities against 
the very populations they purported to free from white imperialism. Military 
conduct in Asia between 1937 and 1945 was characterised to varying degrees by; 
massacres, indiscriminate scorched earth policies, wanton looting and destruction of 
property, bio-chemical experimentation and warfare, sexual violence, including 
forced prostitution, coerced labour, and systematic policies of cultural destruction. At 
times, Japanese commanders also employed measures that embraced the physical 
destruction of substantial parts, if not always the whole, of a population group in a 
given area as a rational but completely immoral military strategy. For example, in 
Nanjing in December 1937 and British Malaya in February 1942, Japanese troops 
were ordered to carry out comprehensive mopping-up operations that involved the 
deliberate yet indiscriminate massacre of a substantial part of the military-aged male 
Chinese population in both cases. Furthermore, anti-guerrilla efforts, first in 
occupied China between 1940 and 1941 and later in the Philippines between 1944 and 
1945, also saw commanders adopt comprehensive scorched earth policies which 
included the killing of all inhabitants in areas of strategic importance. In short, 
genocidal violence, that is, violence that involved the intentional destruction of 
groups, became an occasional option in the Japanese Empire. However, the sporadic, 
inconsistent, and transient nature of this violence has meant that it has rarely been 
viewed through this conceptual lens.  
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Indeed, extreme group-destructive violence in the Empire was often the 
product of a complex and dynamic process. While it could be purposeful, 
widespread, and systematic, it was by no means consistently or universally 
employed. In fact, the physical destruction of local Asian populations was in 
opposition to the Japanese government's grand vision of a Greater East Asia in which 
those groups were to play a vital role. As a consequence, outbursts of violence that 
was genocidal in character were relatively uncommon. Yet, they did occur. Where 
commanders made decisions to employ extreme measures, these were dependent to 
a large degree on the conditions on the ground, the wider international situation, and 
the attitudes of the local populations. Accordingly, genocidal violence, shaped by 
this range of contextual factors, was usually not sustained; it receded in intensity 
once those elements that had facilitated the embrace of such measures had either 
been mitigated or eliminated. Essentially, genocidal violence was deployed by 
commanders as a means to achieving objectives and was not an end in itself. The 
result was that violent extremes perpetrated by the Japanese military varied in scale 
and intensity, manifesting intermittently if at all across the occupied territories.  
It is difficult then, as area specialists have pointed out, to view Japanese 
violence in the context of a concept that is commonly understood to be essentially 
synonymous with the Holocaust. Certainly, Japanese violence does not neatly 
conform to the parameters of an archetype that requires genocide to manifest as a 
sustained and overt state-driven policy that specifically intends to destroy other 
races. It is for this reason that area specialists have tended to eschew engagement 
with this conceptual field. It is this avoidance which I address in this thesis by 
identifying and analysing the genocidal dynamics of instances of extreme violence in 
the Japanese Empire between 1937 and 1945. In so doing, I leave aside Holocaust-
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derived frameworks for examining genocide (which I will shortly explain have had a 
paralysing impact on scholarship) engaging with conceptualisations that have 
emerged out of more recent studies of mass violence in European empires. The 
underlying aim is to explain how and why, in lieu of an overarching plan for the 
destruction of Asian peoples and in the face of pan-Asian declarations for an ‘Asia 
for the Asiatics’, genocidal violence became an option in the Japanese Empire. By 
utilising this conceptual frame, I aim to enhance the understanding of certain facets 
of violence in the Empire which, as a result of the lingering influence of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), continues to be ancillary to 
other research questions within English-language scholarship.   
THE LEGACY OF THE IMTFE AND SCHOLARSHIP ON JAPANESE VIOLENCE 
Japanese violence was addressed to a limited extent at the IMTFE where, between 
1946 and 1948, twenty-eight Japanese leaders were indicted and seven subsequently 
hung for crimes against peace, conventional war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. With the Allies ‘leading the charge’ at the tribunal, the primary focus lay 
in punishing Japan for its aggressive war apparently carried out in accordance with 
an ‘evil plan’ for world domination.1 Consequently, the prosecution of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity – B and C crimes respectively – was a supplementary, if 
copiously documented, element directed towards providing evidence of this 
calculated plan. The prosecution attempted to construct an image of Imperial Japan 
as a counterpart to Nazi Germany and used atrocities to establish a pattern of 
violence that could be viewed as an overarching government policy linked to those 
                                                             
1 Neil Boister & Robert Cryer (eds.), Documents on the Tokyo Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and 
Judgements (Oxford, 2008).  
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leaders on trial. 2  For its part, the defence did not dispute that crimes against 
humanity had occurred though did suggest that in many cases they were likely 
exaggerated. Their argument instead centred on countering the prosecution’s 
supposition that atrocities were ‘premeditated acts committed in pursuance of a 
national policy’ by emphasising that the majority of B and C crimes had taken place 
during the final year of war and should be seen more as ‘tragic’ breakdowns of 
military discipline.3 Essentially, Japanese atrocities, secondary to the question of war 
responsibility, were prosecuted and defended in the shadow of Nazi Germany. This 
is important to note for it has been an enduring legacy shaping scholarly treatments 
of Japanese violence.4  
Indeed, analysis of Japanese violence remained subordinate to other research 
questions and, in comparison to its supposed counterpart, has received limited 
attention in English-language scholarship. Early studies were shaped by the 
aforementioned polemical debates which remained unresolved since, though the 
prosecution was ultimately successful, the IMTFE has been criticised as victor’s 
justice at its worst.5 Thus, early post-war scholarship concentrated on debates over 
war responsibility and, in doing so, analysed reasons for the war more than the way 
in which it was conducted. 6  Scholars have since moved beyond a dichotomous 
approach which typically assessed Japanese imperialism as either ‘calculated 
aggression’ or ‘self-defence’ by examining its complex and mutable nature. However, 
                                                             
2 R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide (eds.), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts 
of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Twenty Two Volumes (hereafter 
Tokyo Trial Transcripts), (New York, 1981), 452–62.  
3 Ibid, 17060–1.  
4 Lord Edward Russell, for example, published The Knights of Bushido: A Short History of Japanese War 
Crimes (London, 1958) as a counterpart to his book on Nazi war crimes. Arnold Brackman also titled his 
account, The Other Nuremberg: the Untold Story of the Tokyo Trials (New York, 1988). 
5  See the dissenting opinion of Justice Radhabinod Pal, in Boister & Cryer, Documents, 809–1427; 
Madoka Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremberg Legacy 
(London and New York, 2008), 68–86.   
6 Ibid, 65; for a summary of this early literature see Marlene Mayo, ‘Introduction’, in Marlene Mayo (ed.), 
The Emergence of Imperial Japan: Self-Defense or Calculated Aggression? (Lexington, 1970), vii–viii.  
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discussions of violence in the Empire remained subordinate folded into studies 
rather than a focus of them. In fact, in some cases the legacy of the IMTFE has 
continued to impact the understanding of violence in the Empire. For example, Mark 
Peattie maintained the viewpoint established at the trial – that the 1931 to 1945 
period was aberrant and a significant departure from earlier Japanese imperialism 
which, as Andre Schmid observed, had implications for the way in which he 
addressed violence perpetrated against the Taiwanese and the Koreans. 7  Since 
violence did not fit well with the image of pre-1930s Japanese imperialism as the 
progressive, modernising force Peattie depicted, he was dismissive of its centrality as 
a means of population control, writing of brutalities in the earlier colonies as 
occasional ‘excesses’ and reasoning that ‘the ruthlessness and insensitivity with 
which Japan set about applying the Meiji domestic strategies overseas should not 
cloud our judgements about their purpose, work, or effectiveness.’8 As this example 
suggests, there has been an associated tendency to understand Japanese violence 
from 1937 through its nexus with war rather than as an inherent part of the empire-
building process. While the wartime context was a crucial enabling factor in the 
perpetration of atrocities, the dominance of this focus has obscured the imperial 
character of violence perpetrated against Asians who stood in the way of the 
Japanese Empire.  
More recent studies have situated Japanese imperialism in the 1930s and 
1940s in a longer-term context; however, the inclination to view Japanese violence as 
a by-product of war has continued to shape English-language scholarship even in 
works where it was a subject of analysis in its own right. Accordingly, those few 
                                                             
7 Andre Schmid, ‘Colonialism and the “Korea Problem” in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A 
Review Article’, Journal of Asian Studies, 59(4) (2000), 958–61. 
8 Mark Peattie, ‘Introduction’, in Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 
1895–1945 (Princeton, 1984), 25. 
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scholars who have examined the Nanjing Massacre, the bio-chemical 
experimentation units, the treatment of POWs, and the sexual enslavement of Asian 
women for use in military ‘comfort stations’, have concentrated on the battlefield 
context and the psychology of war, while also seeking explanations in a 
predominantly national context. For example, scholars have explored the role of 
Japanese ideologies, such as Bushidō and the Imperial Way (kōdō), as well as 
Japanese perceptions of human rights, attitudes towards POWs and surrender, and 
changes in military ethos.9 Though the wartime and national contexts are without 
question crucial to understanding the nature of violence in the Empire, this focus has 
overlooked the importance of imperialism and the broader historical backdrop in 
which Japanese violence was perpetrated. The Japanese Empire was not alone in its 
ruthlessness and brutality. All European empires were marked by violence towards 
the peoples they occupied and, in some cases, also engaged in genocidal violence. 
However, while an ‘anti-imperial turn’ has produced a corpus of knowledge on 
imperial violence, and more recently genocide, within European empires, the same 
has not been true of scholarship that deals with the Japanese Empire. As a result, 
Imperial Japan has remained conspicuously absent from the growing literature on 
empire, violence, and genocide. To a large degree, this is because, having been styled 
as a counterpart to Nazi Germany in the immediate post-war years, consideration of 
Japanese violence in respect to genocide has become a highly politicised, polemic, 
and given the relative dearth of scholarship on this subject, static debate.  
   
                                                             
9 For select examples see: Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II (1993; Eng. 
edn, Boulder, 1996), 197–215; Daqing Yang, ‘Atrocities in Nanjing: Search for Explanations’, in Diana 
Lary & Stephen MacKinnon (eds.), Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China (Vancouver, 2001), 
76–96; Hata Ikuhiko, ‘From Consideration to Contempt: The Changing Nature of Japanese Military and 
Popular Perceptions of Prisoners of War through the Ages’, in Bob Moore & Kent Fedorowich (eds.), 
Prisoners of War and Their Captors in World War II (Oxford, 1996), 250–76; Ienaga Saburō, Japan’s Last War: 
World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945 (1968; Eng. edn, Oxford, 1979).   
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THE POLITICS OF GENOCIDE AND THE SHADOW OF THE HOLOCAUST 
In 1997, the American–Chinese journalist, Iris Chang, published her Pulitzer Prize 
winning book, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, becoming 
the first to explicitly use genocide rhetoric in connection with Japan. Giving little 
apparent consideration for what the term meant, Chang, as her subtitle indicated, 
made an explicit association with Nazi Germany arguing, within the first few pages, 
that, ‘just as Hitler’s Germany would do half a decade later, Japan used a highly 
developed military machine and a master-race mentality to set about establishing its 
right to rule its neighbours.’10 The book was criticised among American scholars for 
its inaccuracies and one reviewer, David Kennedy, lambasted Chang for failing to 
corroborate the above claims.11 However, her express purpose had been to draw 
attention to an event which she saw as disturbingly neglected in English-language 
circles.12 In doing so, she sought to capitalise on the unrivalled rhetorical power of 
genocide which the Polish-Jewish jurist, Raphael Lemkin, had coined in 1944 to ‘chill 
listeners and invite immediate condemnation’.13 Enshrined in its own convention, 
genocide has become the maximal on some imaginary hierarchy of crimes, referred 
to by some even as the ‘crime of crimes’.14 As a consequence, it has developed a role 
as an advocacy tool, used to raise awareness and invest moral authority with the 
group that claims the label.15 That role has contributed to, especially in the case of 
Japan, works that show a lack of real engagement with the concept or the copious 
literature that now accompanies it. Indeed, like Chang, whose reference to genocide 
appeared only in the introduction and epilogue, book-ending a case that was never 
                                                             
10 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (1997; Penguin edn, London, 
1998), 3. 
11 David M. Kennedy, ‘The Horror: Should the Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing be Equated with the Nazi 
Holocaust?’ The Atlantic (April 1998). 
12 Chang, Rape of Nanking, 6. 
13 Quoted in Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: American and the Age of Genocide (London, 2003), 42. 
14 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2000; 2nd edn, Cambridge, 2009). 
15 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2006; 2nd edn, London, 2011), 540–1. 
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properly formulated, a number of other, usually non-academic, writers have made 
similar unsubstantiated comparative claims between Japanese violence and the 
Holocaust.16  
The use of genocide rhetoric by these writers, however, has merely 
exacerbated ongoing history wars, particularly over the Nanjing Massacre, inciting 
passionate and irreconcilable debate. 17  For example, the conservative revisionist 
historian, Yamamoto Masahiro, became determined to disprove the applicability of 
the term to the Nanjing Massacre (which he believed was best understood as a 
‘wartime tragedy’) and took a firm stance against what he saw as a politically 
motivated use of ‘genocide’. 18  Concerned over the issue of reparations and the 
ostensible development of anti-Japanese sentiments in America due to the popularity 
of Chang’s book, Yamamoto argued against comparisons with the Holocaust and 
advocated that genocide be removed from the discussion altogether claiming that 
applying it to this case would enable Holocaust denial.19 These examples represent a 
polarised, contentious, and fruitless debate over labelling the Nanjing Massacre 
‘genocide’ which is of limited value to scholars since it rarely advances the 
understanding of Japanese violence. In fact, the continued controversy over these 
debates can be seen in recent studies, like that of Barak Kushner on Chinese national 
war crimes trials, where mere mention of the Nanjing Massacre is accompanied by a 
qualifying statement emphasising that it was ‘unlike Nazi militarism’, even when not 
                                                             
16 For examples see: Peter Li, ‘The Nanking Holocaust: Memory, Trauma and Reconciliation’, in Peter Li 
(ed.), The Search for Justice: Japanese War Crimes (2003; later edn, New Brunswick & London, 2009), 227–
42; Mark Felton, Japan’s Gestapo: Murder, Mayhem and Torture in Wartime Asia (Barnsley, 2009); Daniel 
Barenblatt, A Plague upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan’s Germ Warfare Operation (2004; pbk 
edn, London, 2006). 
17 Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the 
United States (Oxford, 2006) is a detailed study of these debates. 
18 Yamamoto Masahiro, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity (Westport, 2000), 268, 282–3. 
19 Yamamoto Masahiro, ‘A Tale of Two Atrocities: Critical Appraisal of American Historiography’, in 
Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (ed.), The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: Complicating the Picture (2007; pbk edn, 
New York & Oxford, 2007), 299–300.  
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directly addressing such questions.20 From these statements, one can surmise that 
there has been an avoidance of potentially fruitful enquiries into the genocidal 
character of extreme violence (like the massacre at Nanjing) in the Empire. This 
avoidance has largely been a consequence of the spectre of the Holocaust in genocide 
studies.  
The Holocaust is the keystone around which genocide scholarship has been 
built and, as such, it has become the primary lens through which genocide is 
understood, analysed, and delimited. This is despite the fact that neither Lemkin nor 
the drafters of the Genocide Convention (with the exception of the delegate from the 
Soviet Union) viewed genocide as essentially synonymous with the ‘final solution’. 
In fact, reflecting their intentions for a more universal and flexible application of the 
term than is generally accepted within scholarship, the preamble to the Convention 
explicitly recognised that: ‘at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses 
on humanity …’21 Scholars like Martin Shaw, Dirk Moses, and David Moshman have 
pointed to the paralysing and exclusionary impact this paradigm has had on 
genocide research.22 To be sure, as an archetype for understanding the concept, it has 
produced a framework for analysis that can be so restrictive and narrow in scope that 
it has been difficult, if not impossible, to use productively in respect to other cases. 
Take for instance the scant literature on genocide and Japan. While there was a 
genocidal character to some of this violence, with the exception of a handful of 
scholars who acknowledge this, most comparative scholars overlook if not outright 
                                                             
20 See for example, Barak Kushner, Devils to Men, Men to Devils: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice 
(Cambridge, MA, 2015), 23. 
21 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948), United Nations 
Treaty Series, Vol. 78, 277, Preamble; see Ad Hoc Committee Draft (24 May 1948), UN Doc. E/794, 8 for 
rejection of link with Nazism.   
22 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? (2007; 2nd edn, London, 2015), 53–65; A. Dirk Moses, ‘Genocide and 
Settler Society in Australian History’, in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence 
and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History (2004; reprint edn, Oxford, 2007), 3–4; David 
Moshman, ‘Conceptions of Genocide and Perceptions in History’, in Dan Stone (ed.), The Historiography 
of Genocide Studies (2008; pbk edn, Basingstoke, 2010), 71–89. 
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reject this case in their analyses.23 For example, despite recognising some parallels, 
Manus Midlarsky and R. J. Rummell excluded Japan from the genocidal frame in the 
absence of a state policy that had, as its end goal, the extermination of certain races.24 
The limitations and restrictions of comparative studies that are based on Holocaust-
derived analytical frameworks can obstruct efforts to further understand genocide. 
This is because, among other reasons, they typically overlook the potentially fruitful 
analyses that can emerge from examinations of instances of extreme violence that 
share commonalities with genocide, but do not neatly conform to parameters as 
established by the singular and extreme Nazi case. Explorations of cases of extreme 
violence that shares characteristics with genocide, though they may not ordinarily be 
viewed in these terms, are equally important to enhancing the understanding of this 
universally reviled phenomenon.25   
A further consequence is that area specialists continue to steer clear of 
engagement with this conceptual field, with some, like Joshua Fogel, arguing that 
genocide is an unhelpful analytical tool for understanding Japanese violence. Having 
selectively drawn on the older research of Henry Huttenbach, Zygmunt Bauman, 
and Michael Marrus in his analysis, Fogel reduced the concept of genocide to a ‘pre-
conceived master plan for mass murder’.26 From there, he gave an overview of the 
myriad of ways in which the Nanjing Massacre (neglecting violence in the Empire as 
a whole) did not conform to this analytical model:  
                                                             
23 For those that have acknowledged the genocidal qualities of Japanese violence, see: Martin Shaw, War 
and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society (London, 2003), 98–9; Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A 
World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven, 2007), 455–85; Jones, 
Genocide, 72–4.  
24 Manus I. Midlarsky, The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 2005), 28–30; R. J. 
Rummell, Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900 (New Brunswick, 1994), 144–153. 
25 For further discussion of the obstructing impact of these restrictions see Martin Shaw, Genocide and 
International Relations: Changing Patterns in the Transitions of the Late Modern World (Cambridge, 2013), 28–
47; A. Dirk Moses, ‘Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the ‘Racial Century’: Genocides 
of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust’, Patterns of Prejudice, 26(4) (2002), 7–36. 




[a]n overarching purpose was missing. There was nothing political, military, 
ideological, or economic to be gained by committing this mass murder. And, 
there were no concentration – or death-camps, no elaborate system to distance 
the killers from the killing, and no bureaucratic organization for it except of the 
most primitive ad hoc sort.   
In short, the Nanjing Massacre did not resemble his understanding of the ‘final 
solution’. On the same basis, Fogel also rejected the idea that extreme violence in 
Cambodia and Rwanda (which, he acknowledged, shared similarities with the 
Japanese case) constituted genocide. In fact, he argued, ‘not all genocides may be 
placed on a plain with the Holocaust.’27 In doing so, Fogel exposed his analysis as an 
exercise in establishing Holocaust ‘uniqueness’ rather than a genuine engagement 
with this expanding conceptual field. Indeed, despite writing in 2007, he overlooked 
new directions in Holocaust scholarship which have moved away from analysis of 
this case exclusively in terms of a pre-meditated policy of mass murder, to 
underscore the more complex, disordered, and heterogeneous process of 
radicalisation at work in Nazi-occupied Europe.28 His conclusion that genocide was 
not a useful analytical concept, then, was foregone, merely representing the 
controversy of this subject and the unsuitability of the Holocaust paradigm for 
understanding Japanese violence.  
Area specialist Gavan McCormack was more receptive than Fogel to the 
analysis of Japanese violence through this conceptual lens. He recognised that the 
broad definition offered in the Genocide Convention could be used to make a case 
for cultural destruction in Korea, and physical violence in China, as genocidal. 
However, he was similarly unconvinced of the benefits of doing so, pointing out that 
Japanese scholars rarely viewed violence in such terms, querying whether ‘anti-
                                                             
27 Fogel, ‘Nanking Atrocity’ 281. 
28 Donald Bloxham’s work is an example of this trend, see A. Dirk Moses, ‘Paranoia and Partisanship: 
Genocide Studies, Holocaust Historiography, and the “Apocalyptic Conjuncture”’, The Historical Journal, 




Japanese’ groups, such as military-aged Chinese men, constituted a protected group, 
and reasoning that it did not share the same ideological underpinnings as other cases. 
Providing a further example of the politicisation of this debate, he also suggested 
that ‘the case for extending it to incorporate Japan must argue plausibly that the 
Japanese record in the 1930s and 1940s is legally and morally on a par with the Nazi, 
Khmer Rouge, Turkish, and Rwandan genocides’.29  McCormack found the issue 
further complicated since, he observed, the policies and practices of Western 
countries in their colonies were ‘excluded from the genocidal frame’. Thus, he argued, 
‘[i]f Japan is to be seen as genocidal because of its colonial and imperial crimes, then 
the question of the liability of the major Western powers to such charges stemming 
from their colonial (or post-colonial) record would also have to be reopened’.30 This 
is precisely the trend that has been evident in genocide scholarship over the past 
fifteen years or so and it is in the context of this research that a more productive 
approach to the analysis of extreme violence in the Japanese Empire can be formed. 
The growing body of literature that developed from studies which analyse 
the connections between empire and mass violence challenged the Holocaust as the 
foundation for understanding genocide. In doing so, it opened up new avenues for 
enquiry and the insights that have resulted from these enquiries have led to 
significant advances in the field.31 For the purposes of this study, there are two 
important theoretical trends that have emerged from this research. First, because 
genocidal violence within European empires was similarly complex, turbulent, and 
                                                             
29 Gavan McCormack, ‘Reflections on Modern Japanese History in the Context of the Concept of 
Genocide’, in Robert Gellately & Ben Kiernan (eds.), The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge, 2003), 265–86.  
30 Ibid, 268. 
31 For overviews of this literature see Philip Spencer, ‘Imperialism, Anti-imperialism and the Problem of 
Genocide, Past and Present’, History, 98(332), (2013), 606–22; Robert Melson, ‘Critique of Current 
Genocide Studies’, Genocide Studies and Prevention, 6, 3 (2011), 279–86; A. Dirk Moses, ‘Revisiting a 
Founding Assumption of Genocide Studies’, Genocide Studies and Prevention, 6(3) (2011), 287–300; Ann 
Curthoys & John Docker, ‘Introduction – Genocide: Definitions, Questions, Settler-colonies’, Aboriginal 
History, 25 (2001), 1–15 for discussion of this research.  
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sporadic – hardly representative of a pre-meditated plan for the annihilation of 
native populations, these scholars focused their attention on the process rather than 
the outcome of genocide. In doing so, they have considered closely the relationship 
between structure and agency and some, like Moses, have come to conceptualise 
genocide more as a dynamic process that involves periods of radicalisation and de-
escalation, than a pre-meditated policy of mass-murder.32 A second element that has 
developed from this research, one examined more extensively in the works of 
Michael Mann and Mark Levene, has been to contextualise individual case studies 
within a wider historical frame.33  In doing so, these scholars have been able to 
formulate theories in respect to the relationship between imperialism, violence, and 
genocide which transcend the unique local circumstances in each case. In effect, they 
have posited a relationship between empire and genocide which suggests that all 
empires had the potential for extreme violence under particular conditions and, as 
discussed in more detail in Chapter One, have explored the conditions under which 
that potential was unleashed. Ultimately, these two trends are useful as a framework 
for analysis of Japanese violence in this thesis because, first, they allow for the 
inconsistent, chaotic, and contextually dependent nature of extreme violence in the 
Japanese Empire; and second, they will help to develop the understanding of that 
violence as part of a specific historical context which, while shaped by the local and 
geopolitical situation in Asia, was not an exclusively Japanese phenomenon.   
AIMS, RATIONALE, AND PARAMETERS 
This thesis revisits the genocidal nature of Japanese violence in light of the 
conceptual insights of this research. As the first in-depth study of this kind, I have 
                                                             
32 Moses, ‘Genocide and Settler Society’, 28–35. 
33 Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume II: The Rise of the West and the Coming of 
Genocide (2005; pbk edn, London & New York, 2013); Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: 
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge, 2005), 70–110. 
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three broad objectives. First and foremost, I aim to advance the understanding of 
instances of extreme violence in the Japanese Empire. In particular, I examine this 
violence as the product of a dynamic process of radicalisation, paying close attention 
to the interplay between constantly shifting geopolitical and local contexts, in order 
to explain how and why Japanese commanders came to embrace a military strategy 
that accepted the destruction of substantial parts and, in some cases, whole 
populations in specific areas of the Empire between 1937 and 1945. Second, by setting 
my analysis within the broader historical frame of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century pursuit of empire, I aim to formulate an understanding of Japanese violence 
beyond its national context. In doing so, I hope to highlight that outbursts of 
genocidal violence were shaped by the longer-term context of imperialism as much 
as by the circumstances in Asia and the occupied territories at that time. Third, I 
endeavour to bring discussion of Japanese violence from its comparatively 
marginalised position within area studies into dialogue with the expansive, 
interdisciplinary, and growing corpus of knowledge on empire, violence, and 
genocide. In doing so, I hope to stimulate further discussion and open up new 
avenues for analysing Japanese violence in this conceptual frame in the future. 
As noted, genocide is a provocative and problematic concept. Given the 
difficulties highlighted in the above discussion, it would be reasonable to question, 
as those scholars have, the utility of approaching my analysis through this 
conceptual frame. There are arguments to be made against working with such a 
contentious term, especially for a case in which it is not an obvious ‘fit’. Certainly, the 
politicisation of genocide, the dominance of the Holocaust paradigm, and the 
persistence of definitional challenges (to be discussed shortly) have led some scholars 
to favour seemingly more neutral terms like ‘mass killing’ and ‘massacre’ in their 
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studies.34 Genocide, however, is most apposite for the primary aim of this thesis. My 
interest lies in understanding the dynamics involved when commanders ordered 
their troops to conduct military operations that targeted for destruction substantial 
parts (as in the mopping-up campaigns in Nanjing in 1937 and British Malaya in 
1942) or the whole (as in occupied China in 1941 and the Philippines in 1945) of a 
population group in specific areas. To that end, the theoretical insights of what is 
now a considerable body of research on the dynamics of genocide in imperial 
settings, offers an excellent foundation from which to base my analysis of this aspect 
of Japanese violence. Furthermore, as touched on, the study of lesser known, smaller-
scale, and ambiguously genocidal cases can be fruitful in respect to refining and 
adding to the understanding of genocide more generally. An analysis of violence in 
the Japanese Empire, one that embraces its ambiguities, inconsistencies, and 
complexities can add further insight into how and why, in lieu of an overt plan or 
intention for the elimination of particular peoples, especially within the context of an 
ideology that appeared to work against the logic of group destruction, genocidal 
measures became a viable option and, at times, a perceived necessity.  
Aside from the political nature of the term and the dominance of the 
Holocaust as an archetype, a fundamental problem of utilising genocide as an 
analytical concept is the lack of consensus over definition within scholarship. There 
is, of course, a legal definition enshrined in the Genocide Convention. However, as 
the culmination of a ‘tortuous political process in a divided Cold War atmosphere’, 
this definition, in spite of being internationally recognised and ratified, has inspired 
                                                             
34 For example: Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century 
(Ithaca & London, 2004), 9–15; Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the 
Twentieth Century World (Cambridge, 2010), 5–9; Philip Dwyer & Lyndall Ryan, ‘Introduction: The 
Massacre and History’, in Philip G. Dwyer & Lyndall Ryan (eds.), Theatres of Violence: Massacre, Mass 
Killing and Atrocity throughout History (2012; pbk edn, New York & Oxford, 2015), xi–xxv. 
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more criticism and dispute than consensus. 35  Indeed, animated debates over 
questions of intent, motive, scale, victims, perpetrators, and techniques of genocide, 
endure and are unlikely to subside in the near future.36 The ambiguous wording of 
this definition and its origins within a convention designed to legislate against a 
crime, have also contributed to a tendency for scholars to approach the concept in a 
legalistic and definitive manner as they seek to find evidence of a criminal intent.37 
However, scholarship need not be beholden to the political and legal origins of 
‘genocide’ and as Jacques Sémelin has noted, there is a difference between the work 
of the scholar and that of the politician or lawyer.38 The chief purpose in utilising 
genocide in this thesis is to establish historical understanding of an understudied 
aspect of the Japanese Empire, not to construct a criminal case or inflame further 
political debate by ‘labelling’ Japan. As such, I will not approach genocide in a 
definitive, legalistic sense and do not mean to delve into the question of whether the 
case of Japan constitutes ‘genocide’ or not. To do so would be unproductive. 
Lemkin’s and the UN’s definitions are interpretive and there are so many different 
scholarly readings that it would be possible to manipulate an understanding of the 
concept to make a case either way. There is little academic value in achieving the 
goal when the goalposts can be moved and, as Donald Bloxham has advised, any 
genocide determination should be a by-product of scholarship, not its primary 
purpose.39 Genocide, then, will be utilised in this thesis as a means to understanding 
facets of Japanese violence, not as an end in itself.  
                                                             
35 Ann Curthoys and John Docker, ‘Defining Genocide’, in Stone, Historiography, 13. 
36 Anton Weiss-Wendt, ‘Problems in Comparative Genocide Scholarship’, in ibid, 44. 
37 Jacques Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide, Cynthia Schoch (trans.) 
(2005; pbk Eng. edn, London, 2013), 308–2. 
38 Ibid, 322. 
39 Donald Bloxham, ‘The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the 
Development of a Destruction Policy’, Past and Present, 181 (2003), 189.  
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In employing a broad, non-definitive approach I base my understanding of 
genocide on the fact that genocide is a type of violence that has considerable 
conceptual overlap with massacres, mass killings, and other atrocities. An analysis of 
similar types of violence can, as mentioned, be advantageous in terms of expanding 
the existing knowledge of genocide and, as Straus has argued, in locating it within a 
spectrum of other forms of mass and group violence.40 Thus, genocide will be used 
more flexibly as an analytical tool in the same sense as other abstract terms such as 
war, imperialism, and empire. Embracing the ambiguities and complexities of 
Japanese violence, I intend to trace its group-destructive dynamics by considering 
genocide as an extreme type of violence that emerges through a process of 
radicalisation as opposed to a distinctive, singular event within the Empire. As such, 
influenced by the work of Shaw and Moses, I refer throughout this thesis to 
‘genocidal violence’ rather than ‘genocide’.41 The application of genocide, as a noun, 
must naturally lead to a definitive judgment. In contrast, ‘genocidal’ as an adjective 
describing violence that shares characteristics with genocide is more expedient to 
analyses of cases that skirt the boundaries of definition and where there are 
similarities but also crucial differences that make the use of genocide in a definitive 
sense more problematic. In keeping with my intention to avoid legalistic arguments 
and debates, I propose to differentiate genocidal violence from massacre, mass 
killing, and other atrocities through a general understanding of the concept rather 
than, what has become, an obligation to define the term. This understanding is based 
on scholarly consensus regarding the nature of the concept for, contrary to Anton 
Weiss-Wendt’s argument that there has been no agreement in respect to defining 
genocide, there has, as Straus highlighted, been some convergence of ideas. While 
                                                             
40 Scott Straus, ‘“Destroy Them to Save Us”: Theories of Genocide and the Logics of Political Violence’, 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 24(4) (2012), 551. 
41 Shaw, What is Genocide?, 193; Moses, ‘Antipodean Genocide’, 92–6. 
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debates persist over nuances in definition, most scholars understand genocide to be, 
at a basic level, a form of intentional group destruction.42 Though I recognise that the 
destruction of groups can be achieved by a variety of different physical, biological, 
social, and cultural means, I focus in this thesis on physical destruction of groups. 
That is not to say that other forms of group destruction were not present within the 
Japanese Empire. Certainly, there is a case to be made for further analysis of the 
institutionalised sexual slavery, the system of forced labour, the bio-chemical 
experimentation units, and the Japanization policies employed in Taiwan and Korea 
within this conceptual frame. Limiting my discussion to physical destruction of 
groups is necessary within what is already a broad and far-reaching study. Thus, I 
approach the analysis of Japanese violence in the context of genocide by identifying 
and examining those instances in which that violence involved the intentional, 
meaning deliberate or purposeful, physical destruction of groups.  
MATERIALS, METHOD, AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
I have consulted a wide-range of diverse source types in conducting research for this 
thesis. Much of this was based on the extensive collections of the Library of Congress 
where I spent six months as a funded research fellow. This material included; 
published diaries and memoirs from Japanese and other Asian perspectives, 
contemporary accounts from foreign observers, edited volumes of translated 
Japanese documents, official publications and pamphlets, Japanese controlled 
English-language newspapers and periodicals, US government documents regarding 
the liberation of the Philippines, the Japanese Monograph series, and an enormous 
microfiche collection of captured and translated wartime Japanese documents and 
                                                             
42 Moshman, ‘Conceptions of Genocide’, 89; see Scott Straus, ‘Contested Meanings and Conflicting 
Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide’, JGR, 3(3) (2001), 350–55 for a succinct summary of 
key scholarly definitions.  
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interrogation reports. This was then supplemented by an additional two months 
research conducted at the National Archives and Records Administration in College 
Park, Maryland (NARA) and the National Archives at Kew (TNA) where I utilised a 
range of military intelligence documents such as; military attaché reports, the Office 
of Strategic Services (OSS) intelligence files, as well as interrogation reports and 
captured translated documents from a number of Allied intelligence agencies 
operating in the Pacific. I also accessed war crimes case files compiled by the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), 
various trial transcripts and evidentiary collections translated and assembled for use 
during the national war crimes trials conducted by Britain, the United States, and the 
Philippines, and the archives of the IMTFE.  
This source base features English-language material, though much of it was 
originally produced in English and considerably more was translated from Japanese 
documents. There are obviously limitations in working with translations and I have 
made sure to be circumspect in my treatment of this material, cross-referencing with 
a wide-range of different source-types. Some case studies in the thesis would 
naturally be enhanced through engagement with original documents and multi-
language archives. However, given that the originality and value of this thesis lies in 
its conceptual and contextual approach to the analysis of Japanese violence, this has 
not been detrimental. In fact, working with these materials has turned out to be a 
blessing in disguise. It has forced me to access a wider variety of documents than if I 
had been conducting a more focused study using a single collection and, as such, has 
provided a strong foundation from which to enhance my work with Japanese-
language sources in the future. Moreover, in my rigorous search for English-
language sources, I have made use of two under-utilised collections which have 
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proven to be of tremendous value to the study of Japanese violence.   
The first was the large repository of captured, translated Japanese documents 
and interrogation reports. These documents, dispersed over the three archives, are 
expansive; the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section alone reportedly collected 
around 350,000 documents, of which 18,000 were translated. 43  This material has 
remained largely unexploited by scholars and yet, despite the selective and 
piecemeal nature of some of the translations, they provide useful insights into 
conditions in the occupied areas, the treatment of ‘natives’, information on guerrilla 
warfare and resistance from local populations as well as detailed reports on Japanese 
anti-guerrilla efforts. For Southeast Asia, this has been particularly useful since 
Japanese forces were ordered to destroy their documents from as early as 1942 and 
during the two-week period between the surrender and arrival of American troops 
in Japan, it is estimated that upwards of seventy percent of wartime documents were 
destroyed.44  
The second of these under-used archival collections was the immense 
compilation of materials amassed in preparation for the prosecution of war crimes 
trials in the immediate post-war years. These archives, held at NARA and TNA, 
include case files, investigation reports, trial transcripts, and evidentiary collections. 
While a challenging source base given that they were compiled with an agenda in 
mind, they are, as Yuma Totani has pointed out, a vastly untapped archive which, if 
treated with caution, can be indispensable to the study of Japanese violence.45 Indeed, 
                                                             
43 Edward Drea, ‘Introduction’, in Interagency Working Group (ed.), Researching Japanese War Crimes: 
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case files and investigation reports present a more complete picture of the scope, 
nature, and patterns of violence in the Empire than can usually be gleaned from 
diaries, memoirs, and oral histories. Since the war crimes process placed the Japanese 
Empire under the spotlight in a way that other European empires have not been, 
these sources offer unique oral testimonies that recorded the Empire at this time from 
the perspective of both the oppressed and the oppressor. They have also been useful 
because, as revealed during these very trials, Japanese commanders were issuing 
orders verbally rather than in writing during the latter stages of the war.  
To restate, the central aim of this thesis is to trace the genocidal dynamics of 
violence in the Japanese Empire to understand how and why extreme group-
destructive methods became possible in the absence of an overarching, specific intent 
to annihilate groups. Grounding my analysis in the theoretical insights that have 
emerged out of studies of genocide and mass violence in European empires, I 
examine instances of extreme violence in the Empire as the culmination of a dynamic 
process of radicalisation. Situated within the longer-term context of Japanese 
imperialism as it evolved through interactions with the others powers within the 
imperial system, I explore this process as it emerged in various localities, under 
diverse circumstances, and at different stages of the Empire between 1937 and 1945 
in order to identify the factors involved in the embrace of genocidal violence at 
particular times. I employ an approach that combines elements of macro, meso, and 
micro level analysis.  In doing so, I explore the local circumstances and conditions on 
the ground in which commanders made decisions to adopt genocidal measures. I 
contextualise these decisions within the long-term historical and more immediate 
geopolitical frame to draw out general patterns in the emergence of genocidal 
violence in the Empire. Essentially, this methodological approach takes into account 
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the complex, tumultuous, and heterogeneous process of radicalisation, arguing that 
while certain factors, such as resistance, acted to trigger genocidal violence, the 
emergence of such extreme measures was a result of a multitude of different but 
interrelated dynamics shaped by a highly mutable geopolitical context that, at times, 
seemed to necessitate the use of genocidal violence.  
As stated, the Japanese were not alone in their brutality towards the people 
they occupied. All imperial powers had a proclivity for violence perpetrated against 
those they oppressed. In fact, conquest and the unequal power-dynamics of foreign 
domination was often contingent on it. Most importantly, as revealed by recent 
scholarship, the pursuit of empire carried within it the potential for genocidal 
violence. In Chapter One, I begin the thesis by exploring this potential. I examine the 
relationship between imperialism, violence, and genocide, drawing on the insights 
from the abundant scholarship on this subject. The purpose of the chapter is, first, to 
tease out the factors that proved to be essential pre-conditions for genocidal violence, 
and second, to examine the dynamics involved in the radicalisation process in other 
empires. I centre my discussion on three common elements grouped under the broad 
categories of ideology, resistance, and insecurity and detail the interplay between 
these factors as it drove the radicalisation to genocidal violence in the imperial space. 
The complex and interconnected relationship identified here will form the basis of 
the analysis in ensuing chapters. Furthermore, the conceptual discussion presented 
in this chapter will be vital to the development of an understanding of Japanese 
violence in the 1930s and 1940s as rooted in this specific historical context of 
imperialism.  
Having established the genocidal potential of imperialism and explored the 
ways in which that came to be released in other European empires, I use the insights 
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derived from that analysis to focus my examination of violence in the Japanese 
Empire in subsequent chapters. In Chapter Two, I begin the empirical part of my 
thesis by examining the history of Japan’s engagement with imperialism from the 
mid-nineteenth century to the outbreak of the war with China. This history was an 
important prelude during which significant elements that would prove conducive to 
the radicalisation of violence in later years evolved. Indeed, I argue that the 
insecurities and ideologies that would shape the Japanese leadership’s perceptions of 
the geopolitical situation in the 1930s and 1940s, contributing to decisions for the 
liberation and reconstruction of Asia, were rooted in the longer-term context of 
interactions and engagement with the imperial system. Furthermore, as in other 
empires, violence became a recurring feature in the management of populations, 
especially as a response to resistance in the earlier territories brought under Japanese 
control. These encounters would provide opportunities for developing and honing 
techniques of suppression which in later years would be re-used and, on occasion, 
radicalised to more extreme, genocidal measures. The intent in this chapter then, is to 
take a broad temporal approach exploring the continuities, changes, and disruptions 
in the ideologies and insecurities that shaped Japanese imperialism from the mid-
nineteenth century to the outbreak of war with China in 1937, as well as examining 
the relationship between resistance and violence as it emerged in these earlier 
colonies. Through considering the longer-term roots of genocidal violence in the 
1930s and 1940s, I will be able pinpoint the factors involved in the radicalisation 
process more clearly in the subsequent analysis.  
Following these important conceptual and contextual chapters, I move to the 
analysis of the selected case studies. I take an expansive approach by examining 
instances of extreme violence in different localities and at various stages of the 
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occupation. In order to strike a balance between breadth and depth, I have opted for 
analysis of just four case studies. These are divided between two chapters. In the first, 
Chapter Three, I concentrate on the emergence of extreme violence during the so-
called ‘China Incident’. This chapter is organised into three distinct sections. In the 
first section, I explore the wider context of the war with China and examine the ways 
in which the leadership created battlefield conditions that were conducive to the 
radicalisation of genocidal violence. In the subsequent two sections, I analyse two 
cases studies: the Nanjing Massacre of December 1937 and the so-called Three Alls 
scorched earth policy employed in occupied China from around mid-1941. Aside 
from the presence of genocidal characteristics, these cases have been chosen because 
they represent different stages of the Japanese occupation in China. The massacre at 
Nanjing, for example, took place during a period of initial conquest, during which 
Japan’s aims in this war had not yet crystallised beyond an original punitive focus. 
The Three Alls policy, on the other hand, emerged as a technique of anti-guerrilla 
warfare during attempts to consolidate occupied north China after Japan’s longer-
term ideological strategies for the region had taken shape. Through analysis of these 
two case studies, I will highlight significant similarities and differences, underscoring 
key factors stimulating the radicalisation of violence in these instances.   
In the final chapter, Chapter Four, I follow the same approach to analysing 
extreme violence in Southeast Asia. I begin in the first section by outlining the nature 
of the Japanese occupation of this region and locating the potential for genocide in 
this ‘liberating mission’. In subsequent sections, I analyse two instances of extreme 
violence: the purge of ‘treacherous Chinese elements’ in Singapore and Malaya in 
February 1942 and the escalation of anti-guerrilla warfare in the Philippines from late 
1944 into early 1945. As in the previous chapter, these cases have been selected for 
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their differences as much as for their similarities. In Malaya and Singapore, large-
scale massacres specifically targeting the military-aged male Chinese population 
occurred at the outset of occupation whereas in the Philippines widespread, 
systematic violence escalated during the final months of occupation. Moreover, 
attitudes towards each population were entirely dissimilar at the outset (the Malayan 
Chinese were seen as anti-Japanese, while the Filipinos were viewed as potential 
collaborators) and the military had very different intentions regarding the place of 
these territories within the Empire (British Malaya was to become the core of the 
Empire while the Philippines would one day become, albeit nominally, independent). 
An analysis of the way in which violence manifested in conditions that were almost 
the inverse of each other, will highlight more clearly the similarities of the 
radicalisation process in Southeast Asia. Finally, given the parallels between the way 
in which the massacres at Nanjing and British Malaya, and the escalation of anti-
guerrilla strategy in occupied China and the Philippines, manifested, these four cases 
complement each other and will enhance the understanding of genocidal violence   
in the Empire by revealing continuities and consistencies that will help to explain 



















There was no Nazi atrocity – concentration camps, wholesale maiming 
and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of childhood – 
which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been 
practicing against colored folk in all parts of the world in the name of 
and for the defence of a Superior Race born to rule the world. 













IMPERIALISM, VIOLENCE, AND GENOCIDE 
The pursuit of empire has left a ‘bloody stain’ in its wake. Demographic disasters, 
extreme violence, and unimaginable cruelties have accompanied many encounters 
between the subjugator and the subjugated. Though anti-imperialist critiques were 
as old as imperialism, it was in the aftermath of the Second World War, as great 
strides were being taken in the development of universal human rights and wars of 
decolonisation were being fought, that the violence of imperial projects came under 
greater scrutiny.1 Writing in the context of the fierce struggle for independence in 
Algeria (1954–1962), anti-imperial writers Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and Albert 
Memmi emphasised the inherently violent nature of imperialism.2 In doing so, these 
writers went further than earlier denouncements by making explicit connections 
with the genocide that had so recently shaken Europe. Fanon, for instance, argued 
that ‘Nazism [had] transformed the whole of Europe into a veritable colony’, while 
Césaire asserted that the shocking nature of Hitler’s crime derived from the fact that 
‘he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved 
exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India, and the blacks of Africa.’3 
Speaking out against the French government’s efforts to maintain control in Algeria, 
political philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre even suggested that such efforts ‘oblige[d] men 
to fight despite themselves and die for the Nazi principles that [were] fought against 
ten years ago.’4  
In spite of these early associations, the relationship between empire and 
genocide had been, until the early 2000s, relatively neglected in scholarship which 
                                                             
1 Martin Thomas, ‘Introduction: Mapping Violence onto French Colonial Minds’, in Martin Thomas (ed.), 
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had typically focused on Holocaust-derived frameworks for analysis. As Bart 
Luttikhuis and Dirk Moses have observed, the ‘messy complexities’ of extreme 
violence in the imperial space did not conform to the traditional understanding of 
genocide as ‘a fully developed European bureaucratic apparatus working hand in 
glove with military authorities to destroy a helpless enumerated community with 
ruthless efficiency’.5 Scholars who work on mass violence in European empires have 
played a significant role in challenging this conception as they explored those links 
first observed by the aforementioned writers in greater depth. Many grounded their 
studies in the theoretical insights of the rediscovered work of Raphael Lemkin and 
Hannah Arendt. Unpublished writings from Lemkin’s incomplete manuscript, which 
aimed to cover genocide through time, stimulated interest and added impetus to this 
avenue of enquiry because they confirmed the importance of colonialism to his 
conception of genocide.6 This was an association already implicit in his seminal tome, 
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, where he had explained that genocide involved the 
following two phases: ‘[o]ne, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed 
group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor.’7 Arendt’s 
insights, especially her understanding of the roots of totalitarianism as lying partly 
within the mechanisms of population control and the racial ideologies that emerged 
through nineteenth-century imperialism, also inspired research into the colonial 
                                                             
5 Bart Luttikhuis & A. Dirk Moses, ‘Mass Violence and the end of the Dutch Colonial Empire in 
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dynamics of genocide.8  
As noted in the introduction, the analytical frameworks and conceptual 
observations that have emerged from this research, aside from enhancing the 
understanding of genocide in general, are particularly useful to this study because 
they embrace the complexities, ambiguities, and dynamic nature of radicalisation 
within imperial settings. Furthermore, much of this research has contextualised 
discussion of individual cases within a broader historical frame, highlighting 
important links between imperialism and genocidal violence. Through analysis of 
cases that cover diverse geographic locations and a range of different imperial 
contexts, this research has shown that all imperial powers had the potential for 
outbursts of extreme violence towards the populations they oppressed. However, 
contrary to Philip Spencer’s supposition – that this ‘anti-imperial turn’ scholarship 
attempts to provide a ‘catch-all’ explanation for genocide, this literature has had to 
grapple with the fact that, while all empires had the potential for extreme violence, 
very rarely did the physical destruction of groups become an option in the imperial 
space.9 Accordingly, scholars like Moses and Dominik Schaller, in seeking to explain 
why violence did radicalise in their respective areas of interest, have addressed 
similar questions to those that form the basis of the analysis of Japanese violence in 
this thesis.10 Thus, I look to this research to develop a more general understanding of 
                                                             
8 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951; 3rd edn, London, 1967), 123–226; for detailed 
articles on Arendt and genocide see Richard H. King & Dan Stone (eds.), Hannah Arendt and the Uses of 
History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide (2007; pbk edn, New York & Oxford, 2008). Much of this 
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Research (JGR), 15(3) (2013), 339–62 for a review of this literature.   
9 Philip Spencer, ‘Imperialism, Anti-imperialism and the Problem of Genocide, Past and Present’, History, 
98(332), (2013), 606–22. 
10 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History’, in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Genocide 
and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History (2004; pbk edn, 
New York & Oxford, 2007), 3–48; Dominik J. Schaller, ‘Genocide and Mass Violence in the “Heart of 
Darkness”: Africa in the Colonial Period’, in Donald Bloxham & A. Dirk Moses (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Genocide Studies (2010; pbk edn, Oxford, 2013), 345–64;  
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the dynamics at work in producing genocidal violence within the context of 
imperialism.  
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to draw on the theoretical insights 
of this research in order to dissect the relationship between imperialism, violence, 
and genocide. By developing an understanding of the process of radicalisation as it 
emerged in other empires, I build a foundation on which to base my analysis of 
Japanese violence. Furthermore, in establishing this theoretical base, I can situate the 
Japanese case within its broader historical frame showing, in subsequent chapters, 
how the backdrop of imperialism would shape the Japanese leadership’s pursuit of 
empire, and ultimately, the embrace of more radical forms of violence in later years. I 
begin, then, by exploring the genocidal potential of imperialism, which is used as an 
umbrella term in this thesis to describe the diverse forms of domination extended 
over foreign lands, peoples, or resources in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries. In particular, I analyse the imperial space as inherently violent 
(concentrating on physical, rather than structural or cultural violence), as a ‘space of 
exception’, and as a space founded on racist, negative constructions of native peoples. 
In this section, I show how violence was rationalised, accepted, and encouraged as a 
functional and necessary evil.  
After briefly explaining how there were factors that could militate against 
genocide within imperialism, I then move to an exploration of how the potential for 
genocide came to be unleashed. First, I identify the important role of ideological 
factors in facilitating the embrace of more extreme measures. While ideas rarely 
drove or triggered genocidal actions, they contributed to a context and a mind-set 
that was conducive to them and without which, genocidal violence would have been 
inconceivable. Second, I examine the crucial role of resistance as a catalyst for 
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genocidal responses. I concentrate here on how opposition could cause native 
peoples to lose their putative right to exist in the imperial space and how it 
radicalised attitudes as the oppressors came to desire retribution for attacks on their 
lives and property. I also consider the nature of resistance in the imperial space as an 
asymmetric conflict characterised by guerrilla tactics which had implications in terms 
of driving a degeneration of conduct in anti-guerrilla efforts. I highlight, however, 
that while resistance was the most consistent factor in producing radicalising 
violence in the imperial space, not all outbreaks of opposition resulted in genocidal 
practices. Thus, in the final section of this chapter, I explore the role of insecurities in 
exacerbating the threat of resistance and further fuelling the radicalisation process. I 
explain how resistance in the imperial space could, at times, become a struggle for 
survival and show how the geopolitical context of competition and rivalry 
embedded in the imperial system could raise the stakes and intensify efforts to 
decisively suppress opposition.   
THE POTENTIAL FOR GENOCIDE IN THE IMPERIAL SPACE 
To state that violence was intrinsic to imperialism is now axiomatic. Scholars who 
work on empire have exposed the diversity of ways in which forms of physical, 
structural, and cultural violence permeated at all levels of the imperial project.11 
These studies have reinforced the early insights of Fanon who pointed out that, from 
the first, encounters between the coloniser and the colonised were ‘marked by 
violence’.12  To be sure, sequestering and controlling foreign land, raw materials, 
markets, and labour – objectives at the heart of much of the ‘new imperialism’ of the 
nineteenth century – was achieved primarily through the use of force since would-be 
                                                             
11 Samuel Kalman, ‘Introduction: Colonial Violence’, Historical Reflections, 36(2) (2010), 1–6. 
12 Fanon, Wretched, 28. 
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colonies were not ‘empty spaces’.13 The realisation of imperial objectives hinged, as 
Sven Lindqvist observed, on violent conquest as the ultimate expression of European 
supremacy and power. 14  Short but ferocious frontier wars characterised the 
expansion of empire as the oppressors, bent on securing dominance over foreign 
resources, reacted to the natural inclination of local inhabitants to resist 
encroachments on their lands, freedoms, and livelihoods. Though usually 
numerically superior and, in some cases, capable of organising stiff resistance against 
invading forces, the drastic disparity in military, economic, and political strength 
saw native populations around the world succumb to imperialism in these early 
encounters. 15  The violence of the imperial space, however, rarely ended with 
triumphant conquest.   
The success of imperial projects lay in the complete subservience of native 
populations to the demands of an invariably exploitative and oppressive system. As 
this was a system imposed through force, violence would become a vital component 
in the continual reinforcement of its attendant unequal subjugator–subjugated 
relationship.16 Capital and corporal punishments were institutionalised as principal 
mechanisms of population control and a constant affirmation of the supremacy of 
imperial power. In this way, violence became salutary; it was a necessary and 
functional evil that brought stability, security, and longevity to the project.17 In effect, 
the tools of conquest became the tools of management in the imperial space. 
                                                             
13 Frederick Cooper & Ann Laura Stoler, ‘Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research 
Agenda’, in Frederick Cooper & Ann Laura Stoler (eds.), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a 
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15 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge, 2005), 74.  
16 Jock McCulloch, ‘Empire and Violence, 1900–1930’, in Philippa Levine (ed.), Gender and Empire (2004; 
pbk edn, Oxford, 2007), 220. 
17 Ibid; Thomas, ‘Introduction’, xxii. 
33 
 
The use of physical violence as a means of ensuring obedience and 
cooperation was but a microcosm of the larger power struggle at work within 
imperialism. Indeed, the oppressors and the oppressed inhabited a space of 
perpetual, though highly disproportional, struggle as both sought to (re)assert their 
dominance.18 With violence so deeply embedded in the imperial apparatus, it is of 
little surprise that this struggle entailed viciousness and brutality on both sides. 
While the oppressors fought to maintain their power through recourse to ruthless 
techniques, the oppressed sought to overthrow foreign domination and could be 
equally ferocious in their efforts. As Fanon and Memmi pointed out, since violence 
was central to imperial power, the colonised came to accept the view that 
imperialism could only be supplanted with even greater violence.19 Ever fearful of 
the reprisals that might accompany eruptions of local unrest, oppressors, Michael 
Taussig noted, often acted first utilising violence to terrorise the oppressed into 
docility and, in doing so, further reinforced a two-way ‘culture of terror’ in the 
imperial space. 20  Pre-emptive acts could be rationalised as self-defence against 
perceived or actual threats by the subjugated. Violence then, was not only deemed 
functional, assisting in the management of native peoples, but it was also understood 
to be essential to the continued existence of the imperial project. In short, violence 
accompanied the establishment, management, and preservation of imperial projects, 
making the imperial space a fundamentally violent space.   
SPACES OF EXCEPTION 
However, the exploitation and violence of imperialism was in conflict with the ideals 
and humanitarian principles of post-enlightenment Western civilisation. Rights that 
                                                             
18 Raymond Evans, ‘“Crime without a Name”: Colonialism and the case for “Indigenocide”’, in Moses, 
Empire, 140. 
19 Fanon, Wretched, 48; Memmi, Colonizer, 151. 
20 Michael Taussig, ‘Culture of Terror – Space of Death: Roger Casement’s Putumayo Report and the 
Explanation of Torture’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 26(3) (1984), 467–97.  
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were deemed universal, self-evident truths by the nineteenth century were not 
extended to native populations.21  To do so would have made the cruelties and 
brutalities of imperialism unthinkable. The geographic separation between the 
metropolis and the imperial space became crucial to easing inherent tensions 
between the rights, liberties, and moralities that were guaranteed in the metropole 
and the realities of the treatment of native populations in the colonies. Lines were 
drawn, allowing for practices that were in contravention of basic rights and liberties 
in one space, while prohibiting them in the other.22 For instance, while European 
powers worked to ‘humanise’ warfare through prohibiting certain tactics, such as the 
use of poison gas or dum-dum bullets, there was little compunction about using 
these ‘inhumane’ practices in a colonial context. 23  Essentially, imperial projects 
became de facto ‘spaces of exception’ where the moral and legal constraints of the 
metropolis were suspended and where there was a greater potential for more 
‘exceptional’ and abhorrent behaviours.24   
In these spaces, native populations were excluded from the ‘universe of moral 
obligation’. 25  They were stripped of their humanity and, Abdelmajid Hannoum 
explained, relegated to ‘a space of non-civilisation and of no right and no freedom.’26 
In other words, normal checks on violence were absent in a space where force, 
intimidation, and terror were acceptable, if not principal, means of population 
control. This also meant that institutions which, in the metropolis, would normally 
uphold basic rights and deter violent acts, such as courts, operated instead in the 
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reinforcement of exploitation and violence. As Jock McCulloch explained, in the rare 
instances in which oppressors were held accountable for their violence, the judicial 
process was ‘stage-managed’, jurors and judges were incompetent, the testimony of 
native people was often ignored, and doctors might be brought in to ‘prove’ that 
their deaths were not the result of multiple or excessive beatings but a consequence 
of their ‘paper thin skull’ or a ‘fragile spleen’ which ruptured at the slightest blow.27 
In imperial projects then, law became ‘an instrument of violence’ operating to 
preserve inequality and oppression.28  What is more, the failure of justice in the 
imperial space contributed to the growing problem of excessive, sport-like atrocities 
because, as Elizabeth Kolsky discerned of perpetrators in British India, ‘they knew 
they could get away with it.’ 29  Indeed, Oxford University Professor, Herman 
Merivale, in a series of lectures delivered between 1839 and 1841, condemned the 
widespread destruction of native populations which he blamed on ‘the uncontrolled 
violence of individuals and colonial authorities, followed by tardy attempts on the 
part of governments to repair the acknowledged crime.’ 30  In effect, as Achille 
Mbembe summarised in his discussion of ‘necropolitics’ (an inversion of Michel 
Foucault’s ‘biopolitics’ which he defined as the ‘subjugation of life to the power of 
death’), colonies were ‘the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees 
of judicial order can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of 
exception is deemed to operate in the service of “civilization.”’31  
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However, the construction of spaces of exception which stripped peoples of their 
rights and allowed for otherwise unacceptable behaviours could not have been 
possible without, as Arendt noted, drawing on discourses about ‘race’ and 
‘civilisation’. 32  Nineteenth-century race-thinking, as a corollary to imperialism, 
provided an abundant and wide-ranging set of ideas which could be mobilised in the 
justification of foreign domination and imperial violence. Central to such 
justifications were, what Memmi described as, ‘mythical portraits of the colonized’. 
These ‘mythical portraits’ were fluid and usually contradictory since they were 
constantly adapted and reconceptualised according to the needs of the imperial 
project. In one breath, native populations could be child-like and helpless, in need of 
guidance and civilisation; in another they could be brutes or savages, incapable of 
understanding anything but force.33 What was consistent, however, was that native 
populations were described in diverse, but consistently negative, racist ways which, 
if not completely dehumanising them, certainly placed them, as Norbert Finzsch has 
suggested, on the ‘very bottom rung of humanity’. 34  Referred to as ‘savage’, 
‘barbaric’, ‘animal-like’, and ‘uncivilised’; native populations were discursively 
constructed as the very antithesis of their supposedly civilised oppressors.35  
Convinced of their superiority as the pinnacle of the current stage of human 
evolution, colonisers tapped into metanarratives of progress and modernity to justify 
their dominion over putatively backwards, inferior peoples deemed incapable of self-
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government and in need of external guidance.36 For instance, ardent supporters of 
empire in the United States, such as Albert Beveridge, assured those opposed to 
annexation of the Philippines following victory over Spain in the Spanish-American 
War of 1898 that, ‘[t]he rule of liberty … applies only to those capable of self-
government.’37 In stripping native populations of basic human rights, imperialists 
could rationalise foreign domination as a benign, indeed benevolent, endeavour that 
would bring the ‘blessings’ of civilisation to lesser peoples. The use of violence in 
such efforts was permitted since it assisted in the ‘greater good’ of the ‘civilising 
mission’.38  As such, the civilisation–barbarism dichotomy, well-established in the 
imperial space, allowed for the celebration of violence as representing progress in the 
service of the so-called ‘white man’s burden’. Such was exemplified by the historical 
writer Edgar Sanderson who described the British victory in the ‘half-hour’ battle of 
Atbara against Sudanese rebels in 1898 as ‘a grand feat of arms; a hurricane of war 
which had blown a great Dervish army away in annihilation; a deadly blow dealt at 
barbarism; a triumph gained for humanity and civilisation.’39   
Through characterising native populations as inhabiting the lowest place on a 
presupposed, biologically-determined, and thus, immutable hierarchy of races, 
violence was more directly legitimised as essential, warranted even, in the face of 
peoples who, divested of their humanity, were believed to be incapable of 
understanding anything but force. For instance, in his famous treatise on colonial 
warfare, Small Wars, first published in 1896, British Colonel Charles Callwell advised 
that ‘uncivilized races attribute leniency to timidity’ and warned that ‘savages … 
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must be thoroughly brought to book and cowed or they will rise again.’ 40 
Responsibility for imperial violence was placed squarely on the native populations 
who, in their propensity to resist the spread of civilisation, and because of their 
inherent and inexorable inferiority, forced their oppressors to resort to barbaric 
methods. In fact, the problem of excessive or sport-like imperial violence, 
condemned by anti-imperialists and damaging to the prestige of imperial projects, 
could also be excused on account of colonists ‘going native’.41 As Taussig has pointed 
out, the ‘wild’ and ‘savage’ attributes of native populations were often seen as a 
reflection of the spaces in which they inhabited. 42  More importantly, such 
characteristics were believed to be infectious and violence by colonists was a 
manifestation of their having been consumed by the savagery and barbarism of the 
imperial space.43 As Roxanne Doty remarked, the racialisation of the imperial space 
allowed oppressors to continue to portray themselves as superior, civilised peoples 
while simultaneously engaging in ruthless, cruel practices which were in conflict 
with the very principles and rights of the metropolis.44   
Imperialism, then, was intrinsically violent. Oppressors relied on force, 
exploitation, terror, and intimidation for the continued existence and success of their 
projects. The racialization of the imperial space justified the use of violence in the 
preservation of the unequal subjugator-subjugated relationship which was 
fundamental to the power dynamics of foreign domination. Geographically, as well 
as morally and legally, separated from the metropolis, normal constraints were not in 
place and behaviour was less restricted, making the imperial space one of exception 
and, most importantly, of possibility for the embrace of more extreme, genocidal 
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violence. Whilst not inherently genocidal, there was, nevertheless, an underlying 
potential for group destruction within imperialism.    
UNLEASHING THE GENOCIDAL POTENTIAL OF IMPERIALISM 
Despite the potential for genocide within the imperial space, such extremes were 
uncommon. As Sartre reflected, a paradox of the imperial system was that, while 
conducive to violence as fundamental to its establishment and maintenance, there 
were constraints on genocide since the ‘liquidation’ of local populations was ‘not 
possible without at the same time eliminating the colonial economy and the colonial 
system.’45 Native peoples, as a source of cheap labour, vast markets, and in some 
cases revenue (through taxation), were important to the capitalist foundations which, 
though manifesting in diverse forms of rule, was an important driving force for 
nineteenth-century imperialism.46 While competition over land and resources in the 
imperial space might intensify and allow the embrace of genocidal violence as a 
means of triumphing in this struggle, many recognised that extermination policies 
could also have dire economic consequences.47  
 Furthermore, genocidal violence could undermine the prestige of imperial 
projects and have serious political repercussions in the metropolis. Vocal criticism of 
British ‘reprisals, devastation, and extermination’ during the Second Boer War (1899–
1902), for example, shifted public opinion against the war and contributed to the 
decisive defeat of the Conservative Party in 1906.48 Extreme violence might also be 
used by anti-imperialists to challenge the legitimacy of foreign domination as was 
the case in America where the extremes of anti-guerrilla efforts during the 
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Philippine-American War (1899–1902) – which featured the exceptional and 
notorious case of General Jacob Smith ordering everyone over the age of ten killed on 
Samar Island following attacks on US soldiers in September 1901 – were used to 
bolster arguments that imperialism was against American ideals.49 Even worse was 
international criticism which could be disastrous to the success of imperial projects.50 
King Leopold II had been forced, under international pressure, to relinquish the 
Congo Free State as his private possession after the cruelties and barbarities of his 
rule were publicised through the writings of Joseph Conrad, British diplomat Roger 
Casement, and George Washington Williams, a veteran of the American Civil War.51 
Indeed, violent extremes could be used as justification for divesting imperial powers 
of their colonial possessions. After the First World War, for instance, the British used 
the German extermination campaign during the Herero Wars (1904–8) to validate the 
institution of British rule and to ‘scuttle any attempt by Germany to retain their 
control over Namibia.’ 52  There could be serious domestic and international 
repercussions associated with the use of genocidal violence in the imperial space 
which generally militated against adopting such extreme measures. However, as 
recent scholarship has shown, intentionally group-destructive violence, though 
infrequent, was unleashed in some imperial projects. When this occurred, it usually 
involved a complex process of radicalisation which saw the violence of the imperial 
space intensify as the destruction of native populations became an acceptable and, 
for some, attractive prospect. In the subsequent analysis, I examine what the current 
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literature suggests are three central, interconnected factors which, aside from the 
unique contexts of each case, influenced this radicalisation process.     
LAYING FOUNDATIONS: IMPERIAL IDEOLOGIES AND THE EMBRACE OF 
GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE 
Ideological factors are typically seen to lie at the root of genocide. In fact, Ben 
Kiernan has argued that, while all genocides had their own unique historical contexts, 
there were often shared ideological features in the perpetrator mentality.53 The work 
of comparative scholars, like Kiernan, in addition to Eric Weitz and Jacques Sémelin, 
have identified the importance of ideologies in classifying difference, constructing 
group identities, mobilising support for genocidal enterprises, and most importantly, 
in legitimising genocide. 54  In short, ideological factors are crucial to laying the 
foundations for an embrace of genocidal violence. Within the imperial space, as 
already touched on, ideas about ‘race’ and ‘civilisation’ permitted the 
dehumanisation and moral exclusion necessary to justifying foreign domination. 
Furthermore, the rationalising ideologies of imperialism allowed for and encouraged 
violence against peoples perceived to be inhuman and uncivilised. While these 
factors would also be crucial to the acceptance of more extreme measures, there were 
some specific ideological aspects of imperialism that further facilitated the embrace 
of genocide.  
‘US AND THEM’ 
Genocide, as a type of violence that targets individuals on the basis of their 
(perceived) group membership, is conditioned by a process of ‘othering’ that 
excludes, differentiates, and ultimately, makes warranting the use of exterminatory 
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violence. 55  As scholars, such as Aristotle Kallis, have shown, perceptions of 
‘otherness’ are central to the embrace of genocidal violence because, when imbued 
with fears, hatreds, and prejudices, the excluded ‘other’ can come to be seen as 
necessitating elimination.56 This process also lends itself to group violence because it 
divests peoples of their individuality and imposes homogenous, usually negative, 
group identities which, as might be expected, can lead to the targeting of whole 
groups. For example, in his reflections on the role of nationalism in constructions of 
the ‘other’, Ryszard Kapuśiński observed that ‘for the nationalist the person of the 
Other has just one single feature – national affiliation. It does not matter if someone is 
young or old, clever or stupid, good or bad – the only thing that counts is whether he 
or she is Armenian or Turkish, British or Irish, Moroccan or Algerian.’57 This insight 
is applicable to the imperial space where individuals, as Memmi wrote, ‘drown in an 
anonymous collectivity’, referred to as ‘they’ and ‘them’ rather than ‘he’ or ‘she’.58 
Aside from the imposition of homogenising group identities, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
binary that typically resulted from the construction of the ‘other’ was also more 
clearly demarcated in the imperial space where differences were drawn along racial 
lines. The process of ‘othering’ in the imperial space, then, established a rigid ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ mentality, centred on irreconcilable differences, which established some 
of the necessary preconditions for extreme, group-destructive violence.  
‘VANISHING RACES’ 
A further facilitating factor in the embrace of genocidal violence in the imperial space 
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was the trope of ‘vanishing races’ in nineteenth-century discourses.59 The drastic 
demographic declines of native populations throughout the world did not escape 
attention. Neither did their apparent connection to imperialism. For instance, the 
British politician John Arthur Roebuck, in his 1849 treatise, The Colonies of England, 
acknowledged that many Europeans passed over the fact that ‘when the European 
comes into contact with any other type of man, that other type disappears.’60 While 
some, like Merivale, recognised the active role of imperialists in bringing about these 
declines, for the most part, the destruction of native populations was described as a 
natural consequence of encounters with progress and civilisation.61 The ethnologist, 
James Cowles Prichard, for example, accepted that the arrival of Europeans was the 
‘harbinger of extermination to the native tribes’ and, reflecting his views on the 
inevitability of this, called upon his peers to begin recording the cultures of these 
peoples before they disappeared. 62  In this way, genocide could be regarded, as 
Lindqvist noted, as an ‘inevitable by-product of progress.’63 Indeed, Reverend John 
George Wood, in his survey, Uncivilised Races of Men in All Countries of the World, was 
convinced of the blamelessness of the white races for, he argued, ‘the inferior must 
always make way for the superior.’ As such, extinction ‘ought not to be attributed to 
the white man, who comes to take the place which the savage has practically 
vacated.’64 Aside from removing any sense of responsibility for the destruction of 
peoples who were depicted as victims of the passive forces of progress and evolution, 
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such ideas could, as Benjamin Madley pointed out, be mobilised in support of 
genocidal methods which would simply accelerate a predetermined outcome.65 In 
justifying his orders for the extermination of the Herero in 1904, for example, General 
Lothar von Trotha advised that ‘at the outset we cannot do without the natives. But 
they finally have to melt away. Where the climate allows the white man to work, 
philanthropic views cannot banish Darwin’s law of “Survival of the Fittest”.’66  
‘SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST’ 
As this example suggests, this ‘vanishing races’ rhetoric was given added legitimacy 
with the emergence of evolutionary theories in the mid-nineteenth century. Most 
famously articulated by Charles Darwin, ideas about natural selection, or to use 
Herbert Spencer’s popularised phrase, ‘survival of the fittest’, reinforced the belief 
that the extinction of native populations was part of a natural process. Extinction, 
according to Darwin, went ‘hand in hand’ with natural selection as ‘parent-forms’ of 
a species gave way to their improved offspring.67 In a later work, Descent of Man, 
Darwin further explained the implications of his theory for human interaction when 
he wrote that ‘extinction follows chiefly from the competition of tribe with tribe, and 
race with race … When civilised nations come into contact with barbarians the 
struggle is short, except where a deadly climate gives its aid to the native race.’68 
These ideas, which circulated widely and informed various theories at this time, 
made the extermination of native populations less of a concern. As Lindqvist bluntly 
put it, ‘after Darwin, it became acceptable to shrug your shoulders to genocide.’69 
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Furthermore, characterising this as a law of nature, ‘survival of the fittest’ gave 
legitimacy to the belief that it was natural, indeed, right that those with more power 
displaced others.70 James Barnard, Vice-President of the Royal Society of Tasmania, 
speaking in 1890 of the extinction of the Tasmanian aborigines, for instance, declared 
that: ‘[i]t has become an axiom that, following the law of evolution and survival of 
the fittest, the inferior races of mankind must give place to the highest type of man’.71 
As implied, extreme violence could be justified since it was not only a predestined 
and natural outcome, but was in the service of the betterment of the species. Writing 
on the disappearance of the ‘savage’ before civilisation as ‘nature’s method’, Henry 
Keylock Rusden, offered the following rationalisation for extermination of aboriginal 
peoples in Australia in 1876: 
survival of the fittest means that might – wisely used – is right. And thus we invoke 
and remorselessly fulfil the inexorable law of natural selection (or of demand and 
supply), when exterminating the inferior Australian and Maori races … The world is 
better for it; and would be incalculably better still, were we loyally to accept the 
lesson thus taught by nature, and consistently apply the same principle to our 
conventional practice.72  
In effect, evolutionary theories could be mobilised in support of a kind of salutary 
genocide within the imperial space. Assured of their superiority over ‘primitive’ 
peoples, imperialists’ perceptions of extermination as a natural element of human 
progress, made genocidal violence more acceptable and eased the leap to such 
extreme measures.  
Thus, in addition to the dehumanisation, moral exclusion, and negative 
construction of native populations as inferior, uncivilised savages, the us and them 
dichotomy, the ideas about the inevitability and naturalness of the extinction of 
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native populations, and the putative right of ‘superior races’ to supplant others in the 
evolutionary struggle for survival, facilitated genocidal violence as morally 
acceptable. Nevertheless, as a number of scholars have pointed out, while ideological 
factors created contexts conducive to the embrace of more extreme measures, 
ideology rarely, if ever, triggered the radicalisation process.73 More often, the catalyst 
for an escalation of violence in the imperial space proved to be outbursts of native 
resistance which, enabled by the aforementioned ideological factors, could result in 
vicious and extreme responses from oppressors.  
TRIGGERING THE RADICALISATION PROCESS: NATIVE RESISTANCE 
AND EXTREME RESPONSES  
The role of uprisings and rebellions in stimulating the drive towards the physical 
destruction of native populations was originally discerned by Lemkin during 
research for his unfinished manuscript.74 Sartre’s observations regarding extreme 
conduct in wars for independence in Algeria and Vietnam also saw connections 
between resistance and genocidal violence, which he argued, was employed as a 
military strategy when oppressors faced opposition to their objectives.75 More recent 
scholarship has confirmed such assertions. Scholars working on the Herero genocide, 
like Schaller, pointed out that it had been a massive revolt by the Herero that had 
triggered the ‘bloody violence’ of the colonists.76 Others working on genocide in 
Australia, such as Moses, have similarly shown that the colonial experience was 
punctuated by ‘genocidal moments’ triggered by attacks and uprisings from the 
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aboriginal peoples. 77  While resistance often resulted in violent responses as an 
inherent part of maintaining imperialism, there are a number of ways in which it 
could trigger the radicalisation of that violence leading to genocidal responses.  
LOSING THE RIGHT TO EXIST  
Resistance eased the leap to more extreme violence because it could obviate some of 
the practical constraints on such measures. Since native populations were stripped of 
their rights as inferior, if not inhuman, beings, their continued right to exist in the 
imperial space after conquest typically hinged on their perceived utility or 
willingness to acquiesce to the demands of imperialism. As Weitz has summarised, 
nineteenth-century race-thinking, given added legitimacy through claims to a 
scientific basis, explained the existence of inferior races in terms that equated their 
existence to serving those deemed superior.78 For instance, describing German views 
of the Herero in Southwest Africa, Missionary Elger observed that ‘the settler holds 
that the native has a right to exist only in so far as he is useful to the white man.’79 
Such was confirmed by Paul Rohrbach, German Settlement Commissioner, who 
wrote in 1907 that ‘for a people, as for an individual, an existence appears to be 
justified in the degree that it is useful for general development.’80 The damage caused 
by native resistance and the costs involved in suppressing it called into question the 
perceived utility or value of the continued existence of unruly populations in the 
imperial space. More importantly, it added to the conviction that these were 
incurably savage peoples and legitimised their removal as obstructions, obstacles, 
and nuisances. For example, unrelenting attacks by Native American tribes in 
California in the 1850s led Governor John Bigler to the conclusion that ‘Whites and 
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Indians cannot live in close proximity in peace’ and resulted in an ominous request 
to the army for their removal.81 Similarly, Moses noted that, in Australia, persistent 
native resistance to, and the commensurate failure of, civilising projects was a crucial 
factor in the escalation of violence for it changed optimism that ‘savages’ could be 
civilised into confirmation that they were ‘irredeemably inferior, indeed vermin that 
should be exterminated.’82 In effect, through resistance, native peoples came to be 
perceived as more trouble than their worth, and thus, could lose their right to exist in 
the imperial space. Social psychologists, Daniel Bar-Tal and Philip Hammack, have 
observed a similar phenomenon, called delegitimisation, during intergroup conflicts. 
Delegitimisation is described as a form of social categorisation which, like moral 
exclusion and dehumanisation, makes certain groups ‘deserving of maltreatment’ as 
they come to be viewed as having violated basic human norms or values.83 Such was 
evident in the imperial space where native populations were delegitimised as a result 
of their resistance. For example, after the massive Herero revolt in 1904, von Trotha 
declared that, having ‘murdered and stolen [and] … cut off the ears, noses and other 
body-parts of wounded soldiers’, the Herero were ‘no longer German subjects’ and 
were encouraged to leave the country for ‘within the German borders every Herero, 
with or without a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot.’84 In short, resistance 
made native populations more vulnerable to, if not warranting of, genocidal violence 
in the imperial space.   
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RETRIBUTION AND RETALIATION 
A further element in triggering genocidal violence lay in the radicalisation of 
attitudes and the desire for retribution that so often accompanied the shock of native 
resistance. As mentioned, the imperial space was one in which physical violence was 
already a principal component of  efforts to pre-empt, deter, and suppress opposition 
from local populations. Since the main object of these campaigns, as explained by 
Callwell, was to demonstrate the might of the imperial power and to punish those 
who had taken up arms, exemplary and collective measures became well-established 
tactics.85 An American soldier documented such techniques as used in the course of 
suppression of Filipino resistance: 
We make everyone get into his house by seven p.m., and we only tell a man once. If 
he refuses we shoot him. We killed over 300 natives the first night. They tried to set 
the town on fire. If they fire a shot from a house we burn the house down and every 
house near it, and shoot the natives, so they are pretty quiet in town now.86  
While Callwell had stressed that there was a ‘limit to the amount of licence in 
destruction which [was] expedient’, punitive campaigns regularly devolved into 
extreme, retributive violence.87  
Indeed, since uprisings usually involved attacks on colonists and their 
families, they often exacerbated the hatreds and fears attendant to the racialized 
imperial space which, in turn, fuelled vicious reprisals. Frederick Selous, a well-
known British explorer who participated in the First Matabele War in Zimbabwe in 
1893, for example, explained that the murder of women and children during the first 
days of the uprising ‘had excited a desire for vengeance, which could only be 
satisfied by a personal and active participation in the killing of the murderers.’ 
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Aware of anti-imperial critiques in Britain, Selous further explained that such 
sentiments: 
can only be understood by those Europeans who have lived through a native rising, 
in which women and children of their race have been barbarously murdered by 
savages; by beings whom, in their hearts, they despise; as rightly or wrongly they 
consider that they belong to a lower type of human family than themselves … the 
murder of white women and children, by natives, seems to be to the colonist not 
merely a crime, but a sacrilege, and calls forth all the ferocity of the more civilised 
race.88    
As this example reveals, the civilisation-barbarism dialectic that characterised the 
imperial space further intensified desires for retribution and, driven by such ideas, 
punitive violence could get out of hand as it became not simply enough to suppress 
rebellion, but to make the natives pay ten-fold for their insolence in attacking their 
‘superiors’. According to Lord Edmund Ironside, a British military officer who 
witnessed the atrocities against the Herero while spying on German forces in 
Southwest Africa during 1904, German rage at the death of white families ‘would be 
satisfied with nothing less than the annihilation of all coloured men.’89 During the 
first weeks of rebellion in February, Elger confirmed that: ‘the Germans are 
consumed with inexpiable hatred and a terrible thirst for revenge … All you hear 
these days is “make a clean sweep, hang them, shoot them to the last man, give no 
quarter”’. 90  Alexander Hinton’s observation that revenge during the Cambodian 
genocide (1975–78) became ‘a head for an eye’, then, holds true for the imperial 
context as disproportional, collective punishments were meted out.91  
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Aside from stimulating extreme retributive violence among those at a local 
level, anti-colonial revolts could also radicalise the attitudes of more moderate 
elements in the metropoles further diminishing constraints on genocide. Continued 
resistance to the expansion of the American frontier had radicalised the attitude of 
President Thomas Jefferson, who commented of the tribes that stood in their way 
that, ‘nothing is more desireable than total suppression of their savage insolence and 
cruelties’ and that their ‘ferocious barbarities justified extermination’.92 As intimated, 
the nature of native resistance was an important contributing factor in triggering the 
radicalisation of attitudes and the desires for retribution in the imperial space.  
FIGHTING SAVAGES 
 In their efforts to resist imperialism, native populations had limited chance of 
victory using conventional tactics due to the significant disparity of military power 
between them and their oppressors. As such, rebellions often took the form of 
asymmetric conflicts during which unconventional, guerrilla tactics were employed. 
Typically avoiding direct engagements, rebels would remain mobile staging hit-and-
run attacks while then disappearing among civilians and relying on local 
communities for shelter and supplies. Studies of guerrilla warfare have shown that 
such tactics proved exceptionally difficult to combat using conventional battle 
tactics.93 Callwell explained that suppression of resistance which involved guerrilla 
tactics was ‘troublesome’ bringing about ‘protracted, toilsome warfare’ and was 
‘always most trying to the troops.’94 As Madley noted, guerrilla-style tactics also ‘set 
the stage’ for genocidal violence since irregular warfare was likened to criminal 
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behaviours and prevented the swift suppression of resistance.95 What is more, the 
nature of this type of warfare served to reinforce the belief in native peoples as 
uncivilised savages, reduced moral constraints, and as such, further facilitated the 
embrace of extreme measures. In suppressing the Herero, for instance, one German 
soldier had recommended poisoning the water wells since ‘we are not fighting 
against an enemy respecting the rules of fairness but savages.’96  
As a consequence, conflicts in the imperial space, as Schaller observed, often 
saw a degeneration of normal conduct since conventional battle tactics were often 
useless in the face of an enemy that could neither be pinned down nor easily 
identified.97 Frustrated and suffering humiliation at the continued failure to suppress 
guerrilla resistance, regular armies resorted to lashing out at civilian populations. 
Indeed, as scholars have shown, guerrilla warfare lent itself to attacks on civilian 
populations as the primary support bases of the rebels. 98 In December 1900, for 
instance, General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the Filipino 
population warning that non-combatants would be punished if they should offer 
support for the guerrillas. 99  Under such circumstances boundaries between 
combatants and non-combatants were blurred, taboos were broken, and methods of 
suppression became increasingly systematic and indiscriminate as civilian lives and 
livelihoods became military targets. Essentially, the very nature of native resistance 
as involving guerrilla warfare could ease the leap to genocidal measures and trigger 
the radicalisation process as oppressors resorted to extremes in suppressing it.  
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Thus, there were a number of ways in which resistance could trigger the 
radicalisation of violence in the imperial space. However, as Mark Levene has 
pointed out, while the ‘bitter pill of resistance’ could serve to ignite the radicalisation 
process, the frequency of revolts and rebellions in comparison to the infrequency of 
genocidal violence is suggestive of a more complex relationship.100 Indeed, while 
resistance could spark extreme responses, there was something further at work in 
bridging the moral gulf between legitimate suppression of resistance and genocidal 
actions, actions which might also incite ire and condemnation in the metropolis and 
among other imperial powers.  
US AND THEM BECOMES US OR THEM: INSECURITIES AND THE 
ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE   
Genocide is not typically the preserve of the strong. The role of threat, loss, paranoia, 
trauma, fear, essentially, the role of insecurities as pre-conditions for extreme 
violence, has become a pillar of genocide scholarship. Comparative studies, like 
those of Manus Midlarsky and Sémelin, have shown how security imperatives can 
enable the leap to genocide as perpetrators embrace extreme methods to mitigate 
perceived threats or compensate for losses. 101  Fears and paranoias fuel hatreds, 
prejudices, and exacerbate difference, facilitating the transition of particular ‘out-
groups’ into ‘dangerous others’ that must be eliminated.102 Hannoum has suggested 
that there has been ‘no massacre or genocide – small or large, organised or 
spontaneous – that was not preceded by a discourse in which the other is created as a 
dangerous enemy and a threat to “our” own existence.’103 Indeed, when threats and 
fears come to be viewed as existential in nature, genocide can become an attractive 
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solution. In their comparison of the mentalities behind the Holocaust and the 
potential use of nuclear weapons, for example, psychologists, Robert Jay Lifton and 
Eric Markusen, explained that fears and insecurities could rationalise genocide as 
necessary for guaranteeing survival in the face of a perceived existential threat.104 In 
other words, existential insecurities support the emergence of a ‘destroy them to save 
us’ mentality.105 Accordingly, genocidal violence is most often located in periods of 
instability and uncertainty, as in wars when underlying insecurities are 
exacerbated.106 In the imperial space, it was in those moments when the project 
became insecure and its existence appeared to be threatened that the radicalisation 
process, usually triggered by resistance which generated conflict and instability, 
escalated to genocidal violence. In fact, there are certain aspects of imperialism that 
transformed the challenge of native resistance into an existential threat, making 
genocide a permissible, if not necessary, measure.  
STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL 
While military superiority usually favoured the oppressors, at times, resistance could 
seriously undermine the economic viability of the imperial project and, at others, 
imperil its very existence. Indeed, the power dynamics of the imperial space made 
native resistance a zero-sum game which, as Moses has pointed out, could lend itself 
to a struggle for survival.107 The Social Darwinian theories that came to be embedded 
in the imperial system intensified the threat of resistance for, as Patrick Brantlinger 
observed, the oppressors recognised that they were not exempt from the natural laws 
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governing the extinction of races.108 When native peoples offered stiff resistance, the 
putative superiority of their oppressors and the ideological framing of the legitimacy 
and rightfulness of foreign domination as a civilising endeavour were put to the test. 
In fact, failure to quickly suppress opposition posed not only a challenge to the 
imperial project but to the notion that ‘civilised’ races were superior and, thus, had a 
greater legitimacy than ‘inferior’ races. In effect, within the imperial space, it was not 
just loss of territory or resources at stake, but the success of civilisation and progress; 
the failure of imperialism was a failure of civilisation. Thus, in suppressing resistance, 
oppressors had to reassert their supremacy, mitigate direct threats to the imperial 
project, and uphold the ideological foundations that legitimated imperialism.  
The instability and turmoil generated by resistance intensified insecurities 
and fears creating a context conducive to the unleashing of the genocidal potential of 
the imperial space as a necessary measure to ensuring the project’s survival. In 
Australia, for instance, attacks on settlers and their property hindered colonial 
development, caused setbacks, and were obstacles to the continued expansion of the 
frontier.109 As endemic conflict came to be viewed in existential terms, as in Tasmania 
during the 1820s and 1830s, this led to an escalation of tactics as more extreme 
measures were embraced. 110  As Tom Lawson has shown, while not necessarily 
encouraged by the British government, more drastic measures were at least tolerated 
as a means of ensuring the success of the imperial project.111 Similarly, the Herero 
revolt in 1904 had stimulated fears and hatreds among German colonists, especially 
after the Herero had won striking victories against the outnumbered German troops 
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in the first few months.112 Jürgen Zimmerer has noted that, while past conflicts had 
ended in peace treaties, this time was different; the Herero had been ‘too 
successful’.113 Since the colony held great significance to German prestige, and as an 
outlet for surplus capital and overpopulation, the government sanctioned von Trotha 
to ‘crush the rebellion by all means available.’114 Interestingly, once the Herero were 
in retreat from August 1904, von Trotha’s extermination campaign came under 
criticism in Germany for militating against the economic success of the colony and 
damaging German reputation around the world. 115  Rohrback, for example, 
denounced von Trotha’s continued extermination policies arguing that it would 
‘harm our reputation in the whole world and will be of no benefit here.’116 Once the 
threat had been mitigated, genocidal violence was no longer an acceptable option 
highlighting the importance of insecurity to the escalation and admissibility of such 
measures.   
IMPERIAL RIVALRY 
As the above examples suggest, the escalation to genocide was highly contextual, 
shaped to a large degree by security imperatives and driven by conditions on the 
ground. However, while decisions to employ extreme violence usually radicalised in 
the imperial space, they were also influenced by the wider geopolitical context, and 
particularly, by the nature of the imperial system as fuelled by competition and 
rivalry. As Mark Levene’s work has shown, imperialism, linked to emergence of the 
nation-state system and the concomitant pursuit of progress and modernisation, was 
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infused with insecurities as states struggled to become one of the ‘strong’ in a 
perilous and competitive world.117 Control over foreign resources was perceived to 
be essential for the continued expansion and development of the metropolis. More 
than that, empire was a symbol of strength and prestige in a world conceived in 
increasingly Social Darwinian terms. Indeed, notions of a struggle for survival 
included the conflict and rivalry between the ‘strong’ who were understood to be 
engaged in a competition for resources and dominance over the ‘weak’.118  
 The result of this context was to raise the stakes in the suppression of 
resistance. Aside from damaging the prestige and embarrassing the oppressors 
whose claims to strength and superiority hinged on the success of imperial projects, 
there was a real fear that the inability to decisively and swiftly suppress native 
resistance would expose vulnerabilities and weaknesses, opening the door to 
imperial rivals.119 It had been the insurrection in the Philippines that had enabled the 
US to divest Spain of its colonial possessions, after all. Thereafter, a continued 
American presence in the colony was justified by imperialists, like Beveridge and 
President William McKinley, on the basis that otherwise the islands were open to 
Germany, Britain, and Japan who were ‘hungering after them’.120 At times then, 
against the backdrop of a competitive imperial system, there could be more at stake 
in quashing resistance which further facilitated the escalation of violence. According 
to Giuseppe Finaldi, the logic of massacre in Ethiopia stemmed from the perceived 
importance of establishing Italian rule over the country in the 1930s. Indeed, the 
success of the fascist regime in Italy hinged on its successful acquisition and 
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development of a colony.121 It also added to the zero-sum nature of conflict in the 
imperial space since in the context of the competition and rivalry of the imperial 
system, relinquishing control over a colony was not an option. This mentality, as 
revealed by Selous, contributed to the acceptance of genocidal violence as a last 
resort. Explaining this in Social Darwinian terms, he reasoned: ‘Matabeleland is 
doomed by what seems a law of nature to be ruled by the white man, and the black 
man must go, or conform, to the white man’s laws, or die in resisting them.’122 
Essentially, genocide was an option when deemed necessary to securing the 
existence of the imperial project. As such, insecurities and threats in the imperial 
space were central to the escalation of violence as oppressors acted to alleviate 
perceived existential crises with a ‘destroy them to save us’ mentality.  
*** 
The imperial space was one of exception, terror, and exclusion. Founded on negative 
racist constructions that legitimised a binary unequal subjugator-subjugated 
relationship, imperial projects were, from the moment of inception, dependent on the 
use of violence. What is more, in this racialized space of exception, agents of 
imperialism were not only predisposed to violence, but were also open to the 
possibilities of genocide. The release and escalation of the genocidal potential of 
imperialism, however, was uncommon. In fact, the underlying objectives of 
imperialists and the repercussions of ‘excesses’ tended to militate against the 
destruction of peoples who could be useful to the success of imperial projects. 
Nevertheless, at times, imperial violence, so prevalent in the management of native 
populations, radicalised as more genocidal measures became an option. Regularly, if 
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not always, triggered by local resistance, the ideologies of imperialism facilitated this 
process through providing a rationale, justification even, for such methods, as well as 
intensifying the threat of rebellion as potentially existential in nature. When these 
threats came to be perceived as dangerous to the continued existence of the project, 
usually due to outbreaks of armed resistance from local populations, the imperial 
space as a space of violence and exception facilitated genocide as a retaliatory and 
acceptable option in response. Under certain conditions, then, the ‘us and them’ 
relationship of the imperial space transformed into one of ‘us or them’.  
The analysis of this chapter, then, has revealed an interconnected relationship 
between three essential elements. While the embrace of genocidal violence was, of 
course, shaped by diverse contextual factors, the radicalisation process inherent to 
this was usually facilitated by imperial ideologies, triggered by resistance, and 
exacerbated by insecurities that were inherent to the wider context of the imperial 
system. Although there would be some fundamental differences in the nature of 
Japanese imperialism, as a part of this system, the radicalisation of violence in 
Japan’s occupied territories in later years would also be shaped by the ideological 
factors and insecurities that derived from engagement and interactions with the 
other powers within that system. As such, in the following chapters, I use the above 
framework to analyse the ways in which genocidal violence emerged in the Empire 


















The ancient world was a world in which barbarians threatened 
civilized peoples with their might. The world of today is a world in 
which civilized peoples are swallowing up barbarians with their 
atrocities…  
…If we hope for our country to exist in the battleground where the 
civilized world struggles for the survival of the fittest, then…we must 
place our nation in the ranks of the fittest. 











At the time of the outbreak of war with China in 1937, Japan was a well-established, 
leading imperial power in East Asia. Despite having become one of the so-called 
Great Powers by the early twentieth century, however, the nation’s first interactions 
with nineteenth-century imperialism saw it initially become an unequal, perhaps 
even semi-colonial, nation. The arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry and his use of 
‘gunboat diplomacy’ in 1853 had forced the Tokugawa government, which had 
eschewed involvement in international affairs for over two hundred years, to 
negotiate unfavourable trade agreements with the US. By 1858, treaties had been 
signed with five of the main powers and Japan had become part of the treaty system 
in Asia. These treaties deprived the nation of trade autonomy, allowed foreigners to 
penetrate parts of the homeland, and were later dubbed the ‘unequal treaties’ since 
they offered no reciprocal advantages.1 Heavily criticised for what the prominent 
figure, Tokugawa Nariaki, called the ‘greatest disgrace’ since the dawn of the 
nation’s history, the already ailing government was overthrown and Emperor Meiji 
restored to the centre of political life in 1868.2 
 With the fate of China in the wake of the Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860) 
providing a clear example of the risk of an unsuccessful military clash with a 
materially superior power, the new Meiji leadership responded to the loss of national 
prestige and the looming threat of European imperialism in Asia by embarking on an 
ambitious strategy of modernisation and reform under the slogan ‘rich country, 
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strong army’ (fukoku kyōhei).3 As Emperor Meiji explained in a letter to US president, 
Ulysses Grant, the aim was to learn from the ‘enlightened nations’ and to selectively 
adopt and re-contextualise aspects of their civilisation ‘best suited’ to Japan ‘so as to 
be upon an equality’ with them.4 In other words, the leadership aimed for Japan to 
become a Great Power and, to get there, would employ a policy which, Robert 
Tierney has pointed out, was akin to self-colonisation.5 As they effectively took up 
the ‘civilising mission’, Japanese leaders were exposed to ideas about race, 
civilisation, and the struggle for survival which, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
were fundamental to nineteenth-century imperialism. The circulation of these ideas 
in Japan cultivated a view of the world as divided between the oppressors and the 
oppressed, exacerbated the perceived threat of European imperialism, sparked 
insecurities about the nation’s future place in a competitive imperial world, and 
encouraged the development of ideologies that shaped Japanese attitudes towards 
other Asian peoples.  
These early experiences with the imperial world order also brought unique 
dynamics to Japanese imperialism. The Meiji leadership became preoccupied, 
obsessed even, with national security which, due also to being a late-comer to the 
imperial game, led to policies of expansion directed at areas of close proximity and 
caused imperialism to be viewed as essential to the survival of Japan.6 In dominating 
racially similar peoples, the Japanese also had a different, more fluid interaction with 
those they subjugated which added a distinctive dimension to the formation of 
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rationalising ideologies and opened possibilities for the paternalistic pan-Asianism of 
later years.7 Finally, as Tierney has further pointed out, Japanese imperialism was not 
characterised by a binary subjugator-subjugated relationship but, as a result of its 
initial unequal status, was based on a more triangular relationship influenced by 
both interactions with those they dominated and with the other imperial powers.8 
Thus, while early insecurities and ideas about the imperial world would change over 
time as Japan’s international status grew, they remained at the heart of Japanese 
imperialism, becoming recurrent, though mutable, themes in the rhetoric of the 
Empire. Indeed, persistent concerns over the nation’s future in the world system, 
insecurities and frustrations in respect to engagement with the other powers, and 
embedded perceptions of other Asians as inferior, having evolved over ensuing 
decades, aided in the discursive construction of Japan’s self-proclaimed ‘benevolent 
mission’ in Asia and informed strategies of region-building in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The history of the evolution of these elements, then, is vital to understanding the 
ideological and geopolitical context perceived by Japanese leaders which, as 
explained in the previous chapter, would prove important to the radicalisation of 
violence in later years.  
Furthermore, early encounters with other Asians, particularly challenges to 
the establishment of Japanese rule in Taiwan and Korea, provided opportunities for 
learning, developing, and refining techniques for quashing resistance. Despite later 
claims to a more benign imperialism, like other empires, the establishment and 
maintenance of peace and order in the imperial space often saw ruthless measures 
employed, especially when local communities proved to be unruly. While early 
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methods of suppression were intrinsically violent and showed a potential for 
escalation, extremes were typically condemned and, with the possible exception of 
the treatment of the Taiwanese aborigines between 1909 and 1914, genocidal 
measures were not generally an option in the formative years of Japan’s empire. That 
being said, summary executions of male suspects, scorched earth strategies, and 
indiscriminate reprisal massacres of civilians employed in China and Southeast Asia 
between 1937 and 1945, far from an aberration, had become normalised tactics in 
addressing resistance. In other words, these early encounters had laid the 
foundations for the genocidal practices analysed in later chapters.  
Thus, there are two objectives in this chapter. The first involves examining the 
development and evolution of Japanese imperialism from the Meiji Restoration to the 
outbreak of war with China in order to develop a clearer understanding of the 
context of the late 1930s and 1940s in subsequent chapters. The second objective is to 
explore encounters with resistance in Japan’s early colonies of Taiwan and Korea. I 
analyse military responses to armed resistance, paying particular attention to 
physically violent reactions, teasing out patterns of behaviour, and documenting 
moments of escalation. By interspersing discussions of resistance in Japan’s early 
colonies with a broad analysis of pre-1937 Japanese imperialism, I aim to 
contextualise and, as a result, enhance the understanding of the radicalisation 
process of later years. However, this is an immense, complex, and highly nuanced 
history. As Louise Young has summarised, like other imperialisms, Japanese 
imperialism was influenced by a multitude of different interest groups, diverse 
political, economic, social, and cultural factors, as well as constantly shifting and 
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interconnected domestic and international contexts.9 Thus, I have used the analysis 
of the preceding chapter to focus my examination on insecurities and ideological 
imperatives which would later re-emerge, albeit in modified forms, and influence the 
radicalisation of violence in the 1930s and 1940s. Furthermore, since the intention is 
to examine violence in the Empire as inherent to imperialism rather than as a 
uniquely Japanese phenomenon, I concentrate on the interplay between Japanese 
imperialism and the international world in which it emerged. I pay close attention to 
the fluid ideological climate in Japan as it pertained to attitudes and interactions with 
other Asian peoples and the ‘West’. I also examine changing Japanese perceptions 
and associated misgivings about the nation’s place in the world order through 
situating these aspects within important shifts in the international and domestic 
contexts of the time.  
First, I detail early Japanese perceptions of a competitive imperial world, the 
emergence of insecurities about the threat of European imperialism in Asia, and the 
development of ideologies that positioned other Asians as inferior, aiming to show 
how these factors provided an impetus to imperialism which resulted in the 
acquisition of Japan’s first official colony in 1895. Following this, I explore Japanese 
efforts to consolidate Taiwan, a first test of the nation’s colonising ability, amid 
resistance between 1895 and 1915. In this section, I highlight how, in facing guerrilla 
tactics from a people perceived to be inferior, the Japanese, like other imperial 
powers, embraced more violent, systematic, and indiscriminate measures in 
suppressing opposition. In the next section, I examine Japan’s rise to Great Power 
status, the development of a more-assured sense of superiority over other Asian 
peoples, the leadership’s shifting imperatives as a Great Power, including lingering 
                                                             




insecurities about Japan’s capacity to compete with the economic imperialism of the 
other powers, and finally will detail the growing influence of pan-Asian and anti-
Western ideas. Following this, I discuss the role of the First World War and the 
ensuing peace process in bringing about an important shift in the international 
system, showing how the pan-Asian and anti-Western ideas of the pre-war years 
became more firmly rooted as some groups in Japan began to call for an ‘Asian 
Monroe Doctrine’. I also explain how the military, having learned important lessons 
from the war had begun to advocate a regional solution to perceived natural security 
concerns. Since the peace process had also sparked a resurgence of resistance in 
Korea at this time, I then analyse Japanese responses to a relatively peaceful 
independence movement. Emphasising continuity and shared techniques with 
suppression at an earlier stage in the colony, I also underscore the importance of 
context in driving disproportionally violent responses to an embarrassing situation 
in the peninsula. In the last section of this chapter, I explore the shift from 
cooperation within the new internationalist system of the post-war years to a more 
autonomous imperialism in the 1930s. In particular, I detail how developments on 
the continent, the global economic crisis, and ensuing domestic upheaval towards the 
end of the 1920s undermined Japanese democracy, brought the pan-Asian and anti-
Western ideas of earlier years to the fore, and secured the ascendency of the military. 
I end the chapter with a discussion of the Manchurian Incident showing how 
international condemnation resulted in a rejection of the international system, a 
‘return to Asia’, and set the stage for the grand strategies of region-building of 





AWAKENING TO THE IMPERIAL WORLD: EMBRACING THE PURSUIT OF 
EMPIRE 
Having been forced into the imperial world of the nineteenth century as an unequal 
member of the treaty system in Asia, Japanese leaders came to believe that if they 
were to guarantee the nation’s independence, restore its lost prestige, and raise 
Japan’s status to that of one of the so-called ‘civilised’ nations, they would have to 
adapt to, and navigate, an international system constructed and dominated by 
Western ideals.10  This was understood to be a competitive and perilous system. 
Viewed through the binary lens of imperialism, Japanese leaders saw the world as 
dominated by a strong state–weak state dialectic whereby the ‘strong’ fought for 
supremacy over the ‘weak’. 11  For example, having travelled through European 
colonies with the Iwakura Mission in 1871, Kume Kunitake concluded that ‘[t]he 
strong feed on the flesh of the weak. Ever since the Europeans began to undertake 
sea-voyages in search of trade, they have competed with one another to feed off the 
weak countries in the tropics and import their rich natural produce to their own 
countries.’ 12  This world-view was widely accepted by Meiji statesmen and 
intellectuals, including such prominent figures as Kido Takayoshi and Fukuzawa 
Yukichi, the latter of which warned of the menace posed by European imperialism in 
1875 in writing that: ‘wherever the Europeans touch, the land withers up, as it 
were… Sometimes even whole populations have been wiped out’.13  A renewed 
thrust into Asia by European powers in the 1880s contributed further to the 
leadership’s insecurities as they witnessed more and more Asian countries come 
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under foreign domination. Inoue Kaoru, a respected elder statesman (genrō) and first 
Foreign Minister, for instance, cautioned critics of his treaty revision policy in 1887 
that, ‘[a]ll countries of the west have schemes for engulfing the east by force and we 
must devise plans for defence against them.’14 
The translation of Social Darwinian works in the mid-1880s reinforced these 
perceptions. These texts exposed Meiji thinkers to discourses on race from the likes of 
Herbert Spencer and Jean-Baptise Lamarck which, as briefly outlined in the 
preceding chapter, situated the different peoples of the world as existing in a 
biologically determined and fixed racial hierarchy that placed some as inherently 
more superior to others.15 As one of the ‘coloured’ races, Japan was characterised as 
inferior, contributing to existing apprehensions that the nation was at risk of 
becoming one of the weak states – a concern made more acute by the circumstances 
in Asia at this time. For example, the editor of the journal Nihonjin, Shiga Shigetaka, 
writing in an article published after a trip to the South Pacific Islands in 1887, 
presupposed Japanese inferiority and cautioned that: 
According to existing records, the population of the most inferior race decreases 
quickly once they commence intercourse with the white … Unless the inferior race … 
is determined to improve this condition, it will gradually be destroyed and the whole 
world will fall into the hands of the white one day.16  
The well-known and prolific journalist, Tokutomi Sohō, in his first bestseller, The 
Future of Japan (Shōrai no Nihon) published in 1886, was similarly alarmist when he 
advised his readers that ‘[i]f we hope for our country to exist in the battleground 
where the civilized world struggles for the survival of the fittest, then … we must 
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place our nation in the ranks of the fittest.’17 As supporters of the government’s 
reform policies, Shiga and Tokutomi were optimistic that Japan could improve its 
position showing that, while highly influential, Western ideas were not accepted 
indiscriminately.  
Indeed, Meiji ideologues adapted and reframed these discourses in 
accordance with the Japanese context which led to a general diminishing of the 
biological aspects of race, a challenge to the fixity of the racial hierarchy, and a fusion 
of these ideas with the concepts of ‘nationality’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘civilisation’.18 The 
writings of Fukuzawa, one of the most influential thinkers of this time, were the most 
famous examples of this. In An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation (Bunmeiron no 
Gairyaku) published in 1875, Fukuzawa located Japan as inhabiting a position of 
‘semi-civilisation’ in the racial hierarchy. However, he emphasised that because 
civilisation was a linear, open-ended, and universal process, the nation could work to 
elevate its status to that of the ‘civilised’ white races in the future.19 In fact, he argued, 
Japan was much better equipped to do so than, for example, China due to 
peculiarities of Japanese national history that made it more suited to the assimilation 
of Western civilisation.20 Such arguments were illustrative of a trend among Meiji 
intellectuals who were developing an increased interest in tracing the origins of the 
Japanese race in the 1880s. This interest was a reaction to what was seen to be the 
over-zealous and thoughtless Westernisation of the previous two decades and to the 
growing sense of crisis in respect to European imperialism and Japan’s ability to 
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resist it, especially given its supposedly inherent inferiority. 21  Aside from 
contributing to the creation of a unifying and robust national identity, deemed to be 
an essential part of the modernising process, in constructing Japanese identity 
through alluding to the nation’s unique historical and cultural development, these 
intellectuals aimed to mitigate the insecurities associated with the characterisation of 
the Japanese as a member of the ostensibly inferior ‘yellow’ race. Taguchi’s work, for 
example, emphasised that Japan had a long history of assimilation which gave it a 
distinctive ability to adapt to other cultures, enabling it to integrate elements of 
Western civilisation, maintain its independence, and move out into the world.22  
Despite considerable variation within these theories, which evolved and 
transformed according to the demands and context of the time, an underlying and 
consistent theme was the assertion that Japan had characteristics that set it apart 
from other Asians who, as Stefan Tanaka and John Dower argued, became a point of 
comparison from which to measure Japanese civilisation and advancement.23 While 
the plight of their neighbours remained a source of insecurity, the fact that Japan had 
yet to fall under foreign domination added to a growing conviction that the nation 
was different, indeed more advanced, than other Asians. In fact, Japanese 
intellectuals modified concepts of race to create a two-tiered understanding that 
allowed for the recognition of the nation’s Asian heritage, but also would enable 
Japan to transcend the label of inferiority and advance to Great Power status through 
constituting distinct differences with other Asian peoples.24 The dissemination and 
acceptance of such ideas resulted in the emergence of denigrating attitudes that 
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would shape interactions with other Asian peoples over subsequent years and which, 
ultimately, encouraged the adoption of imperial policies towards them.   
 With European encroachment into China having shaken the status quo in 
respect to the traditional tributary system, Japanese leaders, determined to advance 
their international status, looked to re-orienting relations with their neighbours. Meiji 
interactions with other Asian countries in the 1870s progressed in a ‘mimetic’ fashion. 
For instance, the imperial tactics of punitive expeditions and ‘gunboat diplomacy’ 
were adopted in Taiwan and Korea in 1874 and 1876, respectively.25 For the most 
part, however, policies of expansion at this time were concentrated on those islands, 
such as Okinawa and Hokkaido, which lay at the Japanese periphery since Meiji 
statesmen were aware that Japan was still not strong enough to risk war with other 
imperial powers in the scramble for territory in Asia.26 Thus, despite calls for a 
punitive expedition to Korea in 1873, primarily as a distraction from domestic 
problems at home, prominent figures like Ōkubo Toshimichi and Iwakura Tomomi 
cautioned restraint, emphasising the continued necessity of internal reconstruction.27 
By the 1880s, however, imperialism had come to be seen in various quarters as 
essential for the survival of Japan, particularly since the acquisition of foreign 
resources was understood to be a symbol of strength and success in the Darwinian 
struggle for survival’.28  For example, Soejima Taneomi, a diplomat and staunch 
supporter of expansion, argued in 1885 that: 
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Strong countries make it their business to conquer weak ones and constantly increase 
the territories … It is certain that the powers will choose a time that is best for them 
and annex Korea. Japan too faces the same danger … Therefore, if we want to 
preserve Japan’s independence permanently, we must possess territory on the 
continent.29 
As this example indicates, proponents of expansion saw Japan’s future in terms of a 
binary choice between becoming a strong power, which meant an embrace of 
imperialism, or of accepting Japan’s weakness and inevitable subjugation. Such was 
reflected by Sugita Teiichi’s shift in views after a trip to China in 1884. A politician 
known for his involvement in the democratic Freedom and People’s Rights 
Movement, Sugita initially proposed cooperation with and the ‘raising up’ of other 
Asians as a means of fending off European imperialism. Having witnessed that 
imperialism in action, he began to fear that ‘the yellow race is about to be devoured 
by the white’ and wondered whether ‘Japan will be served up as the main dish in the 
coming feast, or whether it should join the guests at the table.’30  
However, the Japanese government’s explicit embrace of imperialism 
emerged through the opportunities presented by the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–
5), out of which Japan gained its first official colony. While Peter Duus has shown 
that there were economic imperatives underlying this conflict, this war, primarily a 
competition over influence in Korea, was also driven by the insecurities and 
ideological context of this time. 31  By the 1890s, Japanese national security 
requirements had come to be defined in relation to the weakness of its neighbours. In 
his now-famous ‘cordons of interest’ speech, then Prime Minister and ‘father’ of 
Japan’s modern army, Yamagata Aritomo warned the first Imperial Diet in 1890 that 
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‘In order to maintain the independence of the country at the present time among the 
Powers of the world, it is not sufficient to defend the 'cordons of sovereignty’ alone; 
it is also necessary to defend the 'cordons of interest.’ 32  Korea fell into Japan’s 
‘cordons of interest’ and, by this time, had become a particular source of concern 
since many believed it to be a ‘dagger pointed at the heart of Japan’, especially if, as 
seemed likely, it fell under foreign domination.33 Efforts to encourage reform so that 
the Korean government might strengthen its defence against European 
encroachment – the failure of which prompted Fukuzawa to famously declare that 
Japan should ‘leave Asia’ in 1885 lest it continue to be associated with these more 
backwards countries in the future – were hampered by the Qing government’s 
support for traditionalist elements in a bid to reassert Chinese influence on the 
peninsula.34 Sino-Japanese competition for influence in Korea over subsequent years 
came to a head in 1894 after a contingent of Chinese troops arrived to suppress the 
anti-foreign Tonghak rebellion. The situation quickly devolved into war after the 
Japanese leadership reacted by sending a much larger force whose main aims, 
according to the diplomat, Uchida Sadatsuchi, involved seizing the opportunity to 
make Korea into a strong bulwark for Japan. 35  The initial impetus towards 
imperialism then, was shaped considerably by the insecurities that emerged out of 
Japan’s first experiences with the nineteenth-century imperial world.  
After Japan’s decisive defeat of China, it was not Korea that emerged as its 
first colony. Though not initially planned, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu had 
seized the opportunity presented by the war to push for the annexation of Taiwan 
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during the peace negotiations at Shimonoseki in 1895. Among a multitude of factors 
shaping Mutsu’s decision, including; the attitudes of the military, the fear that 
Taiwan might be swallowed up by a rival imperial power, and popular support for 
the capture of Chinese territory within Japan, the acquisition of a colony was seen to 
present an opportunity to demonstrate to the Great Powers the nation’s abilities as a 
‘civilising’ imperial nation.36 Indeed, Takekoshi Yosaburō, a journalist and long-time 
advocate of Japanese expansion, would later claim that successes in Taiwan were 
‘proof’ of Japan’s ‘worthiness to be admitted into the community of the world’s 
greatest colonial powers.’37 The successful consolidation of Taiwan, therefore, would 
be crucial to Japan’s imperial prestige. 
JAPAN’S FIRST TEST: ENCOUNTERS WITH RESISTANCE IN TAIWAN  
With the Taiwanese having a reputation as a ‘lawless and rebellious people’, it came 
as little surprise to contemporary observers that Japanese forces would encounter 
difficulties in efforts to consolidate their control.38 Since the cessation of Taiwan to 
Japan, in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been affected without 
consultation with the local population, a group of intellectuals, balking at the 
prospect of becoming Japanese subjects, had issued a proclamation inciting armed 
resistance. 39  This was followed by the establishment of a new republic and a 
declaration of independence on 23 May 1895 which assured that the population was 
‘irrevocably resolved to die before [they] will serve the enemy’.40 For the next two 
decades, Taiwanese resistance would continue intermittently, frustrating Japanese 
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efforts to consolidate and develop the new colony. During this time, Japanese forces 
first encountered the asymmetric, unconventional tactics that usually characterised 
conflict in the imperial space and learned valuable lessons, particularly about the 
nature of guerrilla warfare. Like other imperial powers, efforts to decisively stamp 
out resistance involved progressively more ruthless practices.     
In spite of the formal transfer of Taiwan to Japan on their arrival at the end of 
May, Japanese forces had to fight a war of conquest. Remnant Chinese soldiers, 
militias, and volunteers determined to defend the new Republic of Formosa, 
organised armed resistance throughout the island. Initially, such efforts were not 
taken seriously by Governor-General Kabayama Sukenori who depicted Japanese 
military campaigns more as a mopping-up of nuisance ‘local brigands and 
insurgents’ than the war of resistance it later became.41 It is true that after landing at 
Keelung, Japanese troops swiftly advanced through the north where they met 
limited opposition. In fact, in some areas, they were welcomed due to an increase in 
lawlessness following the departure of the majority of Chinese soldiers and officials 
from the island.42 However, in the south, where the new Republic’s capital was based 
at Tainan, conquest proved more challenging, particularly due to the propensity of 
the rebels to engage in guerrilla tactics. It would take five months to crush the new 
republic and it was during these southern expeditions that more violent, irregular 
tactics first became an option for Japanese commanders.  
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Initially, soldiers abided by Kabayama’s stated intentions of ‘treat[ing] all 
good citizens with consideration and clemency’.43 Having travelled with troops on 
their expeditions, James Davidson, a correspondent for the New York Herald and later 
US consul in Taiwan, developed a favourable impression of the Japanese whom, he 
observed, in contrast to the rebels, refrained from looting and violence. However, 
Davidson soon became ‘struck’ by the leniency of the commanders, especially given 
the insurgents’ accomplished use of guerrilla tactics, in addition to the Janus-faced 
nature of the population. At Hsinchu, for instance, Davidson witnessed a ‘sudden 
transformation scene’ as Chinese soldiers shed their uniforms and hid among a 
colluding population. He was surprised that since they had greeted Japanese soldiers 
under the pretence of surrender, commanders had made no attempt to identify, 
arrest, or punish those who had been, or had assisted, the rebels. In Davidson’s view, 
this was a ‘weak policy’ that contributed to the worsening conditions of July 1895 
since ‘the large bodies of insurgents learned that they could harass the Japanese with 
comparative safety, and the villagers that killing under the white flag, brought no 
punishment.’44 Since unrest often resumed soon after Japanese troops left an area, 
commanders, according to Davidson, came to a realisation that there would be no 
option but to employ more ‘vigorous methods’. Subsequently, soldiers were to seek 
out insurgents who may be disguised among civilians and were to employ scorched 
earth strategies in villages suspected of harbouring ‘brigands’.45 Such tactics proved 
somewhat more successful for, after the eventual capture of Tainan in October, 
Kabayama could officially declare the island to be pacified.46   
                                                             
43 Translation from Japan Mail cited in Davidson, Island, 294. 
44 Davidson, Island, 319–20; see also Takekoshi Yosaburō, Japanese Rule in Formosa, George Braithwaite 
(trans.) (London, 1907), 87–8.  
45 Davidson, Island, 326–9. 
46 Harry J. Lamley, ‘Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism’, in 
Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History (Armonk, 1999), 207.   
77 
 
This announcement was premature, however. Though it marked the end of 
organised resistance due to the dissolution of the Republic, a rebellion in southern 
Taiwan later that year, followed by an insurrection of a ‘considerable scale’ in the 
north in January 1896, began a period of recurrent disturbances. 47  Uprisings of 
varying scales and intensities would surge sporadically over the next few years.48 
These uprisings differed in nature from the previous few months’ war, motivated 
less by a sense of nationalism and more the experience of harsh military rule.49 
Contemporary observers explained that intense resentment and hatred had emerged 
among the Taiwanese as Japanese soldiers began to treat them as their inferiors, 
looted and wantonly destroyed property, and raped women.50 In effect, the use of 
more ‘vigorous methods’ of suppression had served to intensify hatreds and inspired 
further opposition from angry civilians. No longer contending with semi-organised 
forces, the difficulties of subduing unrest became even more pronounced as the 
insurgent’s tactics became exclusively guerrilla in nature. Partisans launched hit-and-
run attacks on Japanese installations and evaded capture by hiding among a 
population usually willing to shelter them.51 Although just a small section of the 
population engaged actively in armed resistance, the undetermined nature of the 
guerrilla threat and their apparent support among the populace inspired fear. As 
such, Japanese conduct, like that of other imperial powers when faced with 
prolonged guerrilla resistance, came to include ruthless measures of suppression, 
such as the burning of villages and the summary execution of men, which 
increasingly allowed for indiscriminate attacks on civilians. As the following caustic 
account by George Mackay, son of a Presbyterian missionary and his Taiwanese wife, 
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emphasised, efforts to identify what were termed ‘bandits’ or ‘brigands’ were rarely 
thorough:    
One night a surprise attack was made upon the town and all the male citizens were 
placed under arrest. They were then brought to a river bank, and tied in groups of 
five. A minute later the Japanese officers with lanterns in their hands appeared. They 
gazed intently into the faces of the frightened men, and woe unto him who wore a 
stern countenance and was tall and strong. Such physical characteristics to these 
expert phrenologists were considered as proofs that the bearer was a traitor. At once 
a black mark was placed on his forehead and without further ado, he was executed.52 
In his celebrated history of Japanese rule in Taiwan, Takekoshi also acknowledged 
that, ‘[o]wing to the difficulty of distinguishing them, it often happened that 
common people were mistaken for brigands by our troops; sometimes a peaceful 
village was attacked by surprise in the belief that it harboured bandits, and some of 
the peaceful villagers killed.’53 As in European empires, the worst atrocities were 
often committed in reprisal for large rebellions, heavy losses, and particularly, to the 
mutilation of captured Japanese soldiers which fuelled both fury and terror.54 A 
major uprising which occurred in June 1896 in Yunlin County where Japanese troops 
suffered early defeats, for example, was met with a reprisal massacre of up to six 
thousand Taiwanese. 55  A detailed account of the massacre by Presbyterian 
missionary, Thomas Barclay, reported in the liberal and anti-war Manchester Guardian, 
explained that, although scorched earth strategies and indiscriminate reprisal killings 
had become normalised practices for Japanese troops who were rarely called to 
account by their superiors when engaged in subjugation campaigns, the scale of 
violence in Yunlin had been exceptional and foreign speculation of a widespread 
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extermination policy in Taiwan was ‘quite imaginary’.56 Indeed, though representing 
an underlying potential for an embrace of genocidal measures in Taiwan, military 
conduct, having come under international and domestic scrutiny had resulted in the 
Imperial Household granting limited compensation to the communities affected in 
Yunlin county, was more restrained thereafter.57  
 The continued embarrassing failure to end the cycle of rebellion and reprisal 
violence ongoing in Taiwan resulted in further censure and later a shift in policy.58 In 
fact, the military’s costly and seemingly ineffective efforts caused the leadership to 
consider selling Taiwan due to the strain it placed on Japan’s still-developing 
capitalist infrastructure.59 This so-called ‘age of mistakes’ came to a gradual end after 
1898 when, under the direction of the fourth Governor-General Kodama Gentarō and 
his civilian advisor Gotō Shinpei (renowned for their accomplishments in the 
economic and social development of Taiwan), a variety of different ‘carrot and stick’ 
methods were employed. 60  Though capable of sanctioning astonishing acts of 
violence, Gotō’s plans for subjugation centred on intensive reform efforts and 
attempts to entice rebels to surrender with promises of leniency and bribes in the 
form of money or choice employment opportunities. 61  However, though more 
conciliatory than their predecessors, they remained, as Harry Lamley observed, 
highly security conscious after years of prolonged resistance. 62  Thus, while 
responsibility for the suppression of unrest passed from the military to the civilian 
police at this time, Kodama also implemented the Penal Laws against Banditry, a 
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special law which effectively circumvented the legal system and allowed for the 
continuance of the practice of summary execution for suspected ‘bandits’. 63  To 
supplement this, the oppressive hokō system, an adaption of the baojia system which 
the Chinese had previously used in Taiwan, was implemented as a means of 
controlling the population through establishing collective responsibility and 
threatening group punishments for crimes. 64  Reflecting Gotō’s belief in the 
uncivilised and inferior status of the Taiwanese people who, because of this, could 
not be governed in the same manner as the Japanese, these punishments were 
typically corporal in nature. In fact, flogging, having been abolished as a barbaric 
practice in 1895, was reintroduced as a main punishment from 1904.65 In effect, like 
other imperial powers, the Japanese employed methods of population control 
infused with violence. Such measures were possible because of embedded 
perceptions of the Taiwanese as inferior as well as through the creation of a space of 
exception. Indeed, in 1896, the Diet had passed controversial legislation, known as 
Law No. 63, which gave the Governor-General extensive powers to enact laws in 
Taiwan outside the oversight of the government in Tokyo.66 Ultimately, these efforts 
proved more successful for the period of almost continuous unrest had drawn to a 
close by 1903.67  
As armed resistance began to ebb, more attention was paid to the 
development and expansion of territory in the interior, particularly after General 
Sakuma Samata took over as Governor-General in 1906. Sakuma proved more 
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determined than his predecessors to exploit the forests in the mountainous regions 
which had previously been left untouched to avoid inevitable conflict with the 
aboriginal tribes who resided in those areas.68 Aside from limited efforts to subjugate 
the aborigines during the first years of occupation, earlier administrations had been 
preoccupied with the poor state of law and order throughout the island and had 
generally ignored these tribes. However, sporadic attacks by so-called ‘head-hunters’ 
became a problem under Gotō’s tenure leading to the implementation of a guard-line 
to segregate aboriginal land. 69 Entry by either Taiwanese or Japanese civilians was 
forbidden and though punitive expeditions were sent out periodically, aborigines 
were left in relative peace.70 However, by the end of the Gotō’s tenure, this situation 
was deemed to be unsatisfactory; as Takekoshi wrote in 1907, ‘the economic 
development of the island cannot be stopped for ever on account of a few thousand 
savages.’71 
Sakuma’s arrival heralded a new era in Japanese-aboriginal relations as 
increased competition over land erupted into violent conflict.72 Over these years, the 
Japanese encroached further and further into aboriginal territory through a strategy 
that involved sending out punitive expeditions while simultaneously advancing the 
guard line.73 However, these efforts were often hampered by the proficient use of 
guerrilla tactics. More so than the Taiwanese insurgents, aborigines proved adept in 
unconventional techniques and knowledge of the mountainous terrain made them a 
formidable enemy in spite of the considerable technological advantages that Japanese 
soldiers had. In describing the lack of success in punitive expeditions, for instance, 
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Takekoshi explained that ‘the savages can run like deer and climb like monkeys, 
sometimes springing up into trees for refuge when closely pursued’.74 By 1909, little 
progress had been made causing Sakuma to embark on a more intensive ‘five year 
plan for the subjugation of Aborigines’. The basic tenet of this plan was simple; they 
would be given a choice between surrendering unconditionally, forced then to vacate 
the area and live a ‘civilised’ life in the lowland plains, or face extermination. As in 
other empires, the decision to employ such harsh measures was conditioned by 
perceptions (evident in Takekoshi’s comment above) of the aborigines as little more 
than dangerous ‘savages’, enemies of civilisation.75 With little consideration given to 
the welfare of those who stood in the way of Japanese expansion, punitive 
expeditions became merciless often ending with indiscriminate slaughter, 
destruction of entire villages, and devastation of the aboriginal tribes in the region.76 
Under relentless pressure and suffering heavy losses, more and more tribes yielded 
to Japanese forces and, by the time Sakuma’s long administration came to an end in 
1915, he was widely admired for his successes.77 A large-scale, joint Taiwanese–
aborigine revolt in 1915, swiftly suppressed using what was by now characteristically 
brutal reprisal violence, marked the end of the period of consolidation.78 With the 
exception of a further small-scale uprising by the Seediq tribe in 1931, Taiwan was 
considered, and is largely remembered as, peaceable from 1915.79  
Thus, the Japanese military’s first dalliance with resistance to the institution 
of their rule was characteristic of imperial conflicts at this time. Taiwan became a 
space of exception founded on negative perceptions of those they oppressed as 
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uncivilised and inferior and which, as a consequence, facilitated more violent 
methods of suppression. Experiencing and learning from difficulties in combatting 
guerrilla warfare, Japanese commanders also embraced measures which, in 
permitting attacks on the lives and livelihoods of the civilian population, had the 
potential for escalation to extreme violence. 
‘HUNTING WITH THE HOUNDS’: JAPAN AS A GREAT POWER 
Despite the difficulties and costs of consolidating Taiwan, the acquisition of a colony 
and the defeat of China were seen as confirmation of Japan’s rise to Great Power 
status. Reflecting the immense national pride that swept through Japan, Tokutomi 
wrote of Japan’s triumph that ‘we are no longer ashamed to stand before the world 
as Japanese.’80 Indeed, victory had enabled the leadership to realise their long-term 
goal of revising the ‘unequal treaties’, to become a participant in that treaty system 
alongside the other powers and, with the financial boost gained through the 
indemnity from China, to join them on the gold standard. Japan could now claim 
parity with ‘the strong’.81 Moreover, since war had been characterised as a clash 
between civilisation and barbarity, victory over China (the traditional leader of Asia) 
had cemented the belief that the Japanese were distinct from and now undoubtedly 
more advanced than their neighbours.82  
However, the nation’s enhanced international standing did not bring an end 
to the leadership’s trepidations about Japan’s place in the world. In some respects, it 
paradoxically intensified them.83 Meiji statesmen faced an international climate of 
renewed rivalry and competition in the wake of China’s defeat. Japanese victory, 
                                                             
80 Tokutomi Sohō extract in Wm Theodore De Bary, Carol Gluck, & Arthur E. Tiedemann (eds.), Sources 
of Japanese Tradition: Volume 2. Abridged: Part 2: 1868–2000 (New York, 2006), 133. 
81 Ōkuma Shigenobu, ‘Foreign Policy’, in Stead, Japan, 219–21.  
82 Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, 1985), 135–6; Lone, 
Japan’s First Modern War, 142. 




having highlighted the Qing government’s weak position, had precipitated a further 
‘carving up’ of territory by European powers who gave up their earlier pretence of 
respecting Chinese sovereignty and established ‘spheres of influence’ in strategic 
locations.84 For those, such as first Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, the preservation of 
China’s independence was important to the continued growth of the Empire since it 
was deemed the most suitable and natural market for Japanese products.85 While 
fears that the nation might be colonised had been mollified over past decades, the 
menace of more indirect, economic forms of domination continued to haunt the Meiji 
leadership. In particular, they were concerned about the ability of Japan to compete 
with the robust and more developed economies of their rivals. 86  The apparent 
hostility of the other Great Powers to Japanese expansion – signified by the 
intervention of Germany, France, and Russia to force the return of the Liaodong 
Peninsula to China in 1895 – in addition to a growing Russo-Japanese rivalry, added 
to these insecurities.87 Taking advantage of the power vacuum left by China, Russian 
influence had expanded into Korea and, by 1898, much to the chagrin of Japanese 
leaders, they had occupied the Liaodong Peninsula. These moves, in addition to the 
stationing of Russian troops in Manchuria during the joint international effort to 
suppress the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, were perceived to be a threat to Korean 
independence. Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō even described it as a ‘matter of life 
and death’ for Japan because an independent Korea was deemed necessary for the 
nation’s future security.88 The next few years saw cautious attempts to develop a 
‘sphere of influence’ in Korea while at the same time working to check Russian 
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expansion on the continent through diplomatic means.89 These endeavours failed. By 
1904, pro-war groups had successfully incited popular support and pressure for a 
more forceful stance in defence of Japanese interests which, with the security 
afforded by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, encouraged the government to 
accept, and instigate, war with Russia.90  
Japanese victory the following year solidified the nation’s status as a leading 
power in East Asia. As part of the peace process, Japan had procured the lease to the 
Liaodong Peninsula, acquired rights in South Manchuria, including control over the 
lucrative South Manchurian Railway, received the southern half of Sakhalin and, 
with its superior interests recognised by Russia, established a protectorate over 
Korea. These achievements augmented self-assurance in the uniqueness and 
superiority of the Japanese nation. More confident in their ability to defend their 
interests, lingering uncertainties about the nation’s future independence began to 
recede among those statesmen outside of military circles. However, emerging 
concerns about Japan’s economic viability and the capacity to compete with the 
economic imperialism of the powers, particularly in China where Japan had recently 
procured extensive interests, were exacerbated in the aftermath of the war. Japan’s 
war effort had resulted in substantial social upheaval due, in large part, to the heavy 
burden it placed on the economy.91 The struggle to recover financially continued to 
aggravate social unrest among an increasingly nationally conscious populace who 
demanded greater levels of representation and a higher degree of political 
participation. By 1912, these factors contributed to a constitutional crisis when the 
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) tried to force a larger military budget, exposing further 
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the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the Japanese economy. 92  Aside from the 
problems of an expanding population, an adverse balance of trade, and a large 
national debt, alarming was the increased reliance on American and European 
financial backing. In fact, as a number of financiers, seven-time Finance Minister 
Takahashi Korekiyo among them, realised, the war had only been won through 
securing foreign loans. 93  A number of leaders, therefore, recognised and were 
distressed by the implications of this dependency for, as the diplomat Hayashi 
Kiroku later observed, it would compromise the nation’s ability to pursue an 
autonomous foreign policy.94  
Influenced by this adverse economic situation and by Japan’s new status as a 
major imperial power, the leadership looked more to redefining the Empire’s role in 
Asia. As articulated by Foreign Minister, and later Prime Minister, Ōkuma 
Shigenobu, who wrote a number of articles on this subject between 1907 and 1915, 
Japan now had a responsibility, born out of its new superior status and its insights as 
an Asian race that had successfully assimilated Western civilisation, to lead Asia. The 
nation should work to raise the status of other Asians who, he emphasised, were 
inferior due only to circumstance and not to race.95 Through becoming a leader, 
saviour of Asia even, Japan could foster a closer relationship with other Asian 
countries, especially with China, which increasingly came to be seen as vital for the 
Empire’s continued economic growth. 96  Furthermore, it would shore up China’s 
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independence and alleviate underlying concerns about the continued European 
dominance of Asian countries that, it appeared, were in ‘imminent danger of losing 
their national existence’.97 This concept of a Japanese ‘civilising mission’ resonated 
with supporters of empire, such as the intellectual and diplomat, Nitobe Inazō.98 
More importantly, it exposed subtle shifts in Japanese perceptions of the world order 
due to the rising influence of pan-Asian and anti-Western ideas around this time.  
 Pan-Asian thought had emerged in Japan in the 1880s as an alternative to the 
government’s ‘westernising’ approach to the defence against the looming threat of 
European imperialism.99 At this time, it had been a loose collection of ideas. However, 
in tandem with Japan’s growing power in the 1890s, a number of writers, such as the 
Christian pacifist Uchimura Kanzō and the prominent Meiji statesman Konoe 
Atsumaro, began to evoke Asianist sentiments more and more in their 
recommendations for the direction of Japanese foreign policy.100 In his arguments for 
an alliance with China in anticipation of a ‘final contest’ between the races in 1898, 
however, Konoe reflected mounting Japanese dissatisfaction with the West due to the 
perceived injustice of the Triple Intervention of 1895 and the ‘yellow peril’ rhetoric 
that accompanied it.101  
The defeat of Russia in 1905 intensified these trends. Japan’s victory, having 
shattered the illusion of white invincibility, saw pan-Asian discourses became a more 
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cohesive and widespread ideology, particularly outside Japan.102 The concomitant 
eruption of nationalist movements throughout the region had also deepened 
European fears of a united Asia that would rise up to threaten their hegemony.103 
Thus, while the Japanese government worked to assure other imperial powers that 
Japan had, as Suematsu Kenchō relayed in his position as an ambassador to London 
in 1904, ‘cast her lot with the Occident’, ‘yellow peril’ rhetoric contributed to growing 
disillusionment with the international order in Japan. 104  As politicians and 
intellectuals, like Baron Kaneko Kentarō and the historian Shiratori Kurakichi, 
pointed out,  it brought to the fore the issue of race in Japanese interactions with the 
other Great Powers. 105  Indeed, it racialized the perceived slights of the Triple 
Intervention and the Portsmouth Peace Treaty which, because wartime censorship 
had led the population to believe that Japan had won ‘tremendous victories’, was not 
believed to be fair and resulted in outbursts of nationalist sentiment in the form of 
riots at Hibiya Park, Tokyo.106 Against the backdrop of anti-immigration policies 
targeting East Asians in the US, the continued propensity of the other powers to view 
Japan as a ‘yellow’ race and to associate it with those that the Japanese now joined in 
denigrating for their backwards, uncivilised state frustrated a number of leading 
figures, such as Gotō Shinpei, who stressed that Japan was ‘no common Oriental 
country’.107 Shiratori also complained that the Japanese, ‘differing radically’ from 
other Asians, were ‘mistakenly classed with the latter and subjected to the same 
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offensive discrimination’.108 Having long coveted a position as an irrefutable Great 
Power, ‘yellow peril’ discourse as an expression of continued racial discrimination, 
aside from straining relations and seeming to undermine Japanese claims to civilised 
status, fuelled anti-Western ideas as many in Japan began to question whether they 
would ever truly be welcomed as a member of this exclusive club.109 Thus, as writers, 
like Nitobe and the pan-Asian politician Nagai Ryutarō, warned of a potential for an 
east–west clash should the injustices of racial discrimination not be addressed, a 
growing number of Japanese politicians, diplomats, and intellectuals began to 
promote pan-Asian ideas.110 However, where early Japanese pan-Asianists, such as 
Tarui Tōkichi, had proposed a relationship based on equality, the nation’s new Great 
Power status produced a hybridisation of pan-Asian and imperial ideologies, causing 
the former to become distinctly paternalistic in nature. For instance, though by no 
means a staunch advocate of imperialism, having written that ‘Asia is one’ in 1903, 
the writer Okakura Kakuzō, well-known for his English works on Asian culture, 
justified Japanese expansion on the basis that, without guidance from superior Japan, 
the rest of Asia would be doomed to remain in a ‘decadent condition’, imperilled by 
the ‘white disaster’ of European imperialism.111  
By the time of the First World War then, Japan had become a Great Power. 
Though Japanese imperialism would continue to be shaped by insecurities, albeit 
mutated ones, in respect to the nation’s capacity to compete with the other powers, 
the leadership remained committed to cautious expansion through careful 
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navigation and cooperation within the imperial system. As Japanese 
accomplishments became subject to the rivalries, competition, and suspicions of this 
system, however, pre-existing racial sensitivities, exacerbated by ‘yellow peril’ 
rhetoric, intensified in Japan and led to the emergence of pan-Asian and anti-Western 
undercurrents. Though not accepted within official policy since the leadership was a 
‘team player’ in the imperial game at this time, these developments were significant, 
particularly as they began to take a firm root during the upheavals of war in Europe 
and the ensuing peace process.112   
THE ECLIPSE OF THE IMPERIAL WORLD ORDER  
For Japanese leaders, like Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki, who was particularly vocal 
on this matter, the eruption of war in Europe presented an unmatched opportunity 
to enhance the nation’s interests. 113  In fact, for some, such as the aging genrō, 
Yamagata Aritomo, it was imperative that Japan act to shift the balance of power in 
Asia because, after the war, there was sure to be renewed competition, particularly in 
China, as European powers reasserted their position.114 Thus, the Japanese, much to 
the alarm of their British allies, went beyond the role expected of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and, by the end of 1914, had seized control of German possessions in Asia. 
The main emphasis of the leadership’s wartime efforts thereafter involved initiatives 
to develop a ‘special position’ in China. Against the backdrop of political turmoil in 
China following the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the government sought to capitalise 
on the distraction of the European powers by pursuing an overtly imperial agenda 
on the continent. Representing a significant departure from the more cautious policy 
of the Meiji Period (having ended in 1912), the war years saw the nation’s position in 
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China enhanced through initiatives including the notorious Twenty-One Demands of 
May 1915 and the Nishihara loans of 1917. 115  These heavy-handed efforts were 
criticised for stimulating anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese. Yamagata was 
particularly disparaging since he had warned of needing to cultivate friendly 
relations with China as an ally in an impending clash with the West. 116  More 
importantly, Japan’s international reputation was seriously damaged, especially with 
the US which had emerged not only as the Empire’s chief rival in Asia, but as a major 
world power.  
International disapproval of these more aggressive efforts in China 
contributed to mounting dissatisfaction with the existing world order within Japan. 
For supporters of Empire, Japanese imperialism was not undertaken on a ‘whim’, it 
was deemed necessary for the nation’s survival.117 Therefore, criticism of Japan’s 
expansion was perceived to be unfair, hypocritical, and to stem more from extant 
racism than from the competition and rivalry inherent to the imperial system.118 Thus, 
some notable men, like Tokutomi, embracing pan-Asian thinking, began to endorse 
the idea of constructing an Asian Monroe Doctrine as a means of ensuring that 
‘Asiatic affairs [would] be dealt with by the Asiatics.’119  
Notions of greater autonomy for Asian countries continued to gain influence 
in the aftermath of the war as the peace conference at Paris served to deepen 
resentment at a world order that seemed to discriminate against Japan. Although 
Japanese delegates had been invited to participate as one of the so-called ‘Big Five’ 
and Japan had been granted a permanent seat as a founding member of the League 
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of Nations, the rejection of a racial equality clause and the apparent reluctance to 
accept Japanese claims to former German possessions in Asia, was seen as another 
racially-inspired rebuff.120  Many in Japan, such as Tokutomi, Sugita Teiichi, and 
Nagase Hosuke, a known commentator on foreign policy, remained unconvinced of 
the benefits of the post-war peace should racial discrimination be allowed to 
continue.121 Aside from seeming to have little direct benefit for Japan whose two 
main rivals in Asia at this time – the Soviet Union and the US – were not members, 
the League of Nations was criticised by future three-time Prime Minister Konoe 
Fumimaro as an instrument for upholding ‘Anglo-American hegemony’. Konoe and 
others sympathised with German efforts to overthrow the status quo since, like Japan, 
Germany was a ‘have not’ nation, limited in resources and late to the imperial 
game.122 Hayashi Kiroku, having participated in the Paris Peace Conference, had also 
warned that the principles of the League would ‘militate’ against Japanese interests 
since the Empire would no longer be able to expand without violating them.123 Thus, 
there was a great deal of Japanese scepticism about a new international system that 
would no longer allow imperial expansion. As far as those aforementioned men 
understood, this was a new world order that would stifle the advance of developing 
‘have not’ countries while upholding the gains made by others through the very 
system they now claimed to abjure. Such views contributed to a greater acceptance of 
pan-Asian proposals for a regional alliance against ‘the West’ in Japan during the 
interwar years. 
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These proposals were supplemented by calls for autarky in military circles as 
strategists began to analyse the important lessons of the war. The startling defeat of 
Germany, whose militarism was believed to be invincible, impressed upon Japanese 
strategists the increased importance of a robust economy. 124  Admiral Katō 
Tomosaburō, for example, would later defend proposals for naval limitation at the 
Washington Conference in 1921 on the basis that ‘one has to admit that, if one has no 
money, one cannot make war’. 125  In scrutinising the German defeat, Japanese 
military thinkers had come to realise that the nature of warfare had changed. It 
would no longer be a short clash determined by military prowess, but would 
demand the mobilisation of the entire nation, especially its economic resources, in 
order to sustain this new total war effort. Japan was understood to be at a 
considerable disadvantage. As a small island nation, it had limited access to natural 
resources and was seen to lag behind the other powers in its economic development. 
Moreover, the war had further exposed the vulnerabilities of the Japanese economy. 
Initially, the war years had been a boost to the nation’s finances, resolving pre-war 
financial difficulties, creating substantial growth in heavy industries, and 
transforming the nation from debtor to creditor.126 However, Japan had come to rely 
more and more on imports of essential raw materials particularly from its main rival, 
the US, had been unable to keep up with the technological advancements of the 
European powers during the war, and had experienced a period of rapid inflation in 
the aftermath which culminated in a series of riots over the price of rice in 1918, a dip 
into recession in 1920, and a stagnated economy for much of the post-war years.127 
Adding to the concerns of military thinkers, like Ishiwara Kanji, was the fact that 
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both of Japan’s hypothetical enemies at this time had access to vast resources at home, 
had the capacity for mobilisation of considerable manpower, and were largely 
opposed to imperialism. Thus, in addressing these issues and preparing for future 
total wars, military strategists began to advocate for the creation of a self-sufficient 
regional bloc that would strengthen the Japanese economy and end the nation’s 
dependency on trade and finance from other powers by providing access to markets 
and resources essential to important war industries.128 In short, economic imperatives, 
which had typically been a secondary element of national defence, had become 
crucial.129 As a result, those in military circles, disillusioned with the ‘Western’ world 
order, but convinced of the necessity of expansion to achieving defence requirements, 
advocated a more autonomous imperial approach.  
However, the disruptions and upheavals of the First World War had 
drastically altered the balance of power and precipitated the eclipse of the old 
imperial system. The US, having emerged as an economic powerhouse after the war, 
took a leading role in the peace process. As a consequence, more liberal ideas of self-
determination and an open-door trade policy challenged the way in which foreign 
relations had been conducted and laid the foundations for a different international 
system. Aside from bringing new challenges for the Japanese leadership who would 
now have to adapt their expansionist policies to this more cooperative, 
internationalist framework, the anti-imperial rhetoric that permeated the peace 
process appeared to threaten Japan’s hard-won interests in Asia and brought added 
tribulations in the form of disorder and unrest.130 For the Japanese, this meant a 
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resurgence of resistance in Korea as a massive independence movement emerged in 
March 1919.  
THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW SYSTEM: MAINTAINING CONTROL IN 
KOREA  
A resurgence of resistance in Korea was unexpected in 1919. The Annual Report on 
Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea), published by the Government-General of 
Korea (GGK) the year before, had celebrated the ‘tranquillity’ that prevailed since the 
last insurgents surrendered in 1916. 131  This was a recent peace, however. As 
indicated by the report, Korean resistance had troubled the Japanese from the outset 
of the establishment of the protectorate in 1905. These early experiences had shaped 
the nature of Japanese rule in the peninsula after its official annexation in 1910 and, 
with General Hasegawa Yoshimichi presiding over subjugation efforts in both cases, 
underpinned the violent Japanese reactions to the uprisings of 1919.  
While intellectuals had sought to subvert Japanese rule through propagating 
a Korean reform movement after Japan had established its protectorate in 1905, small, 
irregular militias, known as the ‘Righteous Armies’ (ŭibyŏng), began armed resistance 
activities throughout the peninsula.132 Their numbers were supplemented over time 
by civilians angered by the abusive and exploitative policies of the Japanese who, 
according to Homer Hulbert, an American missionary openly critical of Japanese 
policies in Korea, treated them as the ‘scum of society’. 133  By late 1907, Korean 
opposition was a significant problem. The forced abdication of King Kojong and the 
disbandment of the Korean Army had led to riots in Seoul and swelled the ranks of 
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the rebels with trained, enraged, and partially equipped former soldiers.134 From 
September that year, the insurgents became more audacious and, like those in 
Taiwan, relied predominantly on guerrilla tactics to overcome the military 
superiority of Japanese troops. Such tactics proved similarly difficult to combat with 
conventional techniques. Fighting became fierce and, as rebels began to inspire terror 
through attacks on collaborators and the mutilation of Japanese soldiers, foreign 
observers thought it would be ‘impossible to discourage the spirit of universal 
rebellion.’135  
Thus, the ‘mild and gradual’ policy initially employed by Japanese forces 
gave way to more ‘strenuous measures’ and, towards the end of 1907, the IJA 
embarked on a large-scale subjugation campaign.136 Charged with ‘stamping out the 
insurrection’, Hasegawa warned that ‘[t]hose that join insurgents or afford them 
refuge or conceal weapons will be severely punished. More than that, the villages 
that such offenders belong to shall be held responsible and punished with rigour.’137 
The Scottish-Canadian journalist, Frederick McKenzie, having successfully 
circumvented military restrictions on foreign travel, visited the countryside where 
campaigns were in operation. There he witnessed scenes of comprehensive 
destruction, had spoken to survivors who told of Japanese soldiers raping, looting, 
and killing civilians indiscriminately and with impunity, and heard of commanders 
who, in addition to presiding over the execution of suspicious men, had ordered all  
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wounded and surrendered rebels killed. 138  When discovered, such tactics were 
denounced in Japan. However, while Resident-General Itō Hirobumi advised the 
military to tone down their methods, Korean resistance and severe Japanese reprisals 
continued over the next few years. 139  The persistence of uprisings and the 
assassination of Itō in 1909 contributed to the decision to annex the territory in 
1910. 140  Thereafter, the first Governor-General, Terauchi Masatake, became 
determined to subdue Korea and would do so through wielding an ‘iron hand’ 
because, he explained in an article published in the Japanese-controlled Seoul Press in 
1910, ‘there is but one way to deal with these people, and that is by stern and 
relentless methods.’141 Thus, Korea became another space of exception where the 
military became an omnipresent part of Korean life and where violence and 
oppression became central mechanisms of population control. Through diverse, but 
invariably repressive measures, resistance was gradually brought under control in 
this ‘dark period’ of brutal military rule. 142  
However, Terauchi was unsuccessful in stamping out a sense of nationalism 
among Koreans which, influenced by the rhetoric of liberalism and self-
determination espoused by President Woodrow Wilson, resurged in 1919.143 On 1 
March a series of mass demonstrations and peaceful protests erupted across the 
country. These demonstrations were part of an organised independence movement 
timed to coincide with the Paris Peace Conference. Korean elites sent representatives 
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to argue their case at the peace talks and to present a declaration of independence, a 
provisional constitution, and several petitions documenting Japan’s oppressive and 
brutal rule.144 Drawing on the principles of Wilson’s Fourteen Points which Japan 
had outwardly accepted, Korean delegates hoped to make a strong case for the 
nullification of the Annexation Treaty of 1910.145 Organised mass demonstrations, 
protests, and strikes in the peninsula were designed to draw international attention 
to Korea and to undermine Japanese claims of presiding over a peaceful and 
contented colony.146 As such, leaders of the movement instructed that there should 
be no violence towards the Japanese as it could undermine their moral position.147 
However, the movement had been planned at a time of increased tension in Korea 
after the sudden, and according to contemporary observers, suspicious death of King 
Kojong in January that year.148 The funeral, which was to take place in Seoul in early 
March, had presented an opportunity to circumvent the rigid restrictions forbidding 
group gatherings and allowed for large numbers of Koreans to travel and meet in 
cities under the pretext of mourning.149 Thus, while directions for non-violence were 
followed for the first few days, underlying friction soon erupted into violent clashes.  
Demonstrators began throwing stones, charging police stations, and 
assaulting the considerably outnumbered Kempeitai (military police units). Though 
caught by surprise, initial Japanese responses had been calm and controlled, aiming 
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simply at dispersing large crowds and arresting principal leaders of the movement. 
However, as unrest spread throughout the country, showing no signs of abating, 
efforts to restore peace and order became more violent as the Kempeitai stormed 
crowds with bayonets and on occasion opened fire.150 The situation quickly devolved 
and began to garner international attention. Demands for independence challenged 
claims of the magnanimity of Japanese rule and their potential as a benevolent leader 
in Asia. Consequently, widespread and mounting disorder soon became an 
embarrassment, especially in Paris where delegates were arguing for Japan to retain 
control of former German possessions in the Pacific and were working to secure 
acceptance of the racial equality clause. Thus, there was a sense of urgency in quickly 
suppressing the movement and the leadership in Tokyo recommended that 
Governor-General Hasegawa use harsh measures to swiftly and decisively crush the 
movement.151  
 Soon after receiving military reinforcements, Hasegawa issued warnings to 
the Korean people threatening to ‘relentlessly punish anybody daring to commit 
offences against the peace.’152 In the cities, crowds were dispersed with force which 
included bayonettings, beatings, and indiscriminate firing of weapons into large 
groups.153 In a letter written on 10 April 1919, a foreign observer noted that ‘men are 
being arrested here every day, and even before a question is asked them are flogged 
with a two-inch square rod.’154 Thousands were arrested and imprisoned, often for 
simply being present at a demonstration or for a trivial crime such as shouting ‘long-
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live Korea’ (mansei). In prisons, people were treated to appalling conditions due to 
overcrowding, limited rations, and, on some occasions, were even tortured.155 Such 
measures were restrained in comparison to subjugation efforts undertaken in the 
countryside, however. A number of American missionaries residing in Korea at this 
time reported instances of entire villages being destroyed and reprisal massacres of 
men, women, and children.156  In Suwon during early April, the IJA engaged in 
scorched earth operations and punitive expeditions leaving the area desolate. 
According to a correspondent for the Japan Advertiser, H. H. Underwood, who had 
travelled through Suwon soon after, the region was marred by burning villages and 
smoking ruins while bodies lay ‘strewn about’.157 One of the most famous incidents 
reported at this time involved the burning to death of twenty-nine inhabitants in 
Cheam-ni who had been locked inside a church after which the building was set 
alight.158 Such acts garnered international attention after being publicised by the 
foreign community in Korea, some of whom accused Japanese forces of planning to 
exterminate the Christian population of the peninsula.159 By the end of April, the 
situation had been brought under control, though not without damage to Japan’s 
international reputation and domestic criticism of the military. 160  Facing 
condemnation over what were deemed to be excessive and unprovoked subjugation 
efforts, the Japanese government were forced to reassess colonial policies in Taiwan 
and Korea. In the aftermath, a number of administrative changes were implemented 
marking an end to repressive military rule. By 1921, both Taiwan and Korea had 
come under the Japanese Constitution and were to be governed as an extension of 
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Japan Proper through encouraging assimilation (dōka).161 
 Thus, as in Taiwan, Japanese efforts to address resistance in Korea were 
inherently violent and showed a potential for escalation. They were also consistent in 
the practices employed as Japanese forces engaged in scorched earth policies, 
executed suspicious men, and enacted violent reprisal massacres. Early efforts to 
crush insurgency in Korea often intensified according to the situation on the ground 
and the difficulties of countering guerrilla warfare, emphasising the importance of 
the local situation in driving more extreme responses. However, the analysis of the 
Japanese reaction to the independence movement in 1919 underscores the added 
importance of the wider geopolitical context. The use of harsh measures at this time, 
condemned internationally and within Japan, was related more to the 
embarrassment of the movement (which had the potential to harm Japanese efforts at 
the Peace Conference), than it was a reaction commensurate with conditions on the 
ground. Japanese forces were ordered to quickly suppress the demonstrations and 
harsh methods were condoned by the government who sent military reinforcements 
to achieve this. These developments are significant for they highlight that, like other 
imperial powers, when facing resistance that was deemed to be threatening in some 
way, the Japanese leadership could be tolerant of more drastic solutions. The 
escalation in this case, as in Taiwan, was not sustained and had repercussions in 
respect to reinforcing calls for reform of colonial policy at home. This shift in 
attitudes towards the colonies, while a reflection of the anti-imperial international 
atmosphere, was also due to important domestic changes. Indeed, despite the rise of 
anti-Western and pan-Asian ideas in Japan, particularly within military circles where 
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a more autonomous foreign policy was promoted, the post-war leadership proved 
willing to adapt to, and work within, an international framework based on 
cooperation rather than competition with the other powers.162  
FROM COOPERATIVE IMPERIALISM TO AUTONOMOUS IMPERIALISM: 
JAPAN’S ‘RETURN TO ASIA’  
In 1918, the turbulent move towards democracy in Japan had come to fruition when, 
against the backdrop of rice riots and social unrest, the first party cabinet was 
established by the Seiyūkai under the leadership of Hara Takashi (Kei).163 The 1920s 
witnessed a shift in the interest groups which dominated government policy. 
Typically, decisions had been made through coalition and compromise between the 
bureaucrats and the military, overseen and balanced by the influential genrō. 
However, in the 1910s, the political parties had mounted a challenge to this coalition 
and, with the First World War accelerating social changes within Japan, had begun to 
win favour among an increasingly nationally conscious populace.164 At the same time, 
the aging genrō’s influence was waning and a new generation of statesmen proved 
determined to wrest their remaining power from them – an example of which can be 
seen in the issuance of the Twenty-One Demands, pursued without consultation 
with, and against the wishes of, Yamagata Aritomo.165 Most importantly, the military 
was relegated to a peripheral position in policy making. The defeat of Germany by 
countries whose war efforts had been mobilised by their civilian rather than military 
governments had damaged the military’s esteem. 166  As the Japanese economy 
suffered under the strain of post-war recession, the military lost popular support for 
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its costly and unsuccessful five-year intervention in Siberia.167 Their decline in power 
at this time coincided with the rising status of the zaibatsu, a group of important 
financial and business cliques that had benefitted from economic expansion brought 
about by the war.168 In short, the military and the genrō had lost influence while the 
financial conglomerates and party politicians had come to the fore. 169  As a 
consequence, military spending was much reduced and, as Akira Iriye noted, the 
civilian-dominated government, in spite of discord at home, embraced peaceful 
economic expansion under the rhetoric of ‘coexistence and common prosperity’.170  
The leadership at this time meant to salvage foreign relations, especially with 
the US, in the aftermath of the more aggressive policies of the war years. The 
changed nature of warfare and Japan’s unpreparedness to meet the demands of that 
change, in addition to continued economic instability and dependency on foreign 
trade, increased awareness among politicians of needing to retain good relations 
with the other powers.171 Thus, regardless of hostility from some quarters in Japan, 
the leadership ratified, and later complied with, the terms of important treaties 
agreed at the Washington Conference between 1921 and 1922. These treaties 
appeared to offer only limited benefits to Japan while at the same time diluting 
earlier agreements which had ensured national security and the Empire’s ‘special 
position’ in China.172 The acceptance of them had only been possible in the more 
democratic and liberal domestic climate of this time. However, important 
international developments towards the end of the decade undermined Japanese 
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democracy, hastened the return of the military to the centre of political life, 
challenged the efficacy of cooperative foreign policy, and paved the way for the more 
autonomous and aggressive imperialism of the 1930s.  
In addition to a burgeoning communist influence in China, the growth and 
increased belligerency of Chinese nationalism intensified concerns for Japan’s 
position on the continent. Since the First World War, there had been a greater 
determination on the part of the Chinese to overthrow the unequal treaties and 
subvert foreign rule. During the early 1920s, this had taken the form of anti-foreign 
movements, boycotts, and attacks. Such efforts had a profound effect on Japanese 
interests in Manchuria and, as Young pointed out, significantly altered relations with 
collaborators, like the warlord Zhang Zuolin.173 By 1926, there was even greater cause 
for alarm. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Guomindang (GMD), the Chinese 
Nationalist Party, had temporarily allied with the nascent Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and launched the Northern Expedition to subdue unruly warlords in the 
northeast and unite China. These efforts threatened Japan’s long-held position in 
Manchuria which was increasingly seen as a ‘lifeline’ to Japan for its economic 
resources and position as a buffer-zone against the Soviet Union which, at this time, 
had been a cause of mounting trepidation in some Japanese circles. 174  More 
importantly, a united nationalist China would jeopardise the vision of a Japan-led 
East Asian regional bloc favoured in military circles.175 By 1928, a distinctly anti-
Japanese movement had emerged in China after officers of the Kwantung Army, 
acting of their own volition, orchestrated the assassination of Zhang Zuolin. At the 
same time, Britain and the US recognised Chiang’s government and made 
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concessions that would facilitate the eventual end of the treaty system in China.176 By 
the end of the decade, Japan faced significant challenges to its perceived security 
needs and interests on the continent which cooperative imperialism did not appear 
to be resolving.  
Soon exacerbating the impact of these problems was the economic crisis that 
gripped Japan in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash in 1929. Coinciding with the 
Hamaguchi Cabinet’s retrenchment policies and unfortunate decision to return to the 
gold standard (which Japan, like other imperial powers, had left during the First 
World War), global recession hit the nation hard as the spirit of international 
cooperation was replaced with protectionist trade policies.177 Worldwide recession 
and the concomitant decline of trade had a profound and destabilising effect on 
Japanese society. Unemployment rose, wages decreased, labour disputes erupted, 
and social cleavages deepened. As they moved into the 1930s, the leadership had 
serious fears that domestic order might collapse.178 The impact that this turmoil had 
on the political circumstances in Japan, particularly in facilitating the shift towards 
more authoritarian, fascist perhaps, forms of government in the late 1930s, has been 
well-documented in the literature. These works explain how, as the effects of global 
retrenchment intensified, the government’s failure to lift Japan out of recession, 
accompanied by a series of financial scandals that exposed the corruption of party 
politicians who appeared to work only for the benefit of themselves and their zaibatsu 
allies, undermined democracy in Japan. They also detail the radicalisation and 
factionalism ongoing in the military and explain how, between 1930 and 1936, radical 
young army officers, typically from rural communities which suffered most in the 
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economic crisis, secured the ascendency of the military in Japanese politics through 
terrorising and assassinating their opposition.179 More important to the concerns of 
this thesis, however, was the impact this had on Japanese perceptions of the 
international world and the Empire’s future within it.  
The nationalists and militarists who, for years, had criticised the liberal and 
democratic foundations of the cooperative foreign policy pursued by party 
politicians which, they argued, would be potentially ruinous for smaller countries 
should the ‘have’ nations decide not to share, were vindicated as the other powers 
put up barriers and adopted nation-first trade policies.180 Earlier insecurities, albeit 
mutated ones, about Japan’s survival in an international world that appeared to be 
returning to competition over cooperation were revived and exacerbated by the 
unfavourable circumstances on the continent. One political commentator, for 
instance, claimed that ‘at no time in the past has Japan been so menaced by economic 
troubles from external sources as she is today.’181 As a result, there was a gradual 
shift in attitudes that allowed for greater acceptance of the anti-Western, pan-Asian 
ideas espoused vociferously by those on the periphery since the First World War. 
Reflecting these trends, the Japan Magazine published a number of articles in the early 
1930s that included discussions of the grave situation in respect to nationalism and 
anti-Japanism in China, the menace of communism, the looming threat of the Soviet 
Union, the long-term discriminatory treatment of the ‘Asiatics’, and the unfairness of 
the ‘have’ countries in keeping the wealth of the world to themselves while 
                                                             
179 Crowley, Japan’s Quest offers a detailed, if older, account. For more recent literature see Janis Mimura, 
Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State (Ithaca, 2011), 41–69.  
180 Iriye, ‘Ideology of Japanese Imperialism’, 39–40. 
181 M. Arikawa, ‘Menaces from Russia and China’, Japan Magazine (May 1931), 335. 
107 
 
simultaneously preventing the expansion of the ‘have not’ nations. 182  In this 
turbulent milieu, earlier proposals for ‘leading Asia’ to their liberation and for 
constructing a self-sufficient regional bloc gained increasing influence and popularity. 
Thus, when staff officers of the Kwantung Army, Itagaki Seishirō and Ishiwara Kanji, 
staged an incident at Mukden that initiated a full-scale invasion of Manchuria in 
September 1931, their military adventurism met with widespread popular support or, 
as Young puts it, ‘war fever’ in Japan.183  
Since the Kwantung Army’s unilateral actions, in contrast to 1928, had met 
with such widespread popularity, the leadership had limited scope for admonishing 
the officers involved and were forced to retrospectively sanction the invasion. 
Thereafter, the Kwantung Army continued its assault and, by May 1933, when the 
Tanggu Truce brought an end to the fighting, all of Manchuria (established as the 
‘independent’ state of Manchukuo in February 1932), in addition to the province of 
Jehol, had come under Japanese control. The Manchurian Incident, as it has become 
known, was a turning point for Japanese imperialism for a number of reasons. First, 
as Young noted, it set a dangerous precedent. From this point, Japanese policy in 
China would be shaped by a series of ‘incidents’ staged by field officers who would 
use outbursts of fighting with Chinese troops as a pretext to encroach further into 
Chinese territory.184  Second, it was a facilitating factor in the return of the military to 
the centre of political life. Coinciding with the nation’s fast recovery from economic 
recession – a result of the Keynesian policies of Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo 
and a brief surge in Japanese trade in Southeast Asia – the apparent success in 
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Manchuria helped to bolster support for the military and its strategists’ proposals for 
a more regionally-based pan-Asian and autonomous foreign policy. 185  Finally, 
international condemnation of the Kwantung Army’s aggression in Manchuria 
served as a breaking point for those in Japan who had, over the decades, grown 
resentful and frustrated by international responses to Japanese expansion. 
Foreshadowing the rhetoric of imperialism in later years, the Japanese 
leadership had justified the invasion of Manchuria as an act of benevolence and as an 
act of self-defence. For instance, in an address to the 63rd Imperial Diet on 25 August 
1932, Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai explained that Japan had simply provided 
assistance to the people of Manchuria in their efforts to achieve independence from 
the despotic and corrupt rule of warlords like Zhang Xueliang. At the same time, the 
Kwantung Army had acted for the protection of Japanese civilians and, more 
importantly, ‘had been forced to adopt necessary measures for the prevention of 
wanton attacks upon important rights and interests vital for her national 
existence.’186 While the other powers had been somewhat sympathetic to the impact 
of anti-Japanese activities in China, after the outbreak of fighting in Shanghai in 
January 1932, during which Japanese forces bombed the city, attitudes began to shift 
against Japan.187 The leadership’s claims of acting in the interests of self-defence and 
self-determination for the people of Manchuria were less convincing to delegates at 
the League who, on the advice of the Lytton Commission (sent to investigate the 
situation towards the end of 1931), denounced Japanese activities in the region.188 In 
Japan, with ideas about Manchukuo’s importance as a ‘lifeline’ circulating more 
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widely through the speeches and writings of men like Shiratori and Matsuoka 
Yōsuke, international censure was perceived to be unfair and discriminatory 
especially since, as the columnist Abe Ken’ichi explained, other options for Japanese 
expansion, such as trade and immigration, were prohibited by the policies of the 
other powers. 189  Thus, on 24 February 1933, as the League voted to adopt the 
recommendations of the Lytton Commission which recommended withdrawal of 
Japanese troops from Manchuria, Matsuoka advised that the Japanese had ‘different 
views on the manner to achieve peace in the Far East’, had ‘reached the limit of their 
endeavours to cooperate with the League of Nations’, and subsequently walked 
out.190 This move symbolised a rejection of the post-First World War international 
system and a ‘return to Asia’ (which Japan has ‘left’ to pursue imperialism in the 
1890s). While Japan had not completely broken with this system, subsequent years 
saw pan-Asian ideas for region-building begin to gain more traction and filter more 
and more into government policy.191 At the same time, continued turmoil on the 
continent and the nation’s self-imposed international isolation gave rise to renewed 
insecurities which reflected a revival of older ideas about Japan’s future in a 
competitive and hostile world.192 As I will elaborate over subsequent chapters, these 
evolving insecurities and ideologies would shape the direction of Japanese 
imperialism and, as the leadership gradually came to embrace a strategy of region-
building based on the pan-Asian, anti-Western principles that had been fermenting 
over these years, would provide a context conducive to the radicalisation of violence.        
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The early uncertainties and fears that had emerged among the Japanese leadership 
during first interactions with the imperial world of the nineteenth century were not 
easily forgotten and, while constantly ebbing, flowing, and mutating according to the 
changing domestic and international contexts of the time, they remained constant, 
albeit underlying, companions to Japanese imperial pursuits. By the 1930s, the nation 
seemed to face increased threats and challenges in the form of economic difficulties, 
declining relations with the other powers, more belligerent nationalism in China, and 
the rise of communist influence in Asia. Long-term frustrations with the other 
powers and the growing influence of pan-Asian ideas for building an autarkic 
regional bloc, led to the gradual ‘return to Asia’ and an embrace of a more 
autonomous imperialism. Ultimately, the resurgence of insecurities, the rejection of 
the old world order, and domestically, the return of the military to political power, 
would have implications for the Asian populations, long perceived to be backwards 
and in need of guidance, who resisted Japanese efforts to construct this regional bloc.   
Analysis of responses to resistance in Taiwan and Korea indicate that the 
Japanese military had a propensity for an escalation of violence in reaction to 
guerrilla-style tactics which proved difficult to combat and distorted perceived 
distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, allowing for violence against 
civilians. Despite the potential for more extreme methods, brutal and repressive 
policies in Taiwan and Korea, very rarely called for wholesale destruction. In fact, 
when ‘excesses’ did occur they were often condemned leading to a de-escalation and 
a change in the methods of population control. Nevertheless, these early experiences 
had seen taboos broken, lines blurred, and indiscriminate, systematic violence 
become standard methods in the suppression of resistance. Indeed, reprisal 
111 
 
massacres, summary execution of military-aged men, and comprehensive scorched 
earth strategies had become permissible and normal responses to opposition. In the 
turbulent milieu of the late 1930s and early 1940s which, as will be elaborated in 
subsequent chapters, enabled the creation of a context conducive to extreme 
measures, these responses would radicalise as the potential for genocidal violence in 






Obviously no lasting peace can be hoped for until Japan, Manchukuo 
and China, the three countries responsible for the stability of East 
Asia, are speedily united in the realization of the above mentioned 
common objective – the establishment of a new order to replace the old. 
…I hope the above intention of Japan will be understood correctly by 
the Chinese so that they may cooperate with us without the slightest 
apprehension. Otherwise, the construction of the new order would be 
impossible. As for those who fail to understand to the end and persist 
even hereafter in their opposition to Japan, we have no other 
alternative than to exterminate them.  
[Address of Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirō at the 74th Session of 










THE ‘CHINA INCIDENT’ 
On 7 July 1937, a local skirmish between Chinese and Japanese soldiers at Lugouqiao 
(Marco Polo Bridge) on the outskirts of Beijing quickly escalated into an all-out, albeit 
undeclared, war. This conflict was striking for its incredible scale of death and 
destruction. Though exact figures will never be known, Diana Lary estimates that 
between 20 and 30 million civilians and soldiers lost their lives in China.1 Brutalities 
abound on both sides as, amidst what was primarily an asymmetric total war, 
unconventional and often ruthless measures were employed. Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Guomindang (GMD), fighting for its survival by 1938, utilised all available means 
including scorched earth defence strategies which saw the deliberate flooding of the 
Yellow River in June 1938.2 Similarly, outnumbered, increasingly overstretched, and 
facing unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance, Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) 
commanders resorted to terror tactics aimed to inflict maximum civilian damage in 
their efforts to smash Chinese resistance and end a conflict which they had never 
anticipated lasting more than a few weeks.3 Aerial bombardment of undefended 
cities, bio-chemical experimentation and warfare, sexual violence (including 
institutionalised sexual slavery), forced labour, summary execution of Chinese 
captives, and comprehensive scorched earth strategies were some of the features of 
the IJA’s conduct in this war.   
Some scholars, such as Lloyd Eastman, have argued that atrocities 
concomitant with this type of terror-driven warfare were the exception rather than 
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the rule, especially in the occupied areas where life went on as normal.4 To be sure, 
war in China was a not a litany of atrocities from start to finish. However, Eastman’s 
statement is relative. While it is true that those like Gavan McCormack, who 
described the conflict as ‘Nanjing writ large’, exaggerated the realities of the war 
experience in China, there were areas where, at times, atrocities did become 
normalised practices.5 For example, the IJA’s advance from Shanghai to Nanjing 
between November and December 1937 devastated the Yangtze region as soldiers 
moved rapidly leaving a trail of destruction in their wake. In their efforts to 
consolidate occupied China, Japanese forces were engaged in anti-guerrilla 
operations for much of the war and, in these campaigns, progressively left rural areas 
desolate as they burned and massacred their way through villages suspected of 
harbouring insurgents. Of particular interest given the aims of this thesis is that, in 
both of these cases, violence escalated culminating in the intentional destruction of 
substantial parts of the Chinese population in those areas. In December 1937, after 
weeks of unbridled violence from soldiers let loose on the Chinese populace residing 
along the route from Shanghai, commanders ordered a deliberate and organised 
round–up and execution of a large part of the military-aged male population in and 
around Nanjing. The IJA’s anti-guerrilla operations in occupied China saw an even 
more drastic escalation of violence when, after years of unsuccessful subjugation 
efforts, the IJA adopted a counter-insurgency strategy in 1941 that was premised on 
rooting out guerrillas through intentionally making uninhabitable those areas 
deemed ‘unpacified’. In other words, the genocidal potential of Japanese imperialism, 
identified in the preceding chapters, was unleashed during these campaigns.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine in detail the process of 
radicalisation in China in order to identify the factors underlying the embrace of 
genocidal violence in the aforementioned cases. Building on the analysis of the 
preceding chapters, I pay particular attention to the role of insecurity, ideology and, 
most importantly, resistance as the primary forces driving the escalation of violence 
on the battlefield. Since the embrace of intentionally group-destructive measures was 
exceptional and not usually sustained in China, I also concentrate on the role played 
by a dynamic context, shaped by variable local and geopolitical factors, to further 
understand how commanders came to adopt more extreme measures in their efforts 
to quash Chinese resistance at particular times. In doing so, I aim to provide a 
layered analysis of the interplay between the wider international context and the 
immediate situation on the ground in producing an environment conducive to 
genocidal violence.    
The chapter is organised into three distinct sections. In the first section, I offer 
an overview of the origins of the conflict and the way in which war aims were 
defined by the Japanese government since this had a significant bearing on the 
conduct of the IJA in China. I then move to a broad analysis of that conduct aiming to 
show how the leadership gave sanction to commanders on the ground to use all 
available means and, in doing so, established a space of exception favourable to 
genocidal violence. I also examine the ways in which the characterisation of the war 
as having decidedly imperial overtones made it similar to earlier encounters with 
resistance in Taiwan and Korea and exacerbated embedded perceptions of the 
Chinese as inferior which facilitated the use of unconventional, ruthless measures 
perpetrated towards a people whose lives simply mattered less to the IJA.  
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Having considered the implications of the wider context of the war, I narrow 
my focus in the second section of this chapter by exploring the escalation of violence 
during the campaign in the Yangtze region and its conclusion in the organised mass 
killing of part of the male population of Nanjing. I begin with a brief discussion of 
the decision to capture the city, underscoring its significance as the GMD capital, and 
then focus on the experiences and encounters along the march from Shanghai aiming 
to show how, in the context of exception and permissibility established by the 
leadership, attitudes, behaviours, and acceptable methods of warfare were 
radicalised, laying the foundations for greater levels of violence at Nanjing in 
December. Next, I examine the capture of the city, paying particular attention to local 
conditions as the Japanese entered the capital, before considering the nature of the 
violence let loose in December 1937 as part of the IJA’s terror driven warfare in China. 
In the final part of this section, I analyse the organised, deliberate massacres of a 
large portion of the male population in the city. Here I emphasise the important 
interplay between the memories and learning of the march and the realities of 
conditions at Nanjing in driving the intentional destruction of a considerable part of 
the male population.  
In the final section of this chapter, I examine the longer-term process of 
radicalisation during the IJA’s anti-guerrilla operations in occupied China from 1938. 
I begin by exploring the shifts in the nature of the war, detailing in particular how 
the burdens of a protracted conflict, in addition to the government’s plans to 
establish a New Order in East Asia, refocused attention on the increasingly 
important task of consolidating territory nominally under Japanese control. Since 
guerrilla resistance had intensified at this time, I give an overview of the situation 
and challenges Japanese forces faced in these efforts and examine the ever more 
117 
 
systematic and indiscriminate measures employed in early anti-guerrilla strategy. 
Finally, I analyse the abrupt intensification of Japanese tactics which, following a 
massive offensive launched by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) guerrilla forces 
in August 1940, resulted in the adoption of a comprehensive scorched earth strategy 
that involved the elimination of the populations in certain areas. I explain, however, 
that while circumstances on the ground acted to trigger the escalation of violence, 
such extreme measures were embraced by commanders who, due to changes in the 












UNDECLARED AND UNRESTRAINED 
Establishing a Battlefield Context Conducive to Extreme Violence 
War between China and Japan, as mentioned, was triggered by a minor dispute on 7 
July 1937. In this respect, conflict began in the same way as a number of other 
‘incidents’ that had flared at various intervals during the early 1930s – by the 
provocation of officers on the ground rather than at the instigation of the leadership. 
However, where previous disputes had been settled locally, the situation in 1937 
escalated and, by the end of the year, the IJA had become entrenched in a war of 
attrition that would last until August 1945. Indeed, despite intentions to settle the 
situation locally, the leadership on both sides undermined a ceasefire agreement 
reached by field commanders on 11 July by sending further reinforcements to the 
area.6 As fighting intensified over the following weeks, the Japanese leadership still 
hoped to contain the conflict to the north. In fact, there was an expectation that 
events would play out in much the same way as they had over the past few years, 
with favourable concessions from Chiang’s government and expansion of Japanese 
influence in north China. Initially, the leadership had no explicit objectives for this 
undeclared war. As fighting progressed over subsequent days, however, Japanese 
aims began to crystallise and would later have implications for the way in which war 
would be fought.   
‘CHASTISING THE CHINESE’: JAPAN’S WAR AIMS  
Although not orchestrated by the leadership who professed no territorial ambitions 
on the continent, this ‘incident’ was to be used as a pretext for realising long-term 
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ambitions in the region. 7  Influenced by the uncertainties that prevailed in the 
turbulent 1930s, Japanese interest in north China had grown in the wake of the 
Manchurian Incident. Within a climate of continued economic difficulty, mounting 
international isolation, and increasing disillusionment with a world order perceived 
to be discriminatory towards Japan, prominent figures, such as General Matsui 
Iwane, Minister of Colonial Affairs Nagai Ryūtarō, and Viscount Kaneko Kentarō, 
advocated a closer relationship between China, Japan, and Manchukuo. Inspired by 
the pan-Asian ideas that were circulating more widely in the 1930s, this relationship 
was to be styled on the American Monroe Doctrine and would involve the creation of 
a regional bloc that would enable Japan to achieve self-sufficiency and bolster the 
nation’s defences.8  North China, due to its high resource potential and strategic 
position as a buffer-zone against the Soviet Union, was understood among military 
strategists to be important, if not essential, to these plans.9 However, between 1933 
and 1936, as James Crowley has detailed, Japan’s policy in China was marked by 
inconsistency as groups within the Foreign, Navy, and War Ministries disagreed 
over the best strategy for expanding Japanese interest in the region.10 By August 1936, 
a consensus had been reached as the development of a closer relationship between 
China, Japan, and Manchukuo under the principles of ‘coexistence and coprosperity’ 
became a basic tenet of national policy. Thereafter, strategy in north China would 
                                                             
7 For a more detailed account of the origins of the war from both Chinese and Japanese perspectives see 
Rana Mitter, China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival (London, 2013), 17–69. 
8 See the following articles in the Japan Magazine: Matsui Iwane, ‘Asiatic League’ (April–May 1933), 156–
60; Nagai Ryūtarō, ‘Mission of Young Japan’ (September 1933), 10–5; Kaneko Kentarō, ‘Japan’s Monroe 
Doctrine’ (September 1933), 19–22. 
9 For further discussion of Japanese interests on the continent at this time see Nakamura Takafusa, 
‘Japan’s Economic Thrust into North China, 1933–1938’, in Iriye, Chinese and the Japanese, 220–53 & 
Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Ithaca, 
1987). 
10 James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–8 (Princeton, 
1966), 187–243 gives a detailed account of China policy over these years. 
120 
 
involve extending Japanese influence so as to make the area into a pro-Japanese and 
anti-communist autonomous region.11 
Expediting a consensus over policy at this time were developments on the 
continent, specifically the pervasiveness of an overt and increasingly belligerent anti-
Japanese sentiment and the apparent spread of communism, which the leadership 
found alarming. Sino-Japanese relations had stabilised briefly after the signing of the 
Tanggu Truce in 1933. However, the aggressive actions of Japanese field 
commanders in the summer of 1935 – actions which had effectively excluded the 
GMD from the provinces of Hebei and Chahar – caused a renewal of anti-Japanese 
demonstrations, boycotts, and attacks on civilians and property.12 The government 
understood that these acts, encouraged by the GMD, were part of an attempt to oust, 
once and for all, Japanese interests from the Chinese mainland. This was a 
proposition that, given China’s ostensible importance to the nation’s defence, was 
unacceptable to the supporters of empire. Thus, the resurgence and intensification of 
anti-Japanese sentiment at a time of uncertainty was disconcerting both for its direct 
challenge to Japanese interests on the continent and for its alleged connections to 
communism.   
Indeed, the apparent ‘rampancy’ of the CCP was a situation which, according 
to Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki, the government watched with ‘grave misgivings’.13 
In an address to the 68th Imperial Diet in January 1936, Hirota reiterated these 
concerns suggesting that the so-called ‘Red Menace’ was ‘the greatest of all 
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difficulties confronting China’.14 Exacerbating the leadership’s alarm, which was at 
odds with the reality of the CCP’s decline following Chiang Kai-shek’s encirclement 
campaigns and the Long March, was the apparent refocusing of communist efforts 
on Japan after the Comintern met in August 1935.15 According to a pamphlet entitled 
‘Communist Plottings in the Far East’ published by the South Manchurian Railway 
Company, the main objective established at this meeting comprised directly 
challenging Japanese influence in order to realise the ultimate goals of ‘sovietising’ 
Asia. This was to be achieved, first and foremost, through spreading communist 
influence in China.16 By 1936, the leadership’s fears over the unstable state of affairs 
on the continent had been heightened when, with the encouragement of the Soviet 
Union, the CCP suspended its opposition to the GMD and, after the Xi’an Incident in 
December, became allies in a united front against Japanese imperialism.17 This truce, 
however precarious it may have been, represented a determination to confront 
Japanese imperialism in China and presented a significant threat to the interests and 
ambitions which, by this time, were deeply embedded in Japan’s defence strategy.  
Thus, the outbreak of conflict in 1937 was an opportunity to both realise 
Japanese ambitions in north China and address emerging threats on the continent. 
The Bureau of Information, for example, presented the idea that Japan should 
demand the creation of a buffer-zone in north China ‘with a view to neutralizing and 
averting those disastrous forces.’ 18  However, staff officers, like Ishiwara Kanji, 
warned that should conflict become prolonged, it would dangerously strain the 
Japanese economy. In doing so, goals of self-sufficiency and preparations for defence 
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against the Soviet Union would likely be jeopardised. 19  This was particularly 
important since Soviet-Japanese relations had deteriorated amid frequent border 
rumblings and Soviet military strength had substantially increased following a 
massive rearmament drive after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.20 Consequently, 
a swift end to a contained conflict in the north was deemed absolutely essential to 
Japan’s long-term national security goals.  
These plans were soon thwarted when Chiang Kai-shek made a conscious 
decision to expand the fighting to central China after another ‘incident’ between 
Chinese and Japanese soldiers in Shanghai on 9 August 1937. The widening of the 
conflict represented Chiang’s commitment to taking a firm stand against further 
Japanese encroachment into Chinese territory.21 It also signalled a shift in the nature 
of the war. Up to this point, the Japanese government had repeatedly stressed that 
their forceful response was primarily defensive. However, frustrated by the audacity 
of Chiang’s move and recognising that a localised settlement was no longer possible, 
the leadership was forced to reassess war aims, or lack thereof, now that conflict had 
expanded. In an official statement issued on 15 August, the underlying cause of the 
‘incident’ was depicted as a consequence of ‘an atmosphere of hostility towards 
Japan’. Furthermore, it was argued, ‘[t]he Chinese, over-confident of their national 
strength, contemptuous of our power, and also in league with the Communists, have 
assumed towards Japan an increasingly arrogant and insulting attitude.’ As a 
consequence, the Japanese government had ‘lost patience’. Thus, while professing no 
‘ill-will toward the innocent Chinese masses’, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro 
nevertheless announced his intentions to employ a policy of ‘chastisement’ as a 
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means of making the Nationalist government ‘reflect on its policies’.22 Elaborating 
further on this ambiguous war aim at the 72nd Imperial Diet on 5 September, Konoe 
explained that the IJA had been forced to ‘deal a firm and decisive blow’ to the 
Nationalist government and the Chinese army, ‘so that it may lose completely its will 
to fight.’23  The aim and character of the conflict as established by the Japanese 
government at this time would have serious implications for the way in which the 
IJA conducted its campaign in China.  
UNLEASHING THE ‘HORRORS OF WAR’: IJA CONDUCT IN CHINA  
The leadership was keen to quickly and decisively end the fighting in China since 
there were very real fears that it would disrupt long-term defence preparations and 
that the Japanese public would eventually become frustrated with the strain of a 
protracted engagement.24 As such, despite the expansion of fighting, the government 
avoided an official declaration of war, referring to the conflict instead as an ‘incident’. 
This meant that International Laws of War, as stipulated in the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions (to which Japan was signatory but had not ratified), were not in force. 
On 5 August 1937, this position was clarified in a notice to the China Garrison 
Army’s Chief of Staff which gave the following counsel: ‘it is inappropriate to act 
strictly in accordance with various stipulations in “Treaties and Practices Governing 
Land Warfare and Other Laws of War”. As Fujiwara Akira observed, such a 
statement was tantamount to saying that ‘there is no need to obey international 
law’.25 This in itself did not make extreme violence inevitable, but it did mean that 
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Japanese military commanders were advising their subordinates that there were no 
constraints on warfare conducted in China. In effect, field commanders were given 
sanction to use all available means to swiftly end a potentially disastrous conflict as 
quickly as possible. The IJA took advantage of the absence of restraints and, as 
detailed by Wellington Koo, Chinese delegate to the League of Nations, employed 
illegal methods including indiscriminate bombardment of cities and bio-chemical 
warfare from the outset.26 By condoning such measures, the leadership established a 
space of exception in China. This allowed for a context of increased potential for 
atrocities as commanders were given freedom to determine the most efficient means, 
regardless of ruthlessness or legality, for achieving what were often unrealistic 
demands.27 In doing so, they implicitly encouraged the violent extremes of their 
commanders who, able to operate with impunity, could apply a ‘by any means 
necessary’ policy in their efforts to smash Chinese resistance and quickly end the war. 
 The (mis)treatment of POWs in China is an excellent example of the way in 
which this ‘exceptional’ context set the stage for atrocities in this undeclared total 
conflict. Having advised commanders that they had no obligation to follow 
international laws, high command also failed to develop a standardised policy 
regarding the handling of Chinese captives. The interrogation of Lieutenant-General 
Mutō Akira, Vice Chief of Staff of the Central China Area Army (CCAA), at Sugamo 
prison in 1946, revealed that this was not an oversight, but a conscious decision on 
the part of the military leadership. According to Mutō:  
[t]he question of whether Chinese captives would be declared prisoners of war or not 
was quite a problem and it was finally decided in 1938 that because the Chinese 
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conflict was officially known as an ‘incident’ that Chinese captives would not be 
regarded as prisoners of war.28   
Consequently, the fate of Chinese prisoners was left up to commanders on the 
ground. Since no POW camps were established and no supplies for the sustenance of 
prisoners were provided, presenting serious practical difficulties in detaining 
captives, Japanese forces in China often avoided doing so. This caught the attention 
of foreign observers, such as Hallet Abend, who remarked on the lack of prisoners 
witnessed during travels in the occupied areas.29 Henri Johan Diederick De Fremery, 
a former military adviser for the Nationalist government turned Dutch spy, held 
‘grim suspicions’ and wrote in a report to the Dutch government that POWs were 
‘unheard of’ in China.30 Japanese sources indicate awareness among commanders 
that the absence of prisoners was attracting the attention of the foreign press. During 
the Battle of Shanghai in September 1937, the Chief of Staff of the Shanghai 
Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant-General Iinuma Mamoru, for instance, received a 
request that captives to be sent to the rear to assuage foreign concerns.31 Iinuma 
responded that matters concerning prisoners should be left to the frontline troops 
and his diary further revealed that those units were in fact killing Chinese captives at 
Shanghai because of ‘hostile acts among them’. 32  Not all prisoners were killed, 
however. Commanders could, and some did, release captives in other areas or use 
them for labour purposes.33 However, as Ishikawa Tatsuzō, a correspondent for the 
Japanese periodical Chūō Kōron who had travelled with the IJA during the latter of 
half of 1937, related in his novelisation of soldiers’ experiences in China, killing 
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prisoners was often the ‘simplest method of disposal’.34 The level of authority field 
commanders had was highly significant to the development of violent extremes since 
the onus was on these men on the ground to make decisions and embrace or defend 
them when necessary, setting the parameters of acceptable behaviour for their troops 
in doing so.  
One of the consequences of this was that officers reinforced a context 
conducive to violence through turning a blind eye to the atrocities committed by men 
under their command. For example, the rising number of rapes, particularly after 
Nanjing, was viewed as a growing problem by the military leadership since such acts 
fuelled Chinese hatred and spread venereal disease among the ranks. Thus, rape was 
officially prohibited and, to deal with the problem, a system of institutionalised 
sexual slavery to provide ‘comfort’ for Japanese troops was established.35 However, 
given the inherent contradictions of attempting to prevent sexual violence while at 
the same time sanctioning it under supervised conditions, these measures were not a 
success and rape of local women continued in China, and later, Southeast Asia. In a 
bulletin of punishments giving details of crimes committed in the Philippines in 1942, 
it was revealed that one reason for the persistence of rape, despite orders not to 
‘interfere with local women’, was that soldiers were not used to being punished. This, 
it was argued, was because until a change in the Army Penal Code in 1942, 
punishment for rape had been lenient and could not be undertaken unless the 
‘injured party’ brought charges through ‘customary legal channels’.36 In the absence 
of an ‘injured party’, troops could not be punished officially. Aside from encouraging 
soldiers to kill their victims, it meant that responsibility for punishing their 
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behaviour usually fell to unit commanders. Sources suggest that in China such 
efforts were half-hearted at best. In Nanjing, where thousands of rapes occurred over 
a six-week period, foreign witnesses were appalled that officers rebuked their 
subordinates with no more than a slap to the face.37 Reverend John Magee, having 
witnessed a resurgence in rapes after new troops entered the city in February 1938, 
was left with the impression that ‘the army as a whole does not look upon this as a 
crime …’ 38  Of course, these witnesses were not privy to the behind-the-scenes 
workings of the IJA. However, a report by the 11th Military Medicine and Judicial 
Department in 1939 revealed that some commanders thought of rape as ‘necessary 
for building up morale’. 39  Japanese veterans also recalled that their superiors 
overlooked such acts since it reflected badly on them.40 A memorandum from the 
Vice-Minister to the Armed Forces regarding control of troops returning from China 
gave one example in which a company commander had instructed his troops that if 
they were to ‘play’ with the women, they were to give them money or kill them so 
that they would not have ‘problems’ later.41 The indifference of commanders to the 
sexual violence (and other crimes) perpetrated by their subordinates fostered an 
atmosphere of impunity which perpetuated and facilitated the embrace of atrocities 
towards the Chinese population. 
In fact, later accounts from Japanese veterans, though likely influenced by the 
polemic post-war debates over history in East Asia, revealed that a climate of 
permissibility for brutalities towards the Chinese people was nurtured in some units 
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by commanders who urged their troops to commit atrocities as training exercises. 
Tominaga Shōzō, for instance, recalled that as a last stage in his officer field training, 
he was made to behead a Chinese captive as a ‘trial of courage’. On becoming a 
company commander, Tominaga also used human targets for bayonet practice as a 
‘finishing touch’ to the training of raw recruits from Japan.42 According to Sakakura 
Kiyoshi, the use of live prisoners was deemed important to implanting a desire to kill 
among soldiers and those who volunteered first or showed enthusiasm were often 
rewarded with faster promotions while those who hesitated or refused risked 
corporal punishment.43 Indeed, in their efforts to secure complete obedience, some 
commanders would brutalise their subordinates. 44  Sources suggest that, while 
emotional and physical abuse by superiors did not occur in all units, it was 
sufficiently widespread as to warrant attention from the leadership. According to 
captured documents, this so-called ‘personal punishment’, far from instilling 
discipline, appeared to be contributing to the increasing crime rates, particularly for 
desertion and attacks on officers, in the IJA.45 While these documents did not include 
crimes against the Chinese population in their analysis, it is likely, as Daqing Yang 
has pointed out, that the use of such practices also facilitated atrocities as soldiers 
redirected their frustration and anger.46  
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Commanders ultimately made decisions to adopt violent extremes within the 
context of the battlefield. These decisions were also shaped by the characterisation of 
the war and the parameters set by a leadership which endorsed a space of exception. 
This represented a drastic departure from earlier conflicts where commanders had 
been given strict orders to abide by international law and maintain discipline among 
their troops.47 In explaining the dramatic shift in the IJA’s conduct in 1937, scholars 
have pointed to significant changes in Japanese military culture which, as mentioned, 
began to enforce total obedience through the brutalisation of soldiers and bred 
contempt for enemy captives. 48  For example, a textbook for Non-Commissioned 
Officers issued in January 1933 underscored the contemptuous attitude held for 
Chinese soldiers when it gave the following advice for dealing with captives: 
There is no need to send them to the rear for confinement and wait to see how the 
war situation changes – as we would do with nationals of other [Western] powers. In 
the absence of special circumstances, it is alright to release them on the spot or 
transport them elsewhere for release. The Chinks’ domicile registration system is full 
of defects, and most Chink soldiers are the scum of society, so there is little way for 
anyone to check whether they are alive or where they are. Thus, even if you were to 
kill them or release them elsewhere, no one will broach the issue.49   
Though this might account for the indifference and disdain that shaped treatment of 
POWs in China, the embrace of tactics that progressively targeted the civilian 
population is best understood through consideration of the decidedly imperial 
overtones of this conflict. This was not a war of equals. According to the leadership, 
it was not a war at all. Faced with fierce and unprecedented resistance from August 
1937, the campaign in China later that year became punitive in nature which, as 
Callum MacDonald has pointed out, made it more akin to the military’s subjugation 
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efforts in Taiwan and Korea.50 These early encounters with resistance (described in 
Chapter Two) had presented opportunities for learning and provided the IJA with an 
arsenal of tried and tested techniques for subduing unruly populations. By framing 
war as a ‘chastisement’ and establishing a context of exception, much like that in 
place in both Taiwan and Korea until 1921, the leadership permitted commanders to 
use those established techniques – the punitive expeditions, summary executions of 
suspicious men, and scorched earth strategies in particular – to force the submission 
of the Chinese. However, this conduct could only become acceptable within the 
context of an imperial punitive campaign which reinforced long-term beliefs in the 
inherent superiority of the Japanese in comparison to other Asians.  
PUNISHING PEOPLE OF A ‘LOW CULTURE’: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE 
CHINESE   
As elucidated in Chapter Two, victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) saw 
the emergence of an assured sense of superiority among the Japanese constituted 
through comparison to other Asians who, due to their inability to cast off European 
imperialism, were viewed as backwards, semi-civilised people. Even pan-Asianists 
adopted a haughty attitude towards other Asians as they began to advocate a 
civilising mission premised on the role of Japan as natural leader and saviour of Asia. 
By the time of the outbreak of war in 1937, such ideas, though of course not 
monolithic, were deeply embedded in Japanese society. The imperial overtones of 
the conflict defined as a ‘chastisement’ served to reinforce confidence in the relative 
inferiority of the Chinese people. In punishing China for its ‘arrogant and insulting 
attitude’, Japan, like other imperial powers who engaged in punitive expeditions, 
aimed to assert its position and authority as a superior power. Thus, reflecting back 
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on the conflict in China, Takamura Jirō, a member of a signal unit based in Guam in 
June 1942, described this conflict (in comparison to war with the Allies) as a war 
against people of a ‘low culture’. He also observed that ‘in China we were proud of 
our culture when compared to that of the enemy’.51 As might be expected, these well-
established and widely accepted beliefs in Japanese superiority over other Asians 
also shaped the IJA’s conduct in China.  
The self-importance of Japanese soldiers was often apparent in their 
interactions with the Chinese population. Kimikuza Kiyoshi, a pharmacologist based 
at Linfen army hospital in Shanxi, reflecting on the brutal treatment of civilians in the 
war explained that while ‘[i]t is true that the state of mind of those involved in a kill-
or-be-killed war is abnormal. Japanese, however, were particularly prone to flaunt a 
sense of superiority over the Chinese.’52 Foreign observers, such as Theodore White 
and Annalee Jacoby, became convinced that the arrogance they had witnessed in 
Japanese soldiers would be detrimental to their long-term efforts in China. 53 
According to Abend, Japan had fallen into the same trap as other imperial powers 
and would fail because, like those other powers, they did not treat the Chinese as 
‘self-respecting human beings.’54 Aside from damaging relations with civilians who 
were frustrated and scornful when Japanese soldiers demanded that they adopt a 
submissive attitude, the belief in superiority added to the atmosphere of 
permissibility.55 Lewis S. C. Smythe, a sociologist at Nanjing University and witness 
to the horrific events at Nanjing in December 1937 observed that ‘the Japanese 
sincerely believed from the common private up through the highest men here that 
while it was necessary to show some regard for foreigners they could do anything to 
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a Chinese.’56 A Japanese sergeant, captured and interrogated in the Pacific in October 
1943, supported this supposition revealing that while the military police had been 
‘insistent’ that ‘natives’ in Southeast Asia not be ill-treated, ‘[i]n China, it was 
different as there was no objection to the mistreatment of Chinese’.57 As might be 
expected, such a mentality contributed to violence. It was noted in the 
aforementioned report on rape from 1939, for instance, that troops in China raped 
‘because the idea that [soldiers] are free to do things to enemy women that would 
never be permitted at home is extremely widely held …’58 Indeed, according to a 
pamphlet entitled ‘Plan for Improving Discipline’ compiled by Kawara Naoichi, 
adjutant of the War Ministry, on 19 September 1940, ‘many of these crimes [rape and 
looting] are motivated by a feeling of superiority toward the people of the territories 
involved in this Incident.’59 Japanese veterans who later reflected on their actions in 
China further attest to the importance of a sense of superiority in stimulating and 
rationalising the perpetration of atrocities. Uno Shintarō, an intelligence officer who 
utilised torture techniques in his work recalled that ‘[o]n the battlefield, we never 
really considered the Chinese humans … We concluded that the Yamato race was 
superior.’60 Similarly, Tamura Yoshio reasoned that in his work as a member of the 
famous human experimentation unit, Unit 731, ‘if we didn’t have feelings of racial 
superiority, we couldn’t have done it.’61 In a documentary entitled Hell in the Pacific, 
Azuma Shiro, one of the most well-known veterans to openly discuss his experience 
during the war, revealed a prevailing mentality when he explained that ‘war was 
about winning or losing. We didn’t think about humanity at all. We believed we 
could do anything to win.’ Consequently, for Azuma, ‘killing a Chinese person was 
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just like killing a dog.’62 Tsuchiya Yoshio expressed similar sentiments when he 
remembered of his experiences as a member of the Kempeitai that: ‘we didn’t think of 
“Chinks” as human, they were subhuman. If we thought they were human, we 
couldn’t have been so cruel. If we thought they were living people, we thought they 
were scum.’ 63  Such extreme views were by no means ubiquitous. As Yoshimi 
Yoshiaki and Aaron Moore’s work with soldiers’ diaries has shown, attitudes 
towards the Chinese were diverse, complex, and since they were largely dependent 
on experience, mutable.64 However, as the above selection identifies, the long-term 
embedded ideas of Japanese superiority fuelled an environment of permissibility 
since violence towards the Chinese population could be rationalised and radicalised 
on the basis that such people were of lesser value.  
*** 
From the outset, the putative security dilemmas and concomitant pan-Asian regional 
solutions that circulated in Japan during the 1930s influenced the Japanese 
leadership’s decision to establish a context in China that was highly conducive to the 
radicalisation of extreme violence on the battlefield. The wider context of a war in 
which normal constraints did not apply and commanders on the ground had the 
authority to use unconventional illegal measures to decisively and swiftly end 
conflict against an inferior people, contributed to the escalation of violence in China. 
However, genocidal violence was exceptional. In the following sections, beginning 
with analysis of the Nanjing Massacre, I explore the interplay between this 
overarching context and the realities of the experiences on the ground in order to 
further understand the process of radicalisation as it emerged in China.  
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DELIVERING THE ‘DECISIVE BLOW’ 
The Nanjing Massacre, 1937–1938 
Anticipation of a swift and conclusive victory at Shanghai in August 1937 was 
quickly stymied. Japanese troops, overconfident of their ability to quickly smash 
Chinese resistance, were shocked by the fierce opposition they faced from the GMD’s 
best German-trained units. In contrast to their sweeping victories in north China, 
Japanese soldiers were soon engaged in intense combat, suffering hardships and 
losses unprecedented in prior encounters with the Chinese army. It was only after 
reinforcements arrived in early November that the IJA was finally able to overwhelm 
Chinese forces.65 Though the capture of Shanghai was a strategic victory, the three-
month long battle had hardly been the ‘decisive blow’ it was intended to be. As 
Chinese troops began their withdrawal, it became clear that resistance was far from 
at an end.  
FROM SHANGHAI TO NANJING: AN ‘ARMY OF LOCUSTS’ IN THE 
YANGTZE DELTA  
Frustrated by the failure to quickly crush a supposedly inferior enemy, army 
commanders turned their attention to the city of Nanjing. Originally, there had been 
no plans to commit more troops in central China since long-term interest remained in 
the north. However, under mounting pressure to rapidly end the war, the GMD’s 
capital appealed to field commanders as the site where they could deliver the 
‘decisive blow’. As Rana Mitter has observed, though Nanjing had no tactical 
advantage, it held symbolic significance and its capture would denote a definitive 
victory over the nationalism that had long been viewed as a root cause of anti-
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Japanese sentiment in China.66 Acting initially on his own initiative, General Matsui 
Iwane, commander of the newly formed CCAA, led his forces on a hurried march to 
the capital determined to finally smash Chinese resistance. The advance through the 
heartland of GMD China in November 1937, as the work of Honda Katsuichi and 
Yoshimi Yoshiaki has shown, laid the foundations for the extreme violence that 
would occur at Nanjing.67  
As they advanced on the capital, Japanese forces ravaged towns and villages 
bringing terror to the Chinese populace residing in their path.68 Parts of the once 
fertile Yangtze Delta were transformed into barren wasteland. An article featured in 
the China Weekly Review in spring 1938 gave the following description of the region in 
the aftermath of the campaign: ‘[t]oday the traveller will see only cities bombed and 
pillaged; towns and villages reduced to shambles; farms desolated and only an old 
man or woman here and there digging in the once “good earth.”’69 Atrocities were 
normalised by an army command which rarely restrained, often permitted, 
sometimes incited, and, at other times, directly ordered violence perpetrated against 
the Chinese population. In addition to the atmosphere of impunity this fostered, the 
conditions, experiences, and encounters along this march further facilitated the 
gradual embrace of more extreme, systematic violence.  
The unpreparedness for an expanded conflict caused serious logistical 
difficulties for a rapidly advancing army that frequently outran its supply lines.70 
Aside from adding to the hardships of soldiers pushed to their physical limits by 
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commanders determined to reach Nanjing first, this had important consequences for 
the Chinese population in the region. As revealed in a report from the 16th Division 
on 24 December, the problem was dealt with by ‘mak[ing] it a rule for men and 
horses to live off the land’.71 Thus, described as an ‘army of locusts’ by the Chinese 
population, Japanese forces devastated local communities as they moved throughout 
the region taking livestock, farming implements, and crops and, in some cases, even 
burning furniture for firewood.72 As they did so, they came into closer contact with 
Chinese civilians which created opportunities for violent outbursts. Some soldiers 
believed that ‘requisition duty’ was an open invitation to plunder while others used 
it as an excuse to go out searching for women.73 Azuma Shiro recalled that ‘[w]hen 
we went searching for food, we found women hiding. We thought “Oh, they look 
tasty.” So we raped them. But every single time a woman was raped, the soldiers 
would kill her.’ 74  As detailed earlier, such acts were tacitly encouraged by an 
atmosphere of permissibility cultivated by the leadership and by commanders on the 
ground who rarely held their troops to account.  
Small groups of soldiers that went out in search of supplies were more 
vulnerable to attacks from remnant GMD forces and angry Chinese civilians. On the 
occasions when they failed to return, infuriated and vengeful troops, often led by 
their commanders, responded with astonishing violence typically massacring 
civilians and obliterating nearby villages. A member of an artillery unit from the 6th 
Division heard of the following incident after two Japanese soldiers had been 
attacked and one killed by villagers while out ‘requisitioning’:  
                                                             
71 Translation in Kasahara Tokushi, ‘Massacres outside Nanjing City’, in Wakabayashi, Nanking Atrocity, 
64. 
72 Ibid; for Japanese soldiers’ oral testimony see Riben Guizi: Japanese Devils. 
73 Yang, ‘Atrocities in Nanjing’, 84; Ishikawa, Soldiers Alive, 86. 
74 Azuma interview in Hell in the Pacific. 
137 
 
The Japanese soldiers who dug him up were so enraged that they immediately shot 
ten leading villagers as examples. But that did not suffice. Screaming, “Death to them 
all,” other soldiers set fire to a farmhouse. Soon the whole village was aflame. 
Virtually all the villagers were killed.75  
The vengeful and unforgiving attitudes expressed in these encounters were rooted in 
the experience of fierce Chinese resistance at Shanghai where hardships, suffering, 
and loss of friends had a radicalising effect on Japanese troops.76 For example, Imai 
Ryūichi, having participated in just two days of fighting, related in his diary on 25 
August that: ‘[i]n the space of a breath, the conscript Hotta was killed in action! Since 
we landed there has not been one day without casualties. In the end a man has been 
killed today too … My whole body is filled with loathing for Chinese soldiers.’77 
Feelings of anger, contempt, even hatred for the Chinese army were sustained and 
inflamed by the many unplanned encounters with straggling GMD units along the 
route. In a novelisation of his war experiences, Corporal Hino Ashihei recounted 
how these forces arranged ambushes, harassed troops in the rear, and engaged in 
guerrilla tactics.78 As a by-product of these encounters, commanders also had to 
tackle the problem of what to do with those they captured.  
The practicalities of taking prisoners when the leadership had not established 
POW camps soon became apparent as the CCAA continued its hasty march to 
Nanjing. As Ishikawa observed, ‘[s]oldiers about to take part in heavy fighting could 
hardly afford to guard and shepherd them long.’79 The fact that Japanese forces were 
‘living off the land’ added an extra dimension to the problem. Private First Class 
Taniguchi Masaru recalled in memoirs published in 1940 that, ‘at first taking 
prisoners was great sport, then it lost its novelty because we could not feed them. We 
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were on short rations ourselves, so our officers decided not to take them prisoner and 
left them in their trenches to be responsible for their own keep.’80 This, however, 
often proved to be a dangerous option. A Japanese spokesman cited in an article in 
The Times on 10 December, for instance, reported that small groups of Chinese 
soldiers having been left behind by Japanese troops on their march had begun 
staging guerrilla attacks on units in the rear. 81  Therefore, commanders tended 
towards killing their captives as a security measure. As an anonymous Japanese 
veteran rationalised, ‘[i]f we let them remain behind alive when we departed, they 
would only turn on us again later. Consequently, they were always killed on the 
spot.’82 Thus, practical issues, security considerations, and attitudes of anger and 
hatred for Chinese soldiers who had thwarted Japanese efforts to decisively end 
conflict in Shanghai, contributed to the decisions of commanders to employ 
summary execution as a standard, though by no means universal, practice. This, of 
course, had been tacitly sanctioned, encouraged even, by a leadership who had 
shown indifference to the fate of Chinese soldiers.    
The propensity of GMD troops to discard their uniforms and mingle with the 
population further exacerbated the sense of insecurity among Japanese forces on this 
march. These so-called ‘plainclothes soldiers’ became a persistent menace, especially 
to units in the rear, soldiers who fell behind, and small groups out searching for 
supplies. The aforementioned member of the 6th Division, for example, remembered 
that the main threat to his artillery unit was posed by straggler Chinese soldiers who, 
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disguised as civilians, ‘might attack at any moment’.83 Another member of the 6th 
Division further elaborated on this peril, revealing its radicalising impact: 
One of our greatest dangers came from Chinese soldiers disguised as civilians who 
mingled with ordinary citizens until they got an opportunity to approach and attack 
us … I made up my mind that all Chinese were my hated enemies and that if I was to 
stay alive myself I had to kill them. Chinese prisoners taken at this time were 
executed.84  
As soldiers began to fear for their safety against a concealed and seemingly 
omnipresent enemy, violence towards civilians escalated. Troops were advised to be 
cautious when dealing with the populace, adding to growing distrust of the Chinese 
they encountered. Commanders directed their soldiers to ‘mop-up’ the areas they 
occupied by executing all who resisted, including women and children, and 
permitted the killing of any who aroused suspicion. As a consequence, Ishikawa 
related, ‘it became impossible to estimate the number of Chinese that were killed for 
arousing the most trivial suspicions or committing the vaguest offences.’ 85  Such 
practices became progressively more indiscriminate and more systematic. A field 
diary kept by a member of the Japanese medical corps contained the following 
account of ‘mopping-up operations’ at work in Changzhou on 29 November 1937: 
An order was received to kill the residents and eighty of them, men and women of all 
ages, were shot to death … The people were all gathered in one place. They were all 
praying, crying, and begging for help … Soon the heavy machine guns opened fire 
and the sight of those people screaming and falling to the ground is one I could not 
face even if I had had the heart of a monster.86 
Employing scorched earth tactics, villages and towns were routinely burned to 
deprive ‘plainclothes soldiers’ of supplies and hiding spots.87 As a consequence, the 
boundary between combatant and non-combatant became more and more distorted 
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contributing to the escalation of violence visited on a population whose lives had less 
value.   
 Driving the growing inclination to target civilians was an abiding sense of 
hostility emanating from the Chinese communities of this region. In contrast to north 
China where GMD influence was limited, central China was the primary political 
and social base of the party.88 It was the nucleus of Chinese nationalism and, by 
association, anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Accordingly, as they neared Nanjing, 
soldiers became more aware of the enmity of the people. Hino, for instance, recalled 
anti-Japanese slogans written on walls and, after stumbling across a school, realised 
‘how assiduously [Chinese children] were being trained in nationalism and hatred 
for Japan.’89 Reinforced by occasional attacks from incensed civilians (including, on 
rare occasions, those by women and children), this created a tense atmosphere in 
which soldiers’ suspicions, fears, and disdain for the local populace intensified. More 
importantly, as Moore has observed, the campaign began to take an exterminatory 
tone as Japanese commanders became determined to end Chinese resistance by 
completely obliterating the GMD and the foundations of its support base.90  The 
bombing of universities, libraries, and schools, in addition to the burning of 
textbooks – all emblems of an education system thought to be peddling the GMD’s 
anti-Japanese agenda – was representative of such intentions.91 The perception of the 
people of the Yangtze Region as vehemently anti-Japanese facilitated the embrace of 
violent extremes towards them. As Kurosu Tadanobu of the 13th Division observed, 
‘we were under orders to kill everyone, because this region had shown such fierce 
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resistance to us.’92 As they neared the city, Japanese soldiers assured themselves that 
the capture of the capital would see a final decisive end to this ever more brutal 
war.93 At Nanjing, the CCAA planned to encircle and ‘annihilate’ GMD troops and, 
in doing so, would force Chiang back to the negotiating table.94 The increasingly 
systematic, indiscriminate destruction perpetrated by Japanese forces as they neared 
Nanjing primed soldiers for this final ‘war of annihilation’ against the GMD and its 
forces. Of more significance for the people of Nanjing, the encounters and 
experiences along the route had begun a dangerous process of radicalisation as 
boundaries were blurred and taboos broken in respect to acceptable methods of 
conduct.  
‘THE TERRIBLE RESULTS OF RESISTING JAPAN’: JAPANESE FORCES 
CAPTURE NANJING  
As the CCAA approached the city on 9 December, General Matsui issued an 
ultimatum warning that ‘unless the Chinese troops in Nanking surrender by noon on 
December 10 the horrors of war will be let loose’. He also advised that, ‘[t]hough 
harsh and relentless to those who resist, the troops of Japan are kind and generous to 
non-combatants, and Chinese troops who have no enmity for Japan.’95 Unwilling to 
abandon his capital without at least some semblance of opposition, however, Chiang 
ordered Nanjing defended to the last.96 From the perspective of the small foreign 
community who had remained behind in the city and were working to establish an 
International Safety Zone (ISZ) for the protection of non-combatants, such efforts 
would be futile. As early as 2 December, Minnie Vautrin, an American missionary 
based at Ginling Women’s College, observed in her diary that ‘Nanking is a deserted 
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and defeated city already.’97 Although recognising that the city’s geography made it 
difficult to defend, Chinese forces under the command of General Tang Shengzhi 
continued their defence preparations showing, much to the frustration of the 
International Committee (IC), disregard for the safety of civilians as they employed 
scorched earth tactics that uprooted residents in areas of close proximity to the city 
walls.98 As the deadline passed with no capitulation and Chinese forces continued to 
give an outward impression of offering their staunch resistance, the IJA began their 
attack with aerial bombardment on 10 December. 
 Despite the appearance of a stiff resolve to defend the city, however, Chinese 
resistance broke after two days of intensive fighting. Although there was no official 
surrender, large numbers of soldiers, leaderless as Tang and other commanders fled 
the city on 12 December, lost the will to fight and gave up on the battlefield. A report 
in the Asahi Shimbun on 16 December, for instance, detailed the ‘splendid military 
achievement’ of the 65th Regiment when ‘a virtual avalanche of 14,777 retreating 
enemy troops’ near Mufu Mountain simply raised white flags and surrendered 
themselves.99 Inside the city, chaos ensued as abandoned troops were left to affect 
their own escape. Frank Tillman Durdin, a correspondent for the New York Times, 
reported the subsequent ‘debacle’ of the Chinese retreat:   
[t]he flight of the many Chinese soldiers was possible by only a few exits. Instead of 
sticking by their men to hold the invaders at bay with a few strategically placed units 
while the others withdrew, many army leaders deserted, causing panic among the 
rank and file...100  
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In their attempts to escape the city, which the Japanese had almost completely 
encircled, Chinese soldiers rushed towards available exit points, looting food and 
supplies along the way. Many fell to their deaths climbing the city walls and a 
number drowned as they overcrowded small boats and poorly crafted rafts in 
attempts to cross the Yangtze River.101 Robert Wilson, an American surgeon at the 
Nanjing Hospital, described such scenes in his letters, noting that once the Chinese 
soldiers’ morale had broken, ‘[t]here was no discipline and they threw away all their 
guns and equipment which lay scattered all over the road.’102 Vautrin also observed 
retreating soldiers who passed by Ginling College ‘some begging for civilian clothes, 
others casting off their uniforms and firearms into our campus.’ 103  In their 
desperation, Chinese soldiers looted shops and, on some occasions, even killed 
civilians for their clothing. In the commotion, a number of Chinese troops trapped in 
the city became indistinguishable from civilians. 104  In spite of this confusion, 
members of the IC recorded in their diaries and correspondence that they had 
successfully persuaded those stuck in the city to give up any plans for resistance.105 
Confident that the IJA would treat these men in accordance with international law, a 
large number were disarmed and detained in the Supreme Court and Foreign 
Ministry buildings to await the arrival of Japanese forces.106 At this time, the foreign 
community was optimistic of a swift return to normality. American missionary, 
James McCallum, reflecting back in his diary on 19 December wrote that, ‘[w]e all 
breathed a sigh of relief thinking now order would be restored after the panic and 
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stampede caused by the retreating Chinese army.’107 Miner Searle Bates, a history 
professor at Nanjing University, similarly observed an air of anticipation in the city:  
Many local people expressed their relief when the entry of the Japanese troops 
apparently brought an end to the strains of war conditions and the immediate perils 
of bombardment. At least they were rid of their fears of disorderly Chinese troops 
who indeed passed out without doing severe damage to most parts of the city.108  
According to Tsen Shuifang, Vautrin’s assistant at Ginling College, the idea implicit 
in these extracts – that Japanese soldiers would be better disciplined than the Chinese 
army – was common among the foreign community. As she sardonically commented 
on 15 December, ‘[n]ow, they feel differently.’109 
Indeed, on the morning of 13 December, Japanese soldiers began their 
triumphant entry into the city. What followed is now well-known.110 For a period of 
around six weeks, the Chinese inhabitants of Nanjing were victims of unprecedented 
levels of violence as Japanese soldiers looted, raped, killed, and destroyed property 
unimpeded, if not directly encouraged, by their superiors. John Rabe, a German 
businessman and Chairman of the ISZ, gave the following summary of the situation 
in the city on 16 December:  
 
All the shelling and bombing we have thus far experienced are nothing in 
comparison to the terror that we are going through now. There is not a single shop 
outside the Zone that has not been looted, and now pillaging, rape, murder, and 
mayhem are occurring inside the Zone as well.111 
 
He and other members of the IC meticulously documented incidents of ‘disorder’ 
which were then relayed periodically to the Japanese Embassy. Reporting only those 
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instances that they had personally verified, between 16 December and 10 February 
1938, the IC logged over 400 incidents of violence that had taken place in the ISZ 
alone.112  
These foreign witnesses also provided detailed accounts of the events in 
Nanjing in their diaries and correspondence. The idea that soldiers were, as 
Reverend Ernest Forster put it, ‘completely out-of-hand’, was a common trope in 
these documents.113 Having had many dealings with Japanese embassy officials, IC 
members observed how powerless they were in respect to the IJA who, Rabe had 
been advised, were intending to make things ‘very bad’ for the people of Nanjing.114 
Despite receiving a chastisement by Matsui on his entry into the city on 17 December, 
Japanese forces continued to ‘run amok’ for several weeks leaving Smythe with the 
impression that ‘either the Army did not want to stop it or could not – or some of 
both!’115 As Australian correspondent, Rhodes Farmer explained later, the fact that 
the ‘frenzy’ was not halted by the presence of officers ‘lent colour’ to the idea that the 
Massacre had been ‘engineered’.116  
It is an exaggeration to suggest that events in Nanjing were premeditated 
especially as there were aspects of the violence which were suggestive of a 
breakdown of military discipline. Certainly, lax discipline was an element played up 
by the Japanese leadership as they attempted to mitigate the damage to their 
international relations caused by the sinking of the USS Panay on the 12th and the 
subsequent looting of foreign residences. 117  However, the idea that violence in 
Nanjing was entirely the result of a tragic breakdown of military discipline, as taken 
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up by revisionist historians, like Yamamoto Masahiro, is less compelling when taking 
into consideration the wider context of the war detailed thus far in this chapter. The 
violence in Nanjing, though unique in scale and intensity, was not an isolated 
incident. Aside from the destruction of numerous villages and towns along the route 
from Shanghai, the populations of other regions in China had experiences similar to 
that in the capital. In the north, for example, foreign correspondents reported that, 
whereas Beijing and Tientsin had escaped relatively unscathed, Baoding had seen an 
unprecedented (until Nanjing) level of violence from Japanese troops that killed, 
raped, and looted over several days in September 1937.118 Events in Nanjing were 
also replicated, though on a much reduced scale, at Taierzhuang after the capture of 
the city in May 1938.119 According to a US military intelligence report from 1944 
describing conditions in Guangdong province from 1938, there was an identifiable 
pattern to the violence perpetrated by Japanese invasion forces: ‘if there were any 
signs of military personnel, or any trace of anti-Japanese sentiments, or if the invader 
expected to stay in a place any length of time, he used arson, rape, plunder and loot 
as a means of cowing the people.’120 Indeed, according to Haldore Hanson, who had 
witnessed the events in Baoding, the Japanese police chief explained to him that ‘the 
looting and killing which you have seen here is irregular but the Japanese have 
regarded [Baoding] as the centre of anti-Japanism in North China and their hatred is 
completely out of control.’121 Similarly, massacres at Taierzhuang occurred following 
an unexpected and humiliating defeat of Japanese forces in the Xuzhou campaign 
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earlier in the year.122 This suggests that the greater intensity of atrocities and violence 
was a direct response to the level of resistance encountered on the battlefield. 
Moreover, it adds credence to the arguments of those foreign correspondents who, 
not being present in the capital, had contextualised the events at Nanjing within the 
wider context of Japanese conduct in the war. For example, Hanson gave the 
following perceptive assessment: 
 
… the deterioration of army morale might very well be traceable to the official policy 
of terrorism adopted by the Japanese, a technique known as “totalitarian warfare” … 
Such unlimited destruction would almost certainly lead to a breakdown of discipline 
because the individual soldier can always argue – and with some logic – that killing, 
looting, and raping will aid this deliberate campaign of terrorism.123 
This insight is particularly useful in reconciling the appearance of a breakdown of 
discipline at Nanjing with the more organised elements of the Massacre. For, against 
the backdrop of indiscriminate looting, raping, and destruction in the city, Japanese 
forces carried out a systematic mopping-up operation which meant certain death for 
surrendered Chinese soldiers and a large portion of the adult male population in the 
city, further undermining the argument that violence at Nanjing was simply an 
unintentional wartime tragedy.   
 
‘MOPPING-UP’: MASS EXECUTIONS OF THE ADULT MALE POPULATION 
The lack of an official surrender of the city exacerbated the confusion of the Chinese 
defeat on the battlefield which, in turn, intensified violence towards surrendering 
soldiers. While a majority of Chinese units gave up their resistance, some continued 
to engage with Japanese forces as they fled the area. Since soldiers could not be sure 
whether the units they encountered would surrender or attack, sources indicate that 
                                                             
122 Lary, ‘Ravaged Place’, 99–100, 107. 
123 Hanson, “Humane Endeavour”, 146. 
148 
 
a number of Chinese soldiers were ‘taken care of’ on the battlefield.124 Taniguchi, for 
instance, remarked in his memoirs that the impending prisoner ‘food problem’ was 
soon settled at Nanjing since ‘[t]he tens of thousands … that got in our way, had 
been wiped out … The moat around Nanking was so full of corpses that we could 
hardly find water enough to wash our dirty hands.’125 As Yamamoto pointed out, 
periodic encounters with retreating Chinese troops often turned into one-sided 
slaughters as Japanese soldiers vented their frustrations, even as their victims were 
laying down their arms.126 According to an extract from the diary of Major General 
Sasaki Tōichi on 13 December:  
Frenzied troops – rebuffing efforts by superiors to restrain them – finished off these 
POWs one after another. Even if they aren’t soldiers, men would yell, ‘Kill the whole 
damn lot!” after recalling the past ten days of bloody fighting in which so many 
buddies had shed so much blood.127 
While there was an element of post-battle excitement in these early killings, Japanese 
sources reveal that, for the most part, mass executions of Chinese soldiers proceeded 
in an organised, systematic fashion over the course of several days. For example, in 
the vicinity of Mufu Mountain, upwards of fifteen thousand Chinese soldiers were 
captured and detained in the local barracks as soldiers pondered the practicalities of 
their ‘disposal’. Kondō Eishirō, a member of the 19th Regiment’s 8th Company, 
explained in his diary that after a fire in the barracks on 16 December:  
Finally, it was decided today that we would shoot to death 7,000, or one-third of 
them, on the banks of the Yangtze. We went to provide an armed escort and finished 
taking care of them. Any who managed to survive, we stabbed or slashed to death 
with bayonet and sword.128  
 
After this ‘trial execution’, on 17 December Japanese troops proceeded to ‘dispose of’ 
the remaining POWs in a similar fashion. As Ono Kenji argued, ‘[t]his was no 
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impulsive or accidental act by a small number of troops suffering from battle fatigue 
or wartime hysteria.’129 In fact, it was judged at the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (IMTFE) that massacres such as these had been undertaken with the 
apparent sanction of commanders on the ground.130 Though this judgement was 
almost certainly clouded by a sense of ‘victor’s justice’, it has since been borne out in 
Japanese sources. An entry on 13 December from the diary of Division Commander 
Nakajima Kesago revealed that those under his command were indeed operating 
under a ‘general policy’ of not accepting prisoners and identified the challenges this 
policy presented in view of the extremely large numbers of POWs they encountered:   
[w]e see prisoners everywhere, so that there is no way we can deal with them…The 
general policy is “Accept no prisoners!” So we ended up having to take care of them 
lot, stock and barrel. But, they came in hordes, in units of thousands or five 
thousands; so we couldn’t even disarm them…Later I heard that the Sasaki unit [the 
thirteenth brigade] alone disposed of about 1,500. A company commander guarding 
T’aip’ing Gate took care of another 1,300. Another 7,000 to 8,000 clustered at Hsienho 
Gate are still surrendering. We need a really huge ditch to handle those 7,000 to 8,000, 
but we can’t find one, so someone suggested this plan: “Divide them up into groups 
of 100 or 200, and then lure them to some suitable spot to finish them off.”131 
A battle report from the 68th Regiment, 3rd Battalion, documenting the following 
order from the Regimental Commander: ‘[k]ill all POWs in accordance with [One 
Hundred Twenty-seventh] Brigade orders. As a method, we suggest tying them up 
in groups of less than twenty and shooting them one by one …’ confirmed that 
massacres were being authorised at command level.132 As these examples reveal, 
while some early killings on the battlefield may have been the acts of ‘frenzied troops’ 
operating on their own volition, the execution of Chinese captives had become a 
sanctioned practice as part of the IJA’s mopping-up operations progressing in and 
around the city.  
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 Such extreme measures were driven by the realities and practical 
considerations of the situation on the battlefield. Japanese forces confronted the 
serious problem of what to do with the ‘droves’ of Chinese soldiers that surrendered 
to them in the absence of an official POW policy. While they no longer faced the 
logistical pressures of the rapid march, supplies remained low. Reserve Officer 
Amano Saburō, in a letter dated 12 December, told of twenty thousand Chinese 
captives having gone without food or water for over a week in the vicinity of 
Nanjing because ‘provisions [were] inadequate.’133 The exceptionally large numbers 
of surrendering Chinese soldiers made the prospect of detaining captives for any 
long period of time impractical. It also presented real security concerns as Japanese 
units, often outnumbered by their prisoners, began the onerous process of disarming, 
restraining, and guarding them. Memories of guerrilla attacks and ambushes along 
the march to Nanjing, in addition to a determination for resistance and discovery of 
concealed weapons among some captives, militated against releasing a sizeable force 
that might later re-join the fight or become guerrilla units. These practical issues, as 
Yang has argued, made easier, though by no means justifiable, the decision to 
execute Chinese POWs.134 However, the embrace of such extreme (and logistically 
challenging) measures was only possible against the backdrop of ‘exception’ and the 
radicalisation of attitudes that had occurred on the advance to the city. This context 
was crucial since it facilitated the intensification of ‘mopping-up’ efforts which 
included the indiscriminate massacre of a considerable part of the male population of 
Nanjing.  
 As mopping-up operations began inside the city, the foreign community were 
‘frozen in horror’ when the soldiers they had encouraged to disarm were led away 
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and, since this was often followed by the ominous sound of gunfire, presumably 
executed.135 George Fitch, head of the YMCA, lamented that these men would likely 
have preferred to die fighting than to have been slaughtered as they were.136 Such 
acts were reprehensible to IC members for, aside from one or two rogue soldiers, 
they had seen no outward signs of resistance inside the city as of 13 December.137 
Indeed, Archibald Steele, correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, claimed that:  
The Japanese could have completed the occupation of the remainder of the city 
almost without firing a shot, by offering mercy to the trapped Chinese soldiers, most 
of whom had discarded their arms and would surrender. However, they chose the 
course of systematic extermination.138  
From the perspective of the IJA, however, they faced an undetermined security 
problem in Nanjing. Discarded uniforms and arms strewn about the streets 
confirmed the presence of ‘plainclothes soldiers’ and the turmoil that followed as 
Chinese commanders abandoned their troops, added to the uncertainty of the 
conditions in the city. An anonymous private first class noted in his diary on 14 
December that:  
… the only escape route for the enemy was the Yangtze River. Some of the enemy 
tried to escape down the Yangtze in boats, but all of them were killed by the 10th 
Division, which was waiting for them, so the frontline soldiers lost their escape route 
and were in the city as stragglers. There are said to be a hundred thousand stragglers 
in the city …139 
 
The existence of an unknown and, as the above example indicates, exaggerated 
number of unidentifiable remnant troops brought the fears and insecurities which 
had developed through encounters with ‘plainclothes soldiers’ along the march to 
the fore. Thus, in their efforts to secure the city in anticipation of the victory 
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celebrations planned for 17 December, Japanese commanders ordered their troops to 
carry out comprehensive search-and-destroy style operations. Private First Class 
Mizutani Sō gave the following account of the strategies employed by troops 
engaged in these actions in his diary on the 16th:    
In the afternoon we went to the Safety Zone for mop up. We placed sentries with 
bayonets at the intersections, blocked these off, and went about our work rounding 
up virtually all young men we came across. We roped them off, surrounded them 
with armed guards, tied them up in rows, and led them away so that they looked like 
kids playing choo-choo train. Our First Company clearly took less than other units 
but we still got a hundred and several dozen…Even if some unfortunate innocent 
victims were mixed in (we couldn’t tell for sure), it just couldn’t be helped. Killing 
some innocent victims was unavoidable. Commander Matsui ordered us to clean out 
each and every anti-Japanese element and defeated straggler, so we did that in the 
harshest possible manner.140 
As this example insinuates, the difficulties of identifying ‘plainclothes soldiers’ 
combined with an embedded disregard for Chinese life contributed to the 
indiscriminate nature of these ‘mopping-up’ operations. Adachi Kazuo, a Japanese 
correspondent for Asahi Shimbun, observed that ‘almost all the Chinese men who 
stayed in Nanjing have been rounded up and branded “plainclothes” soldiers.’141 
Japanese troops had been advised to detain anyone suspected of having been a 
soldier which, based on documentation from the Shanghai Expeditionary Army’s 9th 
Division, 7th Regiment, was to include all youths and adult males.142 This sanctioned 
an arbitrary and indiscriminate targeting of the military-aged male population in the 
city on the basis that they might be, rather than conclusively were, ‘plainclothes 
soldiers’.  
As a consequence of this indiscriminate approach, Magee observed that men 
were being ‘shot down like hunting of rabbits in the streets’.143 Indeed, men who 
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appeared to be acting suspiciously, who showed fear, or who ran from Japanese 
troops were shot on sight.144 As they moved through the city, rounding-up and 
‘inspecting’ the male population, Japanese troops searched for specific physical 
characteristics that apparently denoted former soldier status. Assumed to have 
previously carried rifles or worn military helmets, men were marched off for having 
callouses on their hands or pale foreheads.145 According to Tillman Durdin, the city 
was also ‘combed in a systematic house-to-house search for men having knapsack 
marks on their shoulders or other signs of having been soldiers.’146 Zhao Shifa, a 
member of the Chinese 88th Army, recalled that he and others had been picked out 
by Japanese soldiers who targeted those in their twenties as well as those who had 
short military-style haircuts.147 The men that were selected were taken to designated 
points and, without receiving a trial or any further investigation as to their former 
soldier status, were ‘disposed of’ in a variety of ways.148  
The ISZ became a particular source of anxiety for Japanese forces in the city, 
especially once suspicions of its use as a haven for soldiers were confirmed in a letter 
from the IC to the Japanese Embassy. In this letter, written on 15 December, Rabe 
explained how Chinese soldiers had arrived seeking refuge. They had been disarmed, 
but despite their best efforts IC members had been unable to keep them separate 
from civilians due to their changing out of military uniform.149  Despite visiting the 
ISZ on a number of occasions and leading men away on each visit, Japanese soldiers 
maintained that at least twenty thousand ‘plainclothes soldiers’ remained in the 
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Zone.150 Accordingly, from 26 December, they began the process of registering the 
entire Chinese population. Both Bates and Vautrin witnessed two separate 
registrations at work, relating in their diaries how hundreds of former Chinese 
soldiers were tricked into revealing themselves through promises of impunity and 
work, only to be taken away and, according to those few who managed to survive 
and return to recount their ordeals, executed.151 This registration process marked the 
end of the main mopping-up operations in the city, though they would continue for 
longer in the surrounding areas. 152  The damage wrought by these operations 
continues to be a source of contention among scholars. Since exact figures can never 
be known and estimates depend on the way in which the events at Nanjing are 
delimited, suffice it to say that the magnitude of the Massacre was extreme and 
exceptional at this time.153 Furthermore, far from a tragic breakdown of discipline, 
the massacres of men in and around Nanjing were part of an organised military 
operation during which all able-bodied men were to be viewed as potential soldiers 
and could be selected for execution, without trial, on the basis of often arbitrary, 
subjective reasons. At odds with the realities of the situation inside the city, the mass 
killings of Chinese men at Nanjing were, like the execution of surrendering soldiers, 
rooted in the memories of the march from Shanghai where the earlier experiences of 
surprise attacks and ambushes from ‘plainclothes soldiers’ exacerbated the 
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In November 1937, Japanese commanders came under increased pressure to swiftly 
end a war that, should it become protracted, could spell disaster for the nation’s 
defence preparations at a time of international uncertainty. In responding to 
stubborn resistance from a presumed inferior enemy, the IJA launched a punitive 
terror-based campaign, tacitly sanctioned by the leadership’s framing of the war, 
with the ultimate goal of delivering a symbolic ‘decisive blow’ to the GMD’s capital. 
The encounters, experiences, and radicalisation of attitudes during the advance 
through the ‘anti-Japanese’ Yangtze Delta contributed to the breaking of taboos in 
terms of permitting increasingly systematic violence against the Chinese population 
which made the decision to employ genocidal measures in Nanjing easier. While the 
process of learning on this march made Japanese troops more open to the use of 
violence against civilians, commanders made decisions at Nanjing based on 
conditions in and around the city. The confusion and turmoil of the Chinese defeat, 
in addition to the practicalities and security considerations attendant to the 
extremely large numbers of Chinese captives and the undetermined number of 
‘plainclothes soldiers’ hiding in the city, fuelled the embrace of measures that 
involved the intentional destruction of a substantial part of the male population of 
Nanjing. As I will now show in the final section of this chapter, the beginnings of this 
breakdown in efforts to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and 
the growing inclination to allow the targeting of the civilian population to root out 
‘plainclothes soldiers’ during this campaign laid the foundations for a more drastic 
escalation of violence in later years as the IJA dealt with the intensification of the 





‘KILL ALL, BURN ALL, LOOT ALL’ 
Anti-Guerrilla Warfare in Occupied China, c1938–1942  
Nanjing represented a turning point in the war. Far from forcing Chiang to submit to 
Japanese demands, the capture of the capital had stiffened his resolve. In a broadcast 
to the nation on 17 December, Chiang revealed the following plans for a defence 
strategy that involved mobilising the masses for protracted grassroots resistance:  
The time must come when Japan’s military strength will be exhausted, thus giving 
China the ultimate victory … The basis of China’s future success in prolonged 
resistance is not found in Nanking or big cities but in villages all over China in the 
fixed determination of the people.154 
In the face of such efforts, the Japanese leadership abandoned any remaining hope 
that inflicting a ‘decisive blow’ would end the war. For example, in an address 
published in the Tokyo Gazette, Konoe explained that ‘the fall of Nanking is but a 
prelude to the solution of the China problem, and we must accordingly be prepared 
for a real war of endurance which is beginning from the present moment.’155 On 16 
January, he also announced that the Japanese government would no longer negotiate 
with Chiang, formalising the eliminationist sentiment that had evolved in respect to 
the GMD between November and December 1937.156 Intending to establish a new 
pro-Japanese regime, the leadership issued statements that now downplayed the 
punitive overtones of late 1937 and promoted more emphatically ideas of friendship 
and cooperation with Chinese collaborators.157 However, while political strategy had 
changed, the IJA continued to seek a military solution to the conflict by launching 
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large-scale ad hoc offensives in its ‘war of annihilation’ against the GMD.158  
SHIFTING STRATEGIES AND THE NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA 
When the fall of Wuhan in October 1938 simply forced Chiang to withdraw further 
into China’s interior, the Japanese leadership once again re-evaluated their strategy. 
The successive but hard-won victories in the offensives of 1938 had left the IJA in 
control of major strategic points and yet, Chinese resistance endured. Thus, Imperial 
General Headquarters directed Japanese forces to modify their tactics and focus on 
consolidating their position in the occupied territories in order to ‘create conditions 
favourable to the sound development of the new central regime in China.’159 This 
shift in military strategy followed the government’s more tangible definition of 
Japan’s war aims around this time. Taking inspiration from pan-Asianists who had 
long espoused the need for a greater role for Japan as leader and saviour of Asia, 
Konoe emphasised the Empire’s responsibility as a stabilising force in the region and 
elucidated plans to create a New Order in East Asia in a speech given on 3 
November 1938. According to this speech, the principal objectives were ‘to secure 
international justice, to perfect the joint defence against Communism, and to create a 
new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia.’ 160  In 
essence, this was a reiteration of earlier plans for a regional economic bloc. Though 
not new, having been advocated in varying forms for many years, these paternalistic 
aspirations added a more overt ideological component to the war. The IJA now had 
two primary objectives: first, to end the conflict, ideally through the complete 
destruction of the GMD and CCP, and second, to reconstruct occupied China in 
accordance with the lofty and abstract ideals of establishing a New Order for the 
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benefit of East Asian peoples. This second goal effectively committed Japan to a long-
term occupation of China and, given the professed benevolence of the New Order, 
made it extremely difficult to withdraw without having achieved these aims.  
This was important since also driving the shift in political and military 
strategy at this time were mounting concerns over the extraordinary strain that 
protracted conflict continued to place on the Japanese economy. In fact, some, such 
as Suma Yakichirō, Director of the Information Bureau, began to describe the 
situation in China in terms of ‘life and death’. According to Suma, conflict must 
quickly be settled else ‘the destructive consequences will continue indefinitely, 
causing the maintenance of expensive armies, the persistent impairment of trade and 
commerce, and the permanent feeling of insecurity.’161 By the end of 1937, Japan had 
come to rely heavily on imports of essential war materials, a situation at odds with 
long-term aspirations of self-sufficiency. The expensive campaigns of 1938 had made 
the situation worse and there were fears among military strategists over the viability 
of continuing the war effort. Deteriorating relations with trade partners, namely the 
United States and Britain, and the ominous rumblings along the Soviet border 
further exacerbated the problem of the ‘China Quagmire’.162 Since abandoning vested 
interests in China was not an option, the exploitation of the resources and markets of 
the occupied areas became an attractive solution to some of these difficulties. 
Editorial writer for the Asahi Shimbun, Ryū Shintarō, for instance, summarised the 
benefits of development on the continent in an article for Contemporary Japan: ‘[Japan] 
is dependent upon imports of raw materials for her manufacturing industries. North 
China can supply her economic wants: cotton for her textile industry; iron and coal 
                                                             
161 Suma Yakichirō, Where Japan Stands: Addresses delivered in America on the Sino-Japanese Conflict (Tokyo, 
1940), 21. 
162 For further discussion of the economic impact of the war see Barnhart, Japan Prepares, 91–114. 
159 
 
for her heavy industries.’163 In addition to the economic benefits, military strategists 
pointed out that the restoration of peace and order would enable a reduction in the 
number of Japanese troops stationed in China, alleviating the economic burden of the 
war effort somewhat.164  Intensive plans to integrate and exploit the north were 
already underway by January 1938 when the North China Development Company 
embarked on a nine-year plan of development.165 However, as Lieutenant Colonel 
Suzuki Kaichi argued in his lecture on methods for maintaining peace and order in 
the region, delivered to troops in Tokyo as part of their training, the elimination of 
unrest was a necessary precondition for the realisation of Japanese objectives in north 
China.166 From late 1938, therefore, Japanese forces were to concentrate their efforts 
more fully on stabilising the occupied areas in order to expedite the establishment of 
the New Order. This was to prove challenging since 1938 had seen the rise of 
stubborn and pervasive guerrilla resistance in occupied China.  
THE RISE OF GUERRILLA RESISTANCE AND ANTI-GUERRILLA STRATEGY 
In contrast to the fierce resistance of GMD forces in central China, Chinese 
opposition in the north was much less effective and the IJA’s campaigns in 1937 had 
progressed swiftly and favourably. By the end of the year, Japanese forces held most 
strategic points and controlled vital communication and supply lines across five 
provinces.167 Despite these successes, their hold beyond these ‘points and lines’ was 
tenuous. According to an anonymous American missionary who had passed through 
the region in February 1938, there was ‘unprecedented lawlessness and anarchy’ 
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throughout the rural areas since the ‘power vacuum’ left after the destruction of the 
former government had caused a proliferation in militia, bandit, and partisan 
groups.168 CCP troops and, to a lesser extent, remnant GMD soldiers also continued 
to harry Japanese forces in the occupied areas by launching hit-and-run guerrilla 
attacks.169 Initially this activity was perceived as little more than a nuisance.170 In a 
statement published in the English-language Japan Chronicle, General Hata Shunroku, 
commander of the CCAA from February 1938, advised that irregulars were to be 
regarded as local bandits and were underserving of attention. 171  It is true that 
guerrillas were primarily engaged in disrupting supply lines and harassing Japanese 
troops in rear areas, not re-capturing cities or launching major offensives. However, 
that was not the primary objective. As Mao Zedong explained in his book On 
Guerrilla Warfare published in 1937, mobile attacks on Japanese forces in the rear 
areas were more effective as a supplement to traditional positional warfare. The aim 
was to add to the burdens of the IJA by forcing a wide dispersal of troops and by 
drawing them more deeply into a protracted conflict.172 In essence, these were tactics 
fundamental to victory in an asymmetric war of attrition.   
Over the course of 1938, the irregulars proved more and more successful in 
this endeavour and, as guerrilla activity intensified, foreign observers began to doubt 
that the IJA could secure its hold in occupied China. Tillman Durdin, for example, 
suggested that CCP forces had made life so difficult for the Japanese as to make the 
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conquest of the province of Shanxi a ‘questionable venture’.173 In his reports to the 
Dutch government, DeFremery estimated that the Japanese controlled less than ten 
percent of the occupied areas and claimed that it was ‘so unsafe’ soldiers would not 
venture far from their garrisons unless in groups.174 Others offered more reserved 
assessments. For T. A. Bisson, an American who worked for the Institute of Pacific 
Affairs, the irregulars had not made Japanese occupation untenable; after all, the IJA 
had won ‘striking victories’. The guerrilla presence was, nevertheless, a hindrance 
that would require ‘a costly army of occupation for many years to come.’175 Based on 
Marine Corps Captain Evans Carlson’s observations during a tour of the north in 
1938, the American Ambassador to China, Nelson Johnson, advised the US 
government in September that ‘the possibility of large scale Japanese exploitation of 
North China seems remote so long as the Communists are able to carry on their 
activities in that area.’176 No doubt these appraisals were overstated by a foreign 
community that had turned decidedly against Japan following Nanjing. All the same, 
they provide some useful, if inflated, insights into the problems faced by the IJA in 
the occupied areas. Though not decisive in a military sense, guerrilla activity was 
becoming more than a simple nuisance as disturbances began to seriously thwart 
efforts to develop occupied China. More importantly, as they continued to advance 
further into the interior in large-scale offensives against Chiang’s main forces, the 
upsurge in small scale conflicts with CCP troops, remnant GMD soldiers, and 
irregulars in the rear forced the Japanese, as DeFremery observed, to begin fighting a 
war on multiple fronts.177  
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The multi-front nature of the war from 1938 presented serious logistical 
difficulties to an army of limited manpower in the vast expanse of China. While the 
majority of Japanese forces engaged in frontline offensives, the rapidly expanding 
occupied areas were left sparsely garrisoned outside of major cities and supply lines 
and, thus, were vulnerable to guerrilla attacks. Irregulars had taken advantage of the 
concentration of Japanese forces at Xuzhou in spring 1938 to increase their activities. 
After the fall of the city in May, soldiers remaining in the area were able to refocus 
their attention on ‘clean up’ campaigns and the situation was thought to be coming 
under control.178 In effect, Japanese forces faced a choice in either scaling back on 
positional warfare or leaving occupied areas only lightly defended which would be 
optimal to guerrilla strategy.  
Until large-scale operations came to an end after the capture of Wuhan in 
October 1938, mopping-up operations by small garrison units continued to be largely 
ineffective. 179  According to an intelligence report compiled by the US Military 
Attaché in Tokyo in August, for all the IJA’s claims that guerrillas had been 
‘annihilated’ in certain areas, more were ready to spring to action and numbers never 
seemed to diminish.180 Indeed, over the course of 1938, the guerrillas thrived in the 
inadequately defended rural areas contributing to their hydra-like nature. Thus, by 
the time the North China Area Army (NCAA) was tasked with ‘annihilating’ them as 
part of more vigorous efforts to restore peace and order to the occupied areas in late 
1938, the guerrillas – the CCP in particular – had become a more serious problem.181 
Poorly equipped and lacking in numbers to begin with, the communist Eighth Route 
Army had enhanced its position through engaging in guerrilla tactics from the outset. 
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This primarily involved disrupting communications and supplies through 
destroying rail tracks, roads, and telegraph lines. Still, irregulars also attacked 
Japanese supply units in the rear. Since the aim was to remain as mobile as possible, 
when they did encounter larger Japanese forces they would scatter, expanding the 
field of battle to make conventional encirclement tactics useless. 182  In an article 
published in the Tokyo Gazette, the Information Bureau begrudgingly acknowledged 
that through careful avoidance of direct battles with Japanese combat units, ‘the 
fighting strength of the main force of the Communist Army, though not originally 
formidable, has largely been preserved.’183 This was a somewhat tempered appraisal 
for, while still not in a position to re-take cities, the Eighth Route Army had become 
more adept at guerrilla warfare, more impressive in manpower, and had established 
a strong support base in the north.184  
The ability to win the support of the local populations was, according to 
Carlson, the greatest achievement of the Eighth Route Army.185 While the aggressive 
and arrogant behaviour of GMD forces and other irregulars won little favour with 
the rural populations, Eighth Route Army commanders gave their troops strict 
guidelines for considerate treatment of the Chinese people. 186  In addition to the 
skilful dissemination of anti-Japanese propaganda, the CCP implemented economic 
policies in the areas that came under their control to alleviate the hardships of the 
locals. They also trained militias and partisans to act as village defence units. These 
groups were responsible for gathering information that was vital to ensuring that 
villagers were evacuated and useful items moved or hidden to prevent destruction 
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by Japanese units out on punitive expeditions. 187 Through these measures the Eighth 
Route Army cultivated a good reputation and won considerable local support. This 
was essential since mobile guerrilla tactics required a close relationship with 
communities who could provide supplies, shelter, and intelligence. As Mao 
summarised, the guerrillas were the fish and the people their water.188  
Aside from their own policies, fundamental to the Eighth Route Army’s 
success in securing cooperation from rural communities were the atrocities 
perpetrated by Japanese forces in their anti-guerrilla efforts. For instance, though 
sympathetic to the CCP’s cause in 1939, war correspondent Freda Utley questioned 
how successful their efforts would be ‘[i]f it were not for the atrocities committed by 
the Japanese’.189 General Nishio Toshizō, Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in 
China, showed awareness of this problem and warned in a pamphlet distributed in 
October 1940 that atrocities perpetrated against ‘peaceable citizens’ meant that ‘no 
pacification in the world, no matter how well executed, will gain anything but the 
hatred of the Chinese.’190 Takahashi Tokubei experienced this first-hand, writing in a 
letter home that ‘[s]ince the garrison before us went out to subjugate the area and 
burned people’s houses down, these people make contact with the Chinese army and 
every night they come around to attack us.’191 This, even though they often enacted 
violent reprisals against those who collaborated with the Japanese, the Eighth Route 
Army endeared themselves more to the Chinese people than did the IJA who 
engaged in punitive expeditions that frequently involved massacres of military-aged 
men and destruction of villages. Such acts engendered animosity among the rural 
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populace who, actively armed by the CCP, sometimes participated in fifth-column 
activities or attacked enemy stragglers.192 This in turn fuelled further violence from 
Japanese forces. 
Like the advance to Nanjing in late 1937, encounters with irregulars roused 
frustrations, hatreds, and fears among Japanese troops who faced immense 
difficulties in combatting an enemy that would not engage and could easily 
disappear among a population usually willing to shelter them. Commenting on the 
security issues in occupied China, a Japanese POW captured and interrogated in 1944, 
recalled of his experience conducting weekly patrols against guerrillas around 
Qingdao that daytime was usually safe, but at night guerrillas would stage attacks on 
Japanese garrisons. 193  Abe Katsuo expressed irritation at this noting that ‘we’re 
unable to rest at night with any sense of security. When you chase after them they 
run away. When you come back they do some more mischief’. Underscoring the 
difficulties in identifying guerrillas and the radicalisation of attitudes this could 
inspire, Abe further wrote, ‘since we can’t tell which guys are making the mischief, 
it’s getting so we can’t be safe unless we take all the natives and tie them up or kill 
them (although we can’t actually do that)’. 194  The uncertainty associated with 
fighting an enemy that could be anywhere and attack at any time added to Japanese 
soldiers’ fears, especially as stories of Chinese reprisals circulated. For instance, a 
POW captured in the Pacific in 1944 told his interrogator that Chinese guerrillas 
killed ‘by degrees’ through cutting off the ears and nose, then removing the tongue 
and gouging out the eyes of their victims.195  One soldier, having heard tales of 
Japanese stragglers ‘being literally ripped limb from limb’, recalled briefly 
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contemplating suicide when he appeared to be falling behind his company.196 As in 
the Yangtze region, Japanese soldiers reacted with astonishing violence in retaliation 
for such acts. Reserve Officer Yasuda Toshio recounted how ‘wrath and hatred for 
those who could do such a thing made us tremble as we wordlessly prayed for the 
repose of the dead.’ He further described how, on discovering the mutilated corpses 
of three soldiers who had left the unit to go out plundering, his ‘enraged commander’ 
had ordered a nearby village burned and all inhabitants killed. As Yasuda observed, 
though inspired by ‘spontaneous fury’, such acts were in line with Japanese anti-
guerrilla strategy at this time.197 
Indeed, despite calls for cooperation with the Chinese under the rubric of the 
New Order, the leadership did not retract their tacit approval for unconventional 
and illegal methods established at the start of the war. In the face of the arduous, 
frustrating, and at times, dangerous task of rooting out guerrillas, commanders could, 
and often did, employ ruthless measures. For example, Yamamoto Takeshi, 
participating in mopping-up operations around Xuzhou in May 1938, recorded 
receiving the following order in his diary: ‘since it is difficult to distinguish ordinary 
residents, local rebels, and Chinese soldiers, kill them as you encounter them.’198 
While the NCAA employed a diverse range of ‘pacification works’ their principal 
method of suppressing resistance was to launch regular punitive expeditions.199 
Intelligence gathered from Japanese soldiers who had deserted to the Eighth Route 
Army in 1944 (and later became members of the Japanese People’s Emancipation 
League in Yan’an), revealed that these operations varied according to the situation. 
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Some might take the form of a routine patrol, others might be used to impress 
villagers with the might of the IJA, while more intense operations involved a combat 
element. Recognising that the guerrillas’ success lay in the support from local 
communities, punitive expeditions often brought the IJA to villages and towns where 
treatment of the Chinese population depended on the personality of the commander 
and the circumstances on the ground.200  They routinely searched private houses 
targeting ‘enemies pretending to be local people’ and particularly ‘all males between 
fifteen and sixty’.201 Sakakura Kiyoshi remembered that ‘regardless of whether they 
were the communist army or farmers, anyone who tried to escape or showed the 
slightest signs of defiance was killed …’ 202  According to those aforementioned 
reports, if villagers proved stubborn or uncooperative, the commander was likely to 
order the village looted and burned and all its men killed.203  Foreign observers 
confirmed the widespread nature of such practices.204 A survey of the situation in 
north China from June 1939 by the American Information Committee reported that 
around Xuzhou:  
every town and village is liable to bombing, burning, and machine gunning, not 
alone because guerrillas are there, but because they were there, or their presence was 
suspected there, or a bridge burned or Japanese soldier killed in the vicinity. And it 
has happened not once, but scores of times.  
The survey concluded that in the north, ‘the Japanese control less of the country 
around the cities than they did six months ago and are burning and shooting up 
defenceless towns and villages with such regularity as to point conclusively to a 
                                                             
200 NARA, RG 226, OSS, Entry 16: File No. 128153, ‘Appendix: Punitive Operations’ (22 December 1944), 
18–20. 
201 Cited in Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York, 2000), 365; JM 178, 218. 
202 Cited in Hell in the Pacific, 56.  
203 File No. 128153, 18–20. 
204 See for example Timperley, What War Means, 72–83; Hanson, “Humane Endeavour”, 265–76; White & 
Jacoby, Thunder, 62–6, 205–6; Lindsay Hsiao Li, Bold Plum: With the Guerrillas in China’s War against Japan 
(Morrisville, 2007), 115, 123. 
168 
 
policy of reprisal and terrorism against  the civilian population.’205 Edgar Snow, an 
American correspondent famous for his writings on the communists in China, also 
viewed Japanese strategy as a policy akin to terrorism.206 Given the context of the 
war and the conduct of the IJA as they came up against resistance on the march to 
Nanjing, examined earlier in this chapter, this seems to be a reasonable conclusion. 
Much like in the Yangtze region in late 1937, atrocities became normalised practices 
in Japanese anti-guerrilla warfare. The previously mentioned commander, Tominaga 
Shōzō, for example, recalled that:  
[M]assacres of civilians became routine. They cooperated with the enemy, 
sheltered them in their houses, gave them information. We viewed them as the 
enemy. During combat, all villagers went into hiding. We pilfered anything 
useful from their houses or, in winter, burned them for firewood. If anyone was 
found wandering about, we captured and killed them. Spies! This was war.207 
As this example reveals, the experience of guerrilla warfare added to the perception 
that the Chinese in areas rife with insurgency were wholly ‘anti-Japanese’ and 
accelerated the process of obliterating distinctions between combatants and non-
combatants which had begun after encounters with ‘plainclothes soldiers’ earlier in 
the war.  
The growing tendency of the leadership to call for the elimination of ‘anti-
Japanese’ elements or those who resisted Japan at this time (as opposed to earlier 
statements which singled out the GMD, CCP, and the Chinese army), represented a 
further obliteration of these distinctions. Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirō made 
this explicit in a speech delivered at the 74th Imperial Diet in January 1939. Though 
he spoke of friendship and mutual prosperity between China and Japan, he also 
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warned that ‘[a]s for those [Chinese] who fail to understand to the end and persist 
even hereafter in their opposition to Japan, we have no other alternative than to 
exterminate them.’208 While not directly inciting violence, this more radical rhetoric 
represented a shift in ways of viewing the Chinese population which had 
implications for civilians who came to be regarded as either ‘pro-Japanese’ or ‘anti-
Japanese’. The following summary from the diary of Murata Washirō in Yoshimi’s 
book reveals how being perceived as the latter could facilitate the hardening of 
attitudes and commensurate violence:   
To those members of the population loyal to the Japanese army, he was kind. To 
Chinese he judged to be anti-Japanese, however, he gave no quarter. He scolded a 
soldier stealing eggs in a pro-Japanese village, but in villages he judged as anti-
Japanese he was completely different, adopting measures that were “tough in a bad 
sense,” methods of “smashing the opponent to bits.”209 
As this example suggests, it was up to men on the ground to decide who was ‘anti-
Japanese’. The difficulty with this was that ‘anti-Japanism’ was not clearly defined. In 
a biting commentary on terms used by the IJA in China, Hanson wrote of ‘anti-
Japanism’ as meaning: 
1. Criticizing justly or unjustly the Japanese nation, the Japanese people, the Japanese 
Emperor, or the Japanese Army. (The Japanese Embassy at Peip’ing called me “anti-
Japanese” because I cabled to the United States a personal eyewitness account of 
Japanese troops looting a Chinese city.) 2. Obstructing the crusade of the Japanese 
Army to create the “Peace of East Asia.” (As China has done by defending her 
territory, or as American trade unions have done by boycotting Japanese goods.)210 
Though exaggerated, Hanson’s final note – that definitions are subject to change 
without notification – captures the essence of the nebulous character of ‘anti-
Japanism’. 211  The consequence was that commanders had ultimate authority to 
determine the fate of the civilian population in China and could legitimise extremely 
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violent acts by using the label ‘anti-Japanese’. As Diana Lary succinctly put it, ‘the 
process was horribly simple. Labelling someone a guerrilla or “irregular” was an 
immediate death sentence.’212 Indeed, a translation of a Japanese propaganda sheet 
circulated around occupied China, explained that ‘whoever cooperates with the 
Imperial troops are friends of the latter and whoever obstructs the actions of the 
Imperial troops are enemies of the latter.’ These enemies would be ‘wiped out’, while 
‘good people’ would not be killed.213 This approach was implicitly formalised in the 
Field Service Code adopted by the War Department on 8 January 1941. According to 
this code, lapses in virtue caused by ‘striking those who do not resist’ should be 
deplored but, troops were to deal ‘crushing blows’ to those who ‘dared oppose the 
Imperial Army’.214  As the necessity of consolidating occupied China grew more 
urgent towards the end of 1940, this mentality would have grave ramifications for 
the Chinese residing in the most unruly provinces. 
‘UNINHABITABLE ZONES’: A GENOCIDAL ANTI-GUERRILLA STRATEGY  
By 1940, the IJA had made limited progress in their efforts to completely ‘wipe out’ 
the guerrillas. Even in areas where peace and order had been restored, there was a 
risk that the enemy might re-infiltrate and so Japanese troops continued to be 
dispersed throughout the occupied territory seriously diminishing the effectiveness 
of mopping-up operations.215 Towards the end of the year, however, commanders 
were startled into a drastic re-evaluation of anti-guerrilla strategy.216 In August 1940, 
the CCP initiated a massive assault on Japanese forces. A first in positional warfare, 
the aptly named Hundred Regiment’s Offensive saw thousands of troops across 
occupied China, particularly in the CCP’s well-established base areas of Shanxi and 
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Hebei provinces, launch simultaneous attacks on Japanese garrisons, installations, 
communications, supply lines, and transport links. The operation caught the IJA 
completely by surprise resulting in heavy losses in resources and manpower.217 The 
campaign was all the more alarming since it revealed the extent of the communist 
presence in occupied territory. The expansion of CCP influence in the north, an area 
in which Japan had vested interests and which portentously bordered the Soviet 
Union, ran counter to the government’s long-term plans of eradicating the 
communist threat in China.218 Thus, having recovered from their initial losses by 
October, the NCAA embarked on a determined campaign to completely destroy this 
threat, beginning with the ‘murderous pursuit’ of retreating CCP forces.219 According 
to the aforementioned report compiled by Japanese soldiers who had deserted in 
1944, the IJA adopted an ‘extermination policy’ which openly called for troops to kill 
civilians, to plunder, and to burn buildings.220  
The next few months saw a drastic radicalisation of previous anti-guerrilla 
strategy. Until that point, Japanese forces had maintained a defensive posture, 
launching intermittent, though no less violent, punitive expeditions only when they 
encountered or suspected the presence of guerrillas. Now they adopted a counter-
insurgency strategy that was a more comprehensive and resolved effort to obliterate 
the guerrilla presence in occupied China.221 Although there was a lull in the CCP’s 
activity during the first half of 1941 (a source of consternation in its already 
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deteriorating relations with the GMD),222 this strategy was instituted as a formal 
military policy after Lieutenant-General Okamura Yasuji, a veteran of punitive 
expeditions and architect of the strategy, took command of the NCAA in July 1941.223 
This policy represented efforts to ‘annihilate’ the irregulars once and for all by 
advancing sector by sector and creating ‘uninhabitable zones’ in areas that were 
deemed to be ‘unpacified’. 224  Having always struggled to distinguish between 
irregulars and the populace, Japanese commanders understood that mass guerrilla 
resistance could only be destroyed through a policy of ‘wholesale depopulation’.225 
Essentially, if the guerrillas were the fish and the people their water, the IJA would 
simply drain the water.  
The strategy was nicknamed the Three Alls Policy by the Chinese who, not 
without good reason, viewed the campaign as an effort to kill, burn, and loot 
everything in these areas.226 Japanese veterans, recalling their involvement in this 
campaign, add weight to this supposition. In an interview given for the joint 
PBS/BBC documentary, The People’s Century, Nagatomi Hakudo described the 
fundamentals of the strategy as he was ordered to carry it out: ‘if there were people 
kill them, if there was a house burn it, if there were cows or sheep slaughter them.’227 
In the 2001 Japanese documentary Riben Guizi: Japanese Devils featuring interviews 
with fourteen veterans, Second Lieutenant Shikada Masao recalled that since 
villagers were friendly with the enemy, he had been advised by his commander that 
they ‘should kill everyone, including all women and children, remove as many 
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material goods as possible, and burn all houses to the ground when [they] left.’228 
Corporal Kaneko Yasuji also explained that following ‘orders from the top’, ‘[i]n the 
Eighth Route Army territory, we burned everything in sight, burned everything, 
killed the villagers, the women because they’d have kids and those kids would grow 
up to oppose the Japanese army. The old people hadn’t got long anyway, so them, 
too.’229 The rudiments of the strategy as employed by Japanese units engaged in these 
operations was to surround an area, first setting fire to the village, and then killing 
any who tried to escape before mopping up any last remnants.230 Sergeant Major 
Suzuki Yoshio gave the following account of these tactics at work:   
Around dawn we circled the entire village and a platoon of men attacked but there 
was no sign of any enemy. That was when Colonel Yamaochi ordered us to set it on 
fire. In a flash, fire consumed the once quiet village ... In under an hour, just about the 
whole village had burned down and we trained machine guns and gunned down 
every last one of the villagers who tried to escape to the mountains. As for those in 
the village, the soldiers either bayoneted them or shot them. Anyone who couldn’t 
move just burned to death, with their home.231  
The complete obliteration of these ‘unpacified’ areas was paramount to this 
counterinsurgency strategy. Army veteran, Yomisu Omae, recounted: 
We were ordered to burn all private dwellings; in other words, we were told to kill 
indiscriminately. Usually, by the time we entered the village, it was empty. Everyone 
had already fled. After we took domestic animals and anything else useful, we made 
huge piles of straw, set them afire, and burned the village to the ground. At our 
departure only a few bricks among the charred ruins retained their original forms. 
Villagers would have no place to live, even if they came home. This was one of our 
goals.232    
In short, this was an anti-guerrilla campaign that deliberately targeted the civilian 
population as a means of depriving the enemy of their principle source of support. 
Unable to hide, establish bases, or obtain supplies from the people, guerrillas would 
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be left increasingly vulnerable to attacks from superior Japanese forces. As might be 
expected, this strategy had a devastating effect on the rural communities in occupied 
China. Although there has been comparatively less scholarly attention paid to this 
policy, Herbert Bix asserted (and is probably correct) that the Three Alls Policy was 
substantially more destructive than the more famous Nanjing Massacre. Japanese 
scholars have estimated that it cost the lives of over 2.7 million civilians although 
exact figures would be impossible to determine since the guerrillas themselves 
engaged in scorched earth strategies and targeted for death any who collaborated 
with the Japanese.233 
Ultimately, the policy achieved its goal. Japanese intelligence sources 
estimated that the populations in the base areas had been reduced by half and the 
CCP’s capacity for resistance was greatly diminished at this time.234 In view of its 
apparent success, the Three Alls Policy came to an end as an official operation 
sometime between late 1942 and early 1943 when, according to US intelligence, the 
IJA adopted a ‘softer’ approach in China.235 However, the context of impunity and 
permissibility long-established in this war meant that commanders could and, some 
sources suggest, sometimes did, continue to use such measures.236 A reiteration of 
orders not to kill, burn, and loot was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the IJA 
on 20 June 1944 exposing the endurance of this strategy in spite of direct instructions 
to the contrary.237 Indeed, an ‘Order of the Day’ issued by Regimental Commander 
Kodama on 23 July 1944 explicitly instructed troops that: ‘in carrying out your 
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mission you must, if necessary, kill all the Chinese, burn their homes, and confiscate 
all their property.’ Operating in central China in 1944, and so presumably involved in 
the Changsha campaign, Kodama rationalised this order on the basis that victory or 
defeat for Japan would be decided by the upcoming battle and, reminding his troops 
of the misery that befell a conquered people, stressed that they ‘must be victorious by 
all means.’238 The Three Alls Policy was not sustained for the duration of the war but, 
as this example indicates, was utilised when deemed necessary by commanders who 
had long been able to operate with impunity. This confirms the impact of the long-
term experiences and attitudes of a war ‘by any means’ in shaping the process of 
radicalisation, but also suggests that the drastic escalation of violence at this 
particular time was largely contextual. 
While the Hundred Regiment’s Offensive initially shocked the IJA into a 
more active effort to exterminate the communist presence in occupied China, the 
roots of this drastic escalation in strategy as an official policy in mid-1941 lay in an 
uncertain and potentially threatening geopolitical context. By 1941, the leadership 
had committed to the IJN’s plans for expansion into Southeast Asia as a means of 
securing access to the rich resources and vast markets of the region. The willingness 
to risk war by advancing south at this time was precipitated by a sharp decline in 
favourable relations with the US, the nation’s primary trade partner, following the 
outbreak of war in 1937. In addition to providing financial support for Chiang’s 
government – believed by many to be the primary factor responsible for the 
continuance of a costly and demoralising conflict – the US had enacted a number of 
trade sanctions against Japan.239 Since conflict in China had forced the nation to rely 
more heavily on imports to sustain the war effort, these measures added to the strain 
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and made the economic situation even more precarious. In fact, over the course of 
1941, many in Japan, such as the renowned journalist Tokutomi Sohō and Foreign 
Minister Togo Shigenori, came to see the economic encirclement by the so-called 
‘ABCD Powers’ (America, Britain, China, and the Netherlands) as a direct threat to 
the existence of the Empire.240 Since Japan’s long-term vested interests in north China 
and the ambitious plans for constructing a New Order in East Asia precluded an 
unfavourable withdrawal from the continent, the Japanese government came to 
perceive an advance into Southeast Asia as the only viable solution to a pending 
existential crisis.  
At the same time, the government was deliberating over whether to join 
Germany in its invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Engagements with Soviet 
forces at Nomonhan on the Mongolian border in summer 1939 had exposed a drastic 
material disparity between the Japanese and Soviet armies. The subsequent crushing 
defeat, in addition to embarrassing and discrediting the IJA, intensified the sense of 
threat posed by the Soviet Union and highlighted the Empire’s continued state of 
unpreparedness for the anticipated conflict.241 While the signing of the Nazi-Soviet 
Non-Aggression Pact in September 1939 persuaded the Japanese government to seek 
an accord with the Soviet Union, Germany’s change of heart in 1941 presented an 
opportunity. As Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke, the most vocal proponent of a 
northern strike consistently emphasised, in this joint enterprise Japan could subdue a 
long-time threat.242 Furthermore, there was some concern that if Germany should 
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prove victorious in the East without the assistance of Japan, the Empire’s 
expansionist ally might soon become a rival influence in Asia.243  
In the summer of 1941 then, the Japanese leadership was seriously 
considering embarking on another war. Compounding the problem was the fact that 
Japanese forces were still heavily embroiled in a stalemate in China. As War Minister 
Tojo Hideki stated, ‘the difficulty [in deciding whether to strike north or south first] 
comes from doing this while we are still engaged in the China Incident; if it weren’t 
for the China Incident, it would be easy.’244 When the US froze Japanese assets and 
imposed a full trade embargo cutting off access to Japan’s primary source of oil and 
steel in July, the decision was made.245 The need to free up troops in China for 
operations in Southeast Asia became acute.246 However, the continued state of unrest 
in the occupied territories, accentuated by the Hundred Regiment’s Offensive, 
prevented immediate withdrawal. Despite over two years of anti-guerrilla operations, 
the IJA had been unable to reduce the size of its force in China which still had to be 
dispersed throughout the occupied territory. Still only able to maintain a tenuous 
hold in certain areas, there was a risk that, should Japanese forces in China be 
reduced, they could lose certain areas to the CCP, an intolerable situation given long-
term communist anxieties among the leadership.247 In this period of international 
insecurity, the IJA were under increased pressure to subjugate certain areas in China 
in anticipation of entering a conflict with a materially superior enemy. Thus, having 
learned from past failures and recognising that the insurgents relied heavily on the 
people to sustain them, commanders came to embrace a genocidal anti-guerrilla 
strategy as an acceptable means of destroying resistance through eliminating the 
                                                             
243 For discussions on this matter see Ike, Japan’s Decision, 64–72. 
244 Ike, Japan’s Decision, 74. 
245 FRUS, 1931–1941: Japan, Vol. II, 262–71. 
246 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, 207–9. 
247 JM 70, 47. 
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populations of the most unruly areas. The experience of guerrilla warfare which had 
accelerated a shift in terms of viewing the Chinese population as either ‘pro-Japanese’ 
or ‘anti-Japanese’ begun during the Yangtze campaign, made the embrace of such 
measures possible.  
  *** 
The escalation of violence to more extreme measures in China was intimately bound-
up with the continued opposition of the Chinese population in an asymmetric and 
total conflict which had proved difficult to end and was conducive to terror-based, 
unconventional warfare. Though stimulated by resistance, there were a number of 
factors behind the embrace of these more extreme measures, however. For the most 
part, commanders made decisions to employ increasingly violent strategies in their 
efforts to force the Chinese to submit in certain areas based on their interpretations of 
the requirements of the local situation. These interpretations were shaped by the 
demands and pressures of a wider geopolitical situation that seemed to Japanese 
actors on the ground to necessitate more drastic measures at particular times. They 
were also shaped by perceptions and attitudes derived from earlier experiences with 
soldiers, guerrillas, and civilians. These prior encounters reinforced existing 
prejudices, hatreds, and fears, contributing to a cumulative distrust of the Chinese 
population. The fact that genocidal violence could become a component of military 
strategy, however, was rooted in the way in which the leadership had framed war in 
China. The Japanese sought a swift solution to the conflict because it was understood 
to be jeopardising efforts to alleviate Japan’s vulnerabilities as a ‘have not’ nation in 
an international atmosphere of protectionism and competition. As such, commanders 
were given sanction to use all available means, including unconventional and 
objectionable practices, to crush resistance. The result was that Japanese soldiers 
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could operate within a context of impunity and permissibility, which was continually 
reinforced by commanders on the ground.  
As Japanese forces experienced setbacks and difficulties in campaigns where 
they were under pressure to quickly quash Chinese resistance, parameters for 
acceptable conduct were progressively expanded, facilitating the radicalisation of 
violence to more extreme measures. This proved to have a cumulative effect as war 
progressed. For instance, while commanders had embraced an indiscriminate policy 
of mass killing directed at the male population of Nanjing, the implementation of the 
Three Alls Policy in occupied China from 1941 represented a more drastic 
culmination of the increasingly more systematic and indiscriminate violence that 
Japanese forces had employed as they embraced the goal of completely eliminating 
whole populations in ‘unpacified areas’. In other words, Japanese commanders had 
moved from ensuring control through partial destruction of a group earlier in the 
war to the eradication of the whole population in specific areas later. This was 
significant. Indeed, the progressive distortion of perceived boundaries between 
combatants and non-combatants and the taboos continually broken with impunity in 
respect to the acceptability of targeting civilians, having progressively obliterated 
any remaining compunctions for the use of genocidal measures in dealing with 
resistance, would have ramifications for the peoples of Southeast Asia when 

















We have no intention of conquering any Asiatic people, nor do we 
have any territorial desire on any Oriental nation…All of you Asiatic 
peoples, must therefore realize that here is your best opportunity to 
achieve the freedom and independence which you have so long 
desired…As long as you reciprocate accordingly, the Japanese forces 
will help you in establishing an Asia for the Asiatics in your part of 
the Orient. But if you fail to understand the true and lofty purpose of 
Japan, and instead obstruct the successful prosecution of the military 
activities and tactics of the Imperial Japanese Forces, whoever you are, 
we shall come and crush you with our might and power, and thus 
compel you to realize by means of force the true significance and 
meaning of our mission in the Far East. 
[Speech by General Honma Masaharu, Commander-in-Chief of the 










‘LIBERATING’ SOUTHEAST ASIA 
In December 1941, having temporarily incapacitated the US Navy following a 
surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces swept through Southeast Asia in a 
series of lightning attacks which saw a drastic increase in the size of the Empire. In 
contrast to war in China, conflict in the Pacific was characterised from the outset as a 
‘benevolent mission’. According to the Japanese leadership, while forced to occupy 
Southeast Asia by the discriminatory and threatening policies of the United States 
and its allies, Japanese forces additionally sought to ‘liberate’ other Asian 
populations from the tyranny of Western imperialism. In an address to the 78th 
Imperial Diet on 16 December 1941, for instance, Prime Minister Tojo Hideki claimed 
that Japan had acted ‘for no other purpose than to bring to an end the tyrannical 
policies of the United States and the British Empire and enable all regions of Greater 
East Asia to restore and develop their inherent character’.1  
In spite of such pan-Asian overtones, however, war in the Pacific proved to 
be detrimental to the welfare of local inhabitants who suffered hardships under 
increasingly oppressive, exploitative, and at times, destructive, occupation policies. 
In fact, scholars give estimates in the millions for the total number of Southeast 
Asians who lost their lives in this supposedly magnanimous conflict.2 While many of 
these deaths were the unintended consequence of deteriorating wartime conditions, 
many others were a more direct result of Japanese violence. Southeast Asians were 
used as forced labour throughout the region and women were coerced into service in 
Japanese ‘comfort stations’ as the leadership extended these practices from China. 
Furthermore, in addition to the quotidian violence associated with foreign 
domination, Japanese forces, as in earlier colonies, used terror tactics to establish 
                                                             
1 IMTFE: Exhibits, No. 879A: ‘Tojo’s Address’, 4. 
2 Tim Harper, ‘A Long View of the Great Asian War’, in David Koh Wee Hock (ed.), Legacies of World 
War II in South and East Asia (Singapore, 2007), 8. 
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ultimate authority and pre-empt potential resistance. Much like in China, such 
measures occasionally escalated as commanders on the ground, encountering 
resistance and/or anti-Japanese sentiments among some groups in Southeast Asia, 
made decisions to employ strategies that allowed for the destruction of those groups 
in order to eliminate opposition in particular areas and at specific times. For example, 
echoing the events at Nanjing in December 1937, after the fall of Singapore in 
February 1942, Japanese forces began an indiscriminate, though more organised, 
mopping-up operation that deliberately targeted for execution the adult male 
Chinese population of British Malaya as an anti-Japanese threat. Furthermore, after 
years of unsuccessful efforts to maintain peace and order in the face of growing 
guerrilla resistance in the Philippines, the 14th Army in 1945 adopted an 
indiscriminate scorched earth anti-guerrilla strategy that, though on a smaller and 
more selective scale than the Three Alls Policy implemented in occupied China, 
aimed to ‘wipe out’ the guerrilla problem through eliminating the Filipino 
populations and destroying towns and villages in areas of importance as a putatively 
reasonable defence strategy.  
It is surprising that such practices became an option in Southeast Asia since, 
more so than in China, genocidal violence was incongruous with the overall framing 
of this conflict as a supposedly benign, liberating mission. The purpose of this 
chapter is to address the question of how commanders came to embrace 
intentionally-group destructive methods within, what appeared to be, a context that 
was adverse to extreme violence perpetrated against those who were to be liberated. 
Using the aforementioned cases, I further develop the analysis of the preceding 
chapter by looking more closely at two key elements: first, the role of resistance in 
triggering extreme violence in Southeast Asia; and second, the complex interplay 
between the security concerns and ideological imperatives that shaped Japanese 
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objectives and the framing of the war, the realities of the situation on the ground, and 
the wider, highly mutable geopolitical context. Like the previous chapter, I divide 
this analysis into three distinct sections. In the first section, I aim to locate the 
genocidal potential of the liberating mission by exploring the origins, objectives, and 
characterisation of the war in addition to long-term strategies of region-building in 
Southeast Asia. I detail the impact that such factors had on military conduct in the 
area and show how, despite limited constraints on soldiers’ behaviour, the framing 
of the war contributed to the creation of categories of exception whereby, 
commanders, as in China, had freedom to use all available means to stamp out 
resistance.  
In the second section, I move to a consideration of the massacres of the male 
Chinese population in Malaya and Singapore in February 1942. I begin the analysis 
in this section by detailing the importance of decisively establishing Japanese control 
in the peninsula due to the intended place of British Malaya as the core of the 
Japanese Empire in the south. After discussing local conditions at the outset of 
occupation, I then examine mopping-up operations in February 1942 showing that 
they were part of a planned purge of part of the male Chinese population. In seeking 
to understand why extreme measures towards the Chinese were employed in this 
instance and not elsewhere in Southeast Asia at the outset of occupation, I evaluate 
the radicalisation of violence in this case within the specific context of policy towards 
the Chinese population in the region, drawing contrasts and comparisons with other 
areas, in addition to considering the impact of past experiences and prejudices from 
the war in China. I also analyse the individual circumstances in British Malaya, 
showing how pre-war anti-Japanese activities in the peninsula, in addition to the 
large size and substantial economic power of the Chinese population in Singapore, 
fuelled perceptions of this group as manifestly hostile to the occupation. Finally, I 
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examine how the interplay between all of these factors transformed perceptions of 
the limited and relatively negligible resistance offered by the small Chinese volunteer 
force in February 1942 causing it to be viewed as a potentially dangerous threat in 
need of elimination.  
In the third section, I analyse the more gradual escalation of violence towards 
a different population group by examining Japanese anti-guerrilla efforts in the 
Philippines. I begin with an overview of pre-war interactions, plans, intentions, and 
attitudes towards the Filipino people drawing out contrasts with perceptions of the 
overseas Chinese that made the Japanese more amenable to cooperation and 
conciliation as they began the occupation of the Islands in 1942. I then analyse the 
development of resistance and explain how, in addressing guerrilla activity in the 
Philippines, Japanese commanders, like in China, used progressively more 
methodical violence. Following this, I examine the beginnings of a more drastic 
radicalisation of violence in 1944 as Japanese troops and guerrillas both began 
preparations for an impending American invasion of the Islands and aim, in 
particular, to show how this context laid the foundations for the embrace of 
genocidal violence in early 1945. Accordingly, in the final part of this section, I 
analyse the adoption of extreme violence as a defence strategy in Luzon as Japanese 
commanders sought to pre-empt a Filipino uprising at the same time as combatting 
American troops in a last-ditch effort to turn the tide of war prior to the Allied 









FROM LIBERATION TO ELIMINATION  
Locating the Genocidal Potential of the ‘Benevolent Mission’ 
In contrast to a long history of continental policies, there had been only modest 
engagement with Southeast Asia prior to the 1940s.3 Of course, circumstances were 
very different in this region. As Mark Peattie described it, the wealth of the area was 
‘already spoken for’ since it had come under foreign domination in the 1880s.4 Since 
Japanese imperialism, as noted in Chapter Two, had evolved with an eye to the 
reactions of the other imperial powers, policies of expansion into Southeast Asia had 
been primarily opportunistic. Thus, aside from some notable pre-war exceptions, 
including the prominent historian and politician, Takekoshi Yosaburō, staunch 
supporters of a ‘southern advance’ experienced limited influence before the 1940s.5 
As detailed in the preceding chapter, the increased interest in Southeast Asia was 
rooted in the turmoil and uncertainty that prevailed in the 1930s.  
‘NO OTHER RECOURSE’: THE ADVANCE INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA   
At a time when trade was declining and the major imperial powers, including the 
Soviet Union, were emphasising autarky, a growing number of politicians, military 
strategists, and economists looked to the south as a solution to Japan’s economic 
vulnerabilities and population demands. Even the pacifist and long-time critic of 
Japan’s expansionist policies, Yanaihara Tadao, wrote of the advantage of a peaceful 
‘southward advance’ as an outlet for ‘her overflowing population and accumulating 
                                                             
3 See Mark R. Peattie, ‘Nanshin: The “Southward Advance,” 1931–1941, as a Prelude to the Japanese 
Occupation of Southeast Asia,’ in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, & Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese 
Wartime Empire, 1937–1945 (Princeton, 1996), 189–242 for more detail regarding early Japanese 
engagement with Southeast Asia.  
4 Ibid, 241. 
5 Takekoshi Yosaburō, ‘Expanded Boundaries’, Japan Magazine (March 1917), 687–90. 
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capital.’6 The most vocal proponents came from within the Imperial Japanese Navy 
(IJN), however. As part of a long-running inter-service rivalry which saw each 
branch of the military push national defence strategy in a direction that would give it 
the dominant role, the IJN had been a steadfast advocate of southern expansion as a 
check to the continental ambitions of the IJA.7 A surge in Japanese activity in the 
region during the early 1930s saw a brief recovery for the economy as Southeast 
Asian markets were flooded with cheap, yet quality, Japanese products. Although 
quickly stifled by trade restrictions implemented by the other imperial powers, the 
success of this activity had confirmed the potential benefits of expanding Japanese 
interest in the region.8 As such, in the wake of an unsuccessful military coup by 
young army officers on 26 February 1936, the government became more receptive to 
proposals from navy strategists who advocated a southern policy as a means of 
strengthening the nation’s defences through gaining access to key resources. 9  In 
August that year, peaceful expansion south became a ‘fundamental principle’ of 
national policy which, as Ken’ichi Goto pointed out, marked the first serious 
consideration of Japanese expansion into the region.10  
The outbreak of war with China in 1937 placed further discussion of a 
southern policy on the backburner for a time as both services dedicated their efforts 
to the conflict. However, as detailed in the previous chapter, Japanese forces soon 
became embroiled in a protracted total war which the economy was not robust 
enough to withstand. Under mounting domestic pressure, the Japanese government 
                                                             
6 Yanaihara Tadao, ‘Japan’s Advance Southward: A Necessity’, Contemporary Japan (September 1936), 
278. 
7 For an overview of this rivalry see James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and 
Foreign Policy, 1930–1938 (Princeton, 1966). 
8 Peattie, ‘Nanshin’, 200–5; W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (Oxford, 1987), 220–4.    
9 See policy documents in Joyce C. Lebra (ed.), Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War 
II: Selected Readings and Documents (Oxford, 1975), 58–60; IMTFE: Exhibits, No 977: ‘Collection of 
National Policy Documents (1936)’. 
10 ‘Fundamental Principles of National Policy’ (1936), in David J. Lu (ed.), Japan: A Documentary History, 
Volume II: The Late Tokugawa Period to the Present (Armonk, 1997), 418–9; Ken’ichi Goto, Tensions of 
Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World (Singapore, 2003), 77. 
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increasingly came to see the solution to the quagmire in China as resting in the rich 
resources, vast markets, and strategic location of Southeast Asia. The outbreak of war 
in Europe in September 1939 and the resultant disruption of trade with European 
partners who now had greater demands on their own economies added to 
trepidations over Japan’s economic stability. 11  Moreover, while the sudden 
distraction of European powers from their colonies presented an opportunity for 
expansion of Japanese interest, it was also seen as a potential threat should that 
opportunity be seized upon by rival influences.12 Thus, the importance of asserting 
Japanese dominance in an area of growing significance to national defence was 
increasingly stressed.13 These shifts in the international context, in addition to the 
Kwantung Army’s chastening defeat by Soviet forces at Nomonhan in the summer of 
1939, made Army planners more amenable to the idea of southern expansion as a 
means of settling the ‘China Incident’ and getting back on track in regards to long-
term defence preparations.14  
By the 1940s, the idea of greater southern involvement had gained traction, 
becoming widely accepted as a necessity within government, military, and business 
circles as reflected in a range of speeches, official statements, and planning 
documents. 15  The precise nature of this involvement remained undetermined, 
however, as both branches of the military had different priorities. Expansion into the 
region was seen by the IJN to provide an opportunity to gain control of essential 
resources, in particular the sizeable oil reserves of the Netherlands East Indies. For 
                                                             
11 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 225. 
12 Ken’ichi Goto, ‘Cooperation, Submission, and Resistance of Indigenous Elites of Southeast Asia in the 
Wartime Empire’, in Duus et al., Japanese Wartime Empire, 274–5.  
13 IMTFE: Exhibits, No. 1029: ‘Measures to be Taken towards the Peoples of East Asia (Burma) (20 
September 1940)’; Ike Nobutaka, Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford, 
1965), 3, 30. 
14 See Alvin Coox, Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 (Stanford, 1990), for detailed study of 
Nomonhan. 
15 For example, ‘Address of Hachiro Arita, Minister for Foreign Affairs’ (February 1940), Tokyo Gazette 
(March 1940), 348; Matsue Haruji, ‘The South Seas and Japan’, Contemporary Japan (May 1940), 625–7; for 
planning documents see IMTFE: Exhibits, No. 628: ‘Collection of Foreign Policy Documents, 1940’.   
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the IJA, occupation of strategic border areas had the advantage of cutting off Chiang 
Kai-shek’s main supply routes and was seen to be an excellent position from which 
to launch offensives in south China. 16  Both goals were pursued in 1940; but a 
determination to avoid war with the US and a commitment to the nation’s largely 
continental interests, meant that any expansion was to be limited and opportunistic.17 
Designs on British colonies in the region, for example, were contingent on the success 
of an expected German invasion and occupation of Britain.18 Further and rather 
alarming shifts in the international context between 1940 and 1941, described in 
Chapter Three, drastically altered this position. Faced with relentless economic 
pressure from the US and its allies who imposed sanctions on Japan, the leadership 
abandoned its ambitions for a northern strike at the Soviet Union in concert with 
Germany and committed to a full-scale military invasion of Southeast Asia as the 
only viable solution to the problems that appeared to imperil the nation. 19 
Accordingly, the government declared war on Britain and the US on the basis that 
‘the situation being such as it is, our Empire for its existence and self-defense has no 
other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.’20 
Japanese interest in Southeast Asia then, was born primarily out of attempts to 
mitigate insecurities and fears related to an international climate perceived to be 
hostile, if not directly threatening, to Japan. As a consequence, this area, having 
abundant resources and vast markets, had come to be of the utmost importance for 
Japan’s continued survival as an independent nation, adding to the exigence of 
successfully occupying and mobilising the region. 
 
                                                             
16 Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Ithaca, 
1987), 162–75.   
17 See IMTFE: Exhibits, No. 865: ‘Collection of Planning Documents, 1940–1941’.  
18 IMTFE: Exhibits, No. 628: ‘Tentative Plan for Policy in the Southern Regions’ (4 October 1940). 
19 For decision making process see Ike, Japan’s Decision for War. 
20 ‘Imperial Rescript’ (8 December 1941), Contemporary Japan (January 1942), 158–9. 
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THE PRIMACY OF JAPANESE INTERESTS: WARTIME OCCUPATION 
Since military interest in Southeast Asia derived from its perceived value to resolving 
the quagmire in China, as well as the supposedly perilous economic situation, 
immediate objectives were naturally oriented towards fulfilling crucial strategic 
imperatives. Consequently, the welfare and interests of Southeast Asian peoples 
were not a priority and occupation policies tended to be exploitative and oppressive. 
Such is reflected in one of the only detailed pre-war plans for the occupation of the 
region. In this document, dated 20 November 1941, troops were directed to 
concentrate their efforts on quickly restoring peace and order to facilitate the 
immediate acquisition and development of resources vital for national defence and 
the self-sufficiency of Japanese forces. 21  Military administrations were to be 
established to take control over all aspects of life pertinent to these goals, at least for 
the duration of the war. This often involved redirecting or, in some cases, drastically 
restructuring the economies and industries of the occupied territories in order to 
mobilise their resources for the war effort and to ensure self-sufficiency throughout 
the region.22 Hardships were anticipated. However, pre-war strategists insisted that 
they would have to be accepted as a necessary burden for the occupied peoples 
stating that ‘[n]atives will have to reconcile themselves to such pressure as is 
unavoidably involved for them in acquisition of resources vital for our national 
defences and the local self-sufficiency of our occupation forces.’23  It was further 
clarified in a document from March 1942 that any pacification efforts must not 
interfere with wartime goals and that ‘no measures shall be taken for the sole 
                                                             
21 IMTFE: Exhibits, No. 877: ‘Details of the Execution of Administration in the Southern Occupied 
Territories’ (20 November 1941). 
22 See Doc. 5: ‘General Plan of Economic Policies in the Southern Areas’ (12 December 1941), in Frank N. 
Trager (ed.), Burma: Japanese Military Administration, Selected Documents 1941–1945 (Philadelphia, 1971), 
38–45. 
23 IMTFE: Exhibits, No. 877.  
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purpose of placating the natives.’24 Promises of independence for Burma and the 
Philippines, for instance, were originally to be finalised only after war had been won. 
In the meantime, despite the rhetoric of liberation, nationalist movements were to be 
considered dangerous to the war effort and should not to be encouraged.25 In effect, 
the wartime context, and particularly, the prominence of insecurities and existential 
fears in driving the southward advance meant that Japanese interests were supreme, 
wartime necessities were a priority, and Southeast Asians would be required to 
completely submit to the demands of occupation, regardless of how exploitative or 
oppressive they might be.26  
However, military planners recognised that the compliance, if not the support, 
of the local populations would be indispensable to the successful prosecution of the 
war.27 The abrupt expansion of the Empire in early 1942 presented serious practical 
problems. The absence of substantive long-term engagement in Southeast Asia meant 
that there were no firm plans in place for occupation, especially since pre-war 
strategists had concentrated more on invasion tactics.28 Accordingly, Japanese forces 
faced a daunting task in controlling vast territories populated with peoples of diverse 
cultures and customs, of which they had only limited first-hand knowledge or prior 
experience, while at the same time preoccupied with continued efforts to end conflict 
in China and with war in the Pacific. Aside from the challenges that would arise 
should they face local resistance, the military had limited resources to spare in the 
                                                             
24 Doc. 6: ‘Outline on the Conduct of Military Administration in Occupied Areas’ (14 March 1942), in 
Harry J. Benda, James K. Irikura, & Kōichi Kishi (eds.), Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: 
Selected Documents (New Haven, 1965), 29–30. 
25 TNA, WO 203/6310: SEATIC Bulletin: Japanese Plans and Operations in Southeast Asia, Doc. 11: 
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26 Gregory Clancey, ‘The Japanese Imperium and Southeast Asia: An Overview’, in Paul H. Kratoska 
(ed.), Southeast Asian Minorities in the Japanese Wartime Empire (London, 2002), 10. 
27 Doc. 7: ‘Telegram on the Administration of the Southern Areas’, in Benda et al., Administration in 
Indonesia, 47. 
28 Harry J. Benda, ‘The Japanese Interregnum in Southeast Asia’, in Grant K. Goodman (ed.), Imperial 
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administration of the occupied territories. As such, practicalities necessitated efforts 
to co-opt local leadership and, where possible, make use of the pre-existing colonial 
apparatus.29 Furthermore, military planners pointed out the advantages of securing 
docility among the local populations through ‘winning the hearts of the people’.30 
Since pacification works were to be limited in scope, such efforts primarily involved 
the dissemination of propaganda that aimed to win support through framing the war 
as a mission for the benefit of all Asians.   
WINNING THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE: ‘ASIA FOR THE ASIATICS’ 
The Japanese government’s rhetoric from 1941 placed a considerable emphasis on the 
insecurities and existential fears that had shaped the decision to advance into 
Southeast Asia as a means of justifying the occupation of territories in the region. 
However, the threat to Japan alone was not adequate as a tool for mobilising the 
support, or at the very least, ensuring the compliance of the populations of the area. 
As such, the leadership began to stress the shared ‘subaltern’ affinities between Japan 
and other Asian nations. Reflecting the revival of the Social Darwinian world view of 
the Meiji Period, politicians and diplomats characterised the Pacific War as an 
‘historical inevitability’; an inescapable clash between the oppressed and their 
oppressors.31 The notion of Japan as a fellow victim of Western discrimination now 
fighting for the liberation of the Asian race, deeply rooted within the pan-Asian qua 
imperial ideology of the interwar years, was accentuated. 32  As a consequence, 
Japanese leaders increasingly depicted conflict as a racial struggle for survival. In his 
inaugural address to the Greater East Asia Conference, a meeting of prominent Asian 
                                                             
29 Benda, ‘Japanese Interregnum’, 68–9; see also Goto, ‘Cooperation, Submission and Resistance’, 275. 
30 Doc. 7, in Benda et al., Administration in Indonesia, 47.  
31 See for instance, IMTFE: Exhibits, No. 177: Hashimoto Kingōrō, ‘The Road to the Reconstruction of the 
World’ (1941); Kurusu Saburō, Kurusu Speaks: Addresses November 26, 1942–December 3, 1943 (Tokyo, 
1944). 
32 See for example, Mitsuaki Kakehi, Three Centuries of Aggression and Conquest (Tokyo, 1942). 
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leaders held in November 1943, Tojo captured the essence of this rhetoric when he 
declared that ‘for all the peoples of greater East Asia, the present war is a decisive 
struggle upon whose outcome depends their rise or fall.’33 War, then, was framed in 
grandiose, existential terms which placed Japanese prestige at stake as they claimed 
to fight, not only for the independence of Asia, but for its continued racial existence. 
While such rhetoric became a mantra featured heavily in propaganda directed 
towards peoples of the occupied territories, this was not just self-serving hyperbole.34 
The notion of an inevitable east–west clash, as explained in Chapter Two, was 
rooted in a long-term dissatisfaction with the ostensive discriminatory treatment of 
Japan by the US and its allies. By the 1940s, a growing number of government 
officials, economists, and diplomats, such as Arita Hachirō, Takahashi Kamekichi, 
Shigetomo Sayegusa, and Kawashima Nobutarō, had become resentful of an 
international system which, as they saw it, threatened ‘have not’ nations like Japan. 
According to their argument, a change in the nature of warfare meant that economic 
strength was now vital to the defence and survival of nations. As a result, those that 
did not have access to abundant resources or markets were vulnerable so long as 
those that did prevented the even distribution of the wealth of the world.35 To that 
end, international condemnation of Japanese aggression was perceived to be unfair 
because, for those such as right-wing military man Hashimoto Kingōrō, a more 
belligerent imperialism was believed to have been the only option left to Japan in 
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view of the anti-immigration and protectionist trade policies of the US and its allies.36  
In mitigating the nation’s perceived vulnerabilities, the leadership began to 
develop further earlier pan-Asian strategies for overhauling and restructuring the 
region as an ‘Asia for the Asiatics’. The primary mechanism through which this 
would be achieved was the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. 
An expansion on earlier ideas for an Asian Monroe Doctrine and a New Order in 
East Asia, the Sphere was initially proposed by Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke, 
one of the main architects of Japan’s wartime political system, in August 1940.37 For 
Matsuoka, the primary aim of the Sphere was reminiscent of the ‘mission’ advocated 
by prominent figures, such as Ōkuma Shigenobu, who had called for a greater role 
for Japan as a leader and disseminator of Japanese-based ‘civilisation’ in Asia.38 The 
Sphere would also be part of a strategy for economic self-defence since, according to 
Arita (a strong proponent of this ideology), if countries like Germany, Italy, and 
Japan did not take ‘definite measures of protection’, they ‘would certainly be 
doomed to extinction’.39 This won favour with both branches of the military since it 
would enable the realisation of long-term goals for a self-sufficient regional bloc 
which, according to a joint Army-Navy draft policy from April 1941, had become 
essential for the ‘rapid strengthening of Japan’s defense posture.’40  
Thus, now an integral part of this strategy, Southeast Asia was to be reshaped 
in line with the grand vision of the Co-prosperity Sphere. According to an outline 
provided by the Total War Research Institute in January 1942, this involved 
reorganising Southeast Asia, in addition to East Asia and the Pacific (including India 
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and Australia), into a tiered hierarchy with each country taking its ‘proper place’ 
according to its apparent economic and strategic value to the Empire, as well as its 
perceived level of development. Though ostensibly founded on historical, 
geographic, and racial similarities between projected Sphere nations, it was chiefly 
paternalistic in design.41 As the leader and epicentre of the Sphere, ‘Japanese values’ 
were to be disseminated and all traces of American and European influence were to 
be erased.42 Other Asian countries would have an ascribed role and, on account of 
their perceived inferior status, would be ‘advanced’ or ‘civilised’ through policies of 
‘Japanization’. This was justified in order to, first, fulfil the economic and defensive 
requirements underpinning the main function of the Sphere, and second, create a 
unifying Asian identity to ensure docility among the occupied peoples. Through 
cultural policies that were often intrusive and heavy-handed, Southeast Asians were 
to be compelled to embrace the new roles thrust upon them as members of the 
Sphere and were expected to accept the reshaping of their societies in accordance 
with Japanese perceptions of a suitably Asian culture. 43  In short, the pan-Asian 
framing of the war as a ‘liberating mission’ was much more than a convenient 
rhetoric designed to win over other Asians. It represented a strategy for mitigating 
long-standing uncertainties about Japan’s security in an international world viewed 
as a competition between the ‘strong’ who naturally and rightfully dominated the 
‘weak’. Essentially, Japan’s national security would finally be assured through 
eliminating the menace of Western imperialism in Asia and replacing it with an 
economically prosperous and autarkic regional bloc based both politically and 
culturally on Japanese values. Ultimately, the security concerns and the arrogant 
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pan-Asian ideas that underpinned Japan’s expansion into, and strategies for, 
Southeast Asia and the way in which war was subsequently framed would shape 
military conduct towards local populations on whom part of the success of Japan’s 
plans for the region were placed.  
THE SHAME OF HARMING ‘NON-RESISTANT NATIVES’: MILITARY 
CONDUCT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  
The way in which this conflict was characterised meant that the populations of this 
area, as the subjects of the professed liberating mission, were not viewed as enemies. 
In a statement explaining the declaration of war, the Japanese government, for 
example, averred that southern expansion ‘does not in the least mean that hostility is 
being entertained toward the inhabitants of those areas’.44 As a consequence, the 
space of exception established in China which had allowed for terror-driven warfare 
and the escalation to more extreme practices in particular areas, was not extended to 
Southeast Asia. In fact, more determined to secure cooperation from local 
populations, the military leadership placed some constraints on conduct in this 
region.  
In order to limit opportunities for violence, access to local inhabitants was 
restricted through close monitoring of troop movements, especially in densely 
populated areas where soldiers were required to get special passes to enter certain 
zones.45 In fact, troops were completely prohibited from visiting some areas where 
outbursts were more likely. For instance, Sato Chitoshi, a member of the IJA’s 55th 
Division, remarked in his diary in early February that Chinese villages in the Pacific 
Islands were completely ‘out of bounds’ to Japanese soldiers.46 In order to avoid 
‘misunderstandings’, commanding officers relayed the general principles of pre-war 
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occupation policies to their subordinates stressing that ‘natives’ be treated kindly and 
their religion and customs be respected.47 Soldiers were also ‘strictly forbidden’ from 
looting or ‘disgracing’ local women and, in efforts to stamp out these crimes, harsher 
punishments were implemented.48 Iwasa Koji, a private captured and interrogated 
by the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) in March 1943, recalled that 
severe penalties were imposed for looting or striking a ‘native’, while rape could be 
punishable by death. 49  Since it was recognised that many of these acts were 
opportunistic and usually committed by soldiers whose behaviour became ‘lax’ 
when out from under the ‘watchful eye of authority’ when ‘foraging’, commanders 
were advised to reduce ‘unnecessary foraging’ expeditions and to send a responsible 
leader with troops when they were unavoidable.50 While the enforcement of such 
orders remained largely dependent on the commanding officer, sources indicate that 
the Kempeitai were more rigorous in their efforts to keep troops in line in Southeast 
Asia. 51  A Japanese sergeant captured in October 1943, when asked about the 
treatment of local populations during an interrogation, remarked that ‘there was no 
possibility of ill-treating natives … as Military Police were insistent that they should 
not be antagonised.’52 Finally, in sharp contrast to POW policy, or lack thereof, 
employed in China, commanders were instructed that Asian prisoners were to be 
treated ‘benevolently and humanely under the idea of the foundation of a Greater 
East Asia’ and that ‘[v]iolence, insult and bad treatment must not be inflicted without 
good reason.’ Furthermore, after being ‘re-educated’, Asian POWs were to be 
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released back into society unless needed for labour purposes for which they should 
be paid.53 In theory, there was to be much less tolerance of atrocities on account of 
the very different framing and demands of this war, then.  
In practice, the atmosphere of permissibility established in China proved 
difficult to completely stamp out. Based on the extensive evidence collected for the 
IMTFE, it is clear that atrocities, though diverse in scale and extent, occurred 
throughout Southeast Asia. 54  One of the reasons for this was that while the 
leadership had taken steps to tackle the widespread sense of acceptability for certain 
behaviours, the characterisation of the war, despite its pan-Asian overtones, further 
reinforced the sense of Japanese superiority which had facilitated violence in China. 
In framing conflict in the Pacific as a ‘benevolent mission’ to overthrow exploitative 
Western imperialism in Asia, the leadership confirmed Japan’s right and 
responsibility to lead their neighbours who, even more so than the Chinese, were 
understood to be relatively backwards. Whereas China was seen as a once great 
civilisation in decline, Southeast Asian countries were typically viewed through their 
colonial status and it was widely believed that without Japanese guidance, these 
peoples could never achieve independence or prosperity.55 There were exceptions 
among those men, like Fujiwara Iwaichi and Takeda Rintarō, who worked with local 
populations as part of dedicated pacification units; however, as Ethan Mark has 
pointed out, Japanese soldiers in general tended to look down upon Southeast 
Asians as backwards, lazy, uncivilised, and inherently inferior. 56  For example, 
Yokoda Shigeki, a third class seaman captured in 1943, explained to his interrogator 
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that, since the ‘natives’ were to be pitied and should be taught civilisation and 
culture, the IJN had treated them kindly but, in the words of the interrogator, ‘could 
not, however, be treated in the same manner as the Japanese.’ 57  An unnamed 
sergeant, also captured in 1943, similarly believed that the ‘natives’ were not to be 
viewed as equals given the far lower state of their civilisation. 58  Commanders 
sometimes advised troops to treat local inhabitants kindly on account of their being 
‘simple-minded’ or of a ‘lower standard’.59 Still, as in China, such attitudes often had 
a detrimental impact on relations between the Japanese and those that came under 
their control. Troops expected their so-called ‘Asian brothers’ to address them as 
‘masters’ and they were often forced to bow, threatened with slaps to the face, 
humiliation or worse if they did not show enough deference or respect. 60  Thus, 
declarations of ‘Asia for the Asiatics’ were belied by day-to-day interactions between 
the populace and Japanese soldiers who carried themselves with the arrogance of 
conquerors. As Grant Goodman has observed, this reinforced the very colonial 
relationship they claimed to be overturning. 61  While the Japanese were initially 
welcomed as the ‘liberators’ they claimed to be in some areas, Burma and Indonesia 
for example, frustration with the exploitative wartime self-interest and the superior 
attitudes of the occupiers strained relations, giving rise to discontent and, in some 
cases, forms of resistance from Asian peoples across Southeast Asia. It is in 
addressing outbreaks of unrest and opposition among local inhabitants that the 
genocidal potential of the so-called ‘liberating mission’ can be located.  
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There was a crucial dichotomy at work in the Japanese treatment of Southeast 
Asian populations. This was centred on resistance as occupation forces vacillated 
between conciliation and violent subjugation, depending on the reception and 
behaviour of the local inhabitants. While troops had been instructed that, as 
exemplified by the following operation orders from the South Seas Detachment, ‘[t]o 
harm non-resistant natives is to shame the banner of the Imperial Army and bring 
about misunderstandings’, constraints on behaviour did not apply to those who 
offered opposition.62  Indeed, driven by deeply rooted insecurities and long-term 
ideological imperatives, the grandiose existential framing of the war meant that there 
was to be no tolerance of resistance in Southeast Asia. As mentioned, Japanese 
objectives required the complete submission of local populations. Thus, where 
limited pacification efforts failed, the leadership sanctioned violence as a means of 
subjugating unruly peoples who had limited rights under international law and 
whose lives mattered less in this apparent struggle for survival. For example, 
Lieutenant-General Honma Masaharu had threatened in a speech marking the fall of 
Singapore on 16 February that:  
… if you fail to understand the true and lofty purpose of Japan, and instead obstruct 
the successful prosecution of the military activities and tactics of the Imperial 
Japanese Forces, whoever you are, we shall come and crush you with our might and 
power, and thus compel you to realize by means of force the true significance and 
meaning of our mission in the Far East.63 
Japanese forces ‘impelled to take extreme measures with those who did not 
understand [their] real motive and prevented the peace …’ utilised those practices 
honed through numerous encounters with resisting Asian populations since 1895.64 
Throughout the occupied areas, populations were warned of the perils of opposing 
Japanese rule and terror tactics including; on-the-spot executions, public displays of 
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violence, reprisal killings, destruction of property, and collective punishments were 
used to reinforce these warnings. The Kempeitai as the primary agents responsible for 
the maintenance of peace and order were given considerable discretionary powers to 
raid, arrest, and execute on the slightest suspicion and used torture as a primary 
means of ‘investigation’.65 In essence, though the leadership had framed the war as a 
predominantly benevolent endeavour during which Japanese troops were to be more 
restrained in their conduct towards other Asians who, ideally, would be encouraged 
to cooperate, there were exceptions. Commanders on the ground had discretion to 
use violent measures in response to resistance or, more significantly, groups of 
people who were deemed to be ‘anti-Japanese’. As in China, these terms were not 
clearly demarcated and men on the ground had ultimate authority to define 
‘resistance’ and ‘anti-Japanism’. Thus, while the space of exception established in 
China had not been fully extended into Southeast Asia, the absolute necessity of 
ensuring compliance in this perceived struggle for survival, caused the leadership to 
employ, as they had in occupied China, a fluid, ambiguous, and subjective rhetoric of 
exception that allowed for, warranted even, extreme violence towards those that 
stood in the way of their grand plans for reconstructing Asia. This made resistance 
even more concomitant to the radicalisation process in Southeast Asia.  
*** 
Despite the outward, and not necessarily disingenuous, impression of a benevolent 
war of liberation, the context and framing of this conflict was not completely adverse 
to extreme violence. Indeed, the insecurities that had driven Japanese interest and 
fuelled an ambitious strategy of region-building in Southeast Asia, allowed for the 
destruction of people who were considered to be ‘anti-Japanese’ or ‘resisting’. 
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Though resistance was central to unleashing the potential for genocidal violence in 
this region, the adoption of more extreme measures was part of a radicalisation 
process similar to that in China whereby commanders made decisions to escalate 
their methods under particular conditions. In subsequent sections, beginning with an 
examination of the purge of the male Chinese population in British Malaya, I analyse 
this radicalisation process in Southeast Asia in greater depth to further identify the 

















‘SWEEP[ING] AWAY THESE TREACHEROUS CHINESE’ 
Purging ‘Anti-Japanese Elements’ in British Malaya, 1942 
The invasion of British Malaya coincided with the attack on Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941. Having landed in the south of Thailand, Japanese troops advanced 
swiftly through the peninsula. Just over two months later, British forces, which in the 
view of one contemporary observer had been ‘hopelessly unprepared’, capitulated.66 
Celebrated as an ‘epoch-making event’, the fall of Singapore, Britain’s so-called 
‘impregnable fortress’, on 15 February 1942, was viewed as a definitive victory over 
Western imperialism in Asia.67 This triumph was all the more important because 
British Malaya was deemed essential to achieving Japanese objectives in Southeast 
Asia. The peninsula was strategically placed making it indispensable to securing, and 
later defending, access to the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies, one of the military’s 
foremost wartime objectives. 68  Furthermore, Malaya had a highly developed 
economy that could provide abundant supplies of rubber and tin and Singapore was 
one of the main storage and distribution centres in the region. 69  In short, the 
peninsula was both strategically and economically advantageous and, as such, was 
to become the core of Japan’s empire in the south.70 This meant that, while other 
areas, such as Burma and the Philippines, were only important in the wartime 
context and were to one day become nominally independent, British Malaya was 
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always to be fully absorbed into the Empire.71 In order to facilitate this, Japanese 
dominance over the peninsula was to be firmly established. 
However, local conditions were less than desirable. There had been 
considerable destruction throughout the peninsula as a combined result of intensive 
fighting and the haphazard scorched earth policy employed to a limited extent by 
British commanders.72 More importantly, chaos reigned as the collapse of the British 
administration led to widespread rioting and looting.73 Since the 25th Army, under 
the command of Lieutenant-General Yamashita Tomoyuki, was shortly to advance 
on Sumatra leaving just a small defence force behind, the highest priority was the 
swift restoration of peace and order.74 Thus, on his arrival into Singapore, Yamashita 
issued the following warning: 
[The] Nippon Army will drastically expel and punish those who still pursue bended 
delusions as heretofore, those who indulge themselves in private interests and wants, 
those who act against humanity and disturb the public order and peace and those 
who are against the orders and disturb the military action of Nippon Army.75 
 
While most of the 25th Army remained outside Singapore, so as to avoid ‘outbreaks 
of disorder and inauspicious events’, the Kempeitai were tasked with promptly re-
establishing stability inside the city. 76  True to Yamashita’s warnings, those who 
threatened public peace were ‘drastically’ punished and further disturbances were 
suppressed through the use of terror tactics, including public beatings and on-the-
spot executions. Perpetrators caught looting a military store, for example, were 
immediately beheaded without trial, their heads then publicly displayed on spikes at 
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well-traversed areas across Singapore.77 The Chinese population typically bore the 
brunt of such acts. While Japanese troops proved more forgiving of members of the 
Malay and Indian populations, who were often let-off with warnings for minor 
misdemeanours, Chinese offenders were treated to the severest of punishments and 
it was usually their heads that adorned spikes throughout the city.78 The threat of 
violence loomed large as details of such incidents, accompanied by explicit warnings, 
appeared frequently in the Syonan Times, the primary Japanese-controlled newspaper 
in the peninsula.79 Such measures, though shocking, were ultimately successful. The 
looting stopped and Lee Tian Soo remembered of the occupation that ‘one could live 
freely with doors wide open, with no fears of burglary’.80 From the outset then, local 
conditions, strategic considerations, and long-term plans for the peninsula led to a 
greater urgency in the restoration of peace and order. In achieving this, the 25th 
Army showed a predilection for terror and a menacing prejudice towards the 
Chinese population. The most extreme, genocidal measures, however, emerged three 
days later after the original bouts of unrest had, for the most part, been quelled. 
‘THE GREAT INSPECTION’: MASSACRES OF THE CHINESE MALE 
POPULATION  
On 18 February 1942, Army Headquarters issued a startling and ominous decree. All 
male Chinese in Singapore between the ages of eighteen and fifty were required to 
report to one of five designated ‘screening centres’ by noon on 21 February. This 
began what the Japanese were to call the ‘great inspection’ (daikenshō) and what has 
since become known as the sook ching, a Hokkien term meaning ‘purge through 
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cleansing’.81 Japanese notices were displayed throughout the city warning of severe 
punishment for non-attendance and advising men to bring three days’ worth of food 
and water with them.82 Naturally, given that the majority in Singapore did not speak 
Japanese, there was considerable panic and confusion as to the intentions behind the 
operation. Speculation was rife. Some had heard that they were to listen to a 
chastising speech over past misdemeanours, others believed they were to be 
registered for identity cards or for labour purposes yet, while some were more 
apprehensive, having heard the terrible stories of Nanjing, none predicted the true 
nature of the operation.83 As such, the Japanese rarely had to force or coerce Chinese 
residents to attend, although some Kempeitai did go door-to-door, terrorising the 
population by roughly forcing them from their homes at gun-point. The lack of 
coordination meant that often women, children, and elderly men also arrived at the 
centres.84 Once there, thousands waited, crowded together in confined spaces that 
rarely offered shelter from the elements, for a screening process that could take 
anywhere between six hours and six days, with only the provisions they may have 
brought with them.85 Many suffered from dehydration, hunger, and exhaustion as 
they awaited their fate.86   
At the centres, the Kempeitai, assisted by the Imperial Guard Division, had just 
three days to screen the entire male Chinese population in Singapore and ‘dispose of’ 
any ‘anti-Japanese’ or ‘bad’ elements.87 The operation had been planned prior to 
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entry into the city and so was assisted by suspect lists prepared in advance.88 These 
lists targeted men who had been involved in the China Relief Fund, volunteers who 
had fought with the British, those who had come to Singapore after the outbreak of 
the ‘China Incident’, suspected communists, and those with professions that 
ostensibly made them more likely to be anti-Japanese, such as government officials, 
journalists, teachers, and students.89 The term ‘anti-Japanese’ became so sweeping 
and subjective that men would also be singled out on the basis of completely 
arbitrary reasons such as being rich, educated, or able to speak English, as well as on 
the basis of their physical appearance. Tattoos, spectacles, close-cropped hair styles, 
and soft hands all apparently denoted ‘anti-Japanism’.90 As Lee Geok Boi observed, 
‘life for thousands in those few days essentially hung on the whims and fancies of the 
men doing the screening.’91  
Like in China, commanders had authority to decide what constituted ‘anti-
Japanism’ and so the rigour with which men were investigated varied according to 
the character of those in charge. For instance, while women had been sent home 
fairly early in the process at most other centres, at the Victoria School in Jalan Besar 
they were screened and some taken away in trucks to be used, it was suspected, in 
military brothels. 92  Shinozaki Mamoru, a Japanese civilian diplomat notable for 
saving the lives of a large number of Chinese men by issuing ‘good citizen’ passes, 
visited several of these centres and was concerned that the investigations were not 
very fair or methodical. He described with incredulity how, in some centres, 
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interviews were conducted entirely in Japanese. 93  In some locations, hooded 
informers were used to identify ‘anti-Japanese’ elements simply through a nod of the 
head or a point of the finger.94 According to the memoirs of Fusayama Takao, a 
member of the Imperial Guard Division who had conducted operations in Malaya, 
other commanders offered no pretence of investigation at all and simply divided 
men at random until the line of ‘anti-Japanese’ reached one hundred. Fusayama’s 
unit had effectively been asked by the Division Commander to ‘kill enough to satisfy 
the Army Headquarters’ after a chastisement for low execution rates.95 This suggests 
that these units had been given a target, the achievement of which would be 
ascertained quantitatively rather than qualitatively encouraging further an arbitrary 
selection process. Indeed, according to a statement given by Hishikari Takafumi, a 
newspaper correspondent attached to 25th Army Headquarters, at the ‘Chinese 
Massacres Trial’ conducted by the British in 1947, he had been advised by staff 
officers that the hard-liners’ objective was to kill fifty thousand Chinese, although the 
operation was later halted before that figure had been reached.96 Though this is 
hearsay evidence, the fact that Army Headquarters had given an impossible deadline 
which, according to Lieutenant-General Nishimura Takuma, commander of the 
Imperial Guard Division, precluded thorough investigation, further supports the 
conclusion that the operation was meant to be a planned purge of part of the male 
Chinese population as opposed to a thorough investigation, arrest, and punishment 
of genuine ‘anti-Japanese’ elements.97 
Those who made it through the arbitrary screening process were stamped 
with the word ‘examined’ or given a certificate and were free to leave; those who did 
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not were loaded into trucks and taken away. Their fate remained a mystery for days 
and family members continued to believe that they had been taken for labour 
purposes until bodies were discovered washed up on Changi Beach and a handful of 
survivors eventually returned to relate their experiences at the various execution 
sites.98 Their accounts were later corroborated by the diaries and testimony of British 
POWs, a number of whom had been forced to bury the bodies of those executed.99 
The screening centres began to disappear after several days in Singapore, however, 
the operation was not considered to be enough and further round-ups were ordered, 
though they were carried out on a smaller-scale and were much less 
indiscriminate.100 In Malaya, the 5th and 18th Divisions, having begun operations 
there on 21 February, staged a series of round-ups over the course of several 
weeks. 101  In the urban centres, procedure followed that of Singapore and was 
similarly capricious in the targeting of Chinese men. In a Japanese document 
captured by ATIS, statistics given for an operation in the vicinity of Kuala Lumpur 
on 6 March 1942, indicate that of the 237 ‘anti-Japanese’ people executed, 229 had 
been Chinese. Of these, few strictly met the criteria on the suspect lists. For instance, 
forty-six were executed for possession of Chinese flags, pro-British items, and anti-
Japanese photos, thirty for plotting to escape the round-up, and eighty-four as ‘other 
suspects’ while only fourteen had directly opposed the IJA, only three had been 
‘known enemy sympathisers’, and just twelve were members of the Malayan 
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Communist Party.102 Conditions in the rural areas made the process of concentrating 
and screening the populace impractical and, as they began to encounter sporadic 
guerrilla activity in remote provinces, Japanese soldiers came to regard all Chinese in 
those areas as enemies leading to more indiscriminate massacres that included 
women and children among the victims. 103  Like Nanjing, the death toll in this 
instance continues to be debated and it is unlikely that a consensus will be reached. 
For Singapore, figures range between five and fifty thousand and for Malaya 
between four and twenty thousand killed.104 What is clear is that the massacres 
represent an instance, similar to that in Nanjing, where mopping-up operations 
intentionally and indiscriminately targeted the Chinese male population regardless 
of their actual involvement in anti-Japanese activities. Where the massacres at 
Nanjing were part of a cumulative radicalisation that had occurred during the brutal 
punitive campaign in the Yangtze Delta, such extremes in British Malaya were 
shocking for their abrupt, pre-emptive character and for having emerged within the 
wider context of the ‘liberating mission’. 
A declaration addressing the massacres by Yamashita on 25 February gives 
some insight into where the origins of the decision to employ extreme measures lie. 
According to this declaration, published in the Syonan Times, ‘the recent arrests of 
hostile and rebellious Chinese have drastically been carried [out] in order to establish 
the prompt restoration of the peace of “Syonan-Ko” (port of Syonan) and also to 
establish the bright Malaya.’ He further detailed the various anti-Japanese activities 
of the Chinese, observed that they had fought alongside the British as ‘traitors’ of 
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East Asia, and advised that they had disguised themselves as ‘good citizens’ with the 
intention of carrying on guerrilla activities which threatened the future prosperity of 
the area. Ultimately, he argued, it had been ‘the most important thing to sweep away 
these treacherous Chinese elements’.105 As implied in this declaration, to understand 
the roots of the decision to adopt more radical measures in British Malaya, it is 
necessary to look more broadly at general policy towards the Chinese in Southeast 
Asia, the unique pre-war circumstances in the peninsula, and the limited support 
offered to the British during the Malayan Campaign.  
THE ‘CHINESE PROBLEM’ IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Pre-war planners had identified the overseas Chinese as a potential problem from 
the outset. 106  Since the outbreak of war with China in 1937, they had provided 
financial and some limited military support for Chiang Kai-shek’s government. 
Furthermore, they had organised boycotts, engaged in various anti-Japanese 
activities and, in the Philippines, had even clashed with Japanese civilians.107 The 
presence of anti-Japanese sentiment was prevalent throughout the region and 
consequently the overseas Chinese were considered to be hostile and potentially 
dangerous to Japanese efforts. As noted, the military, having learned hard lessons in 
China, favoured a zero-tolerance policy towards potential resistance. Echoing the 
intentions of the IJA in their campaign in the Yangtze region during late 1937, a 
number of ‘hardliners’ recommended a pre-emptive show of force in Southeast Asia 
to cow the Chinese into submission.108 However, strategists also recognised their 
importance to the economic life and prosperity of the region. Local Chinese 
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communities typically dominated the commerce, industry, and business of many 
areas and, since Japanese interest in Southeast Asia was principally economic, they 
were understood to be vital to the realisation of key military objectives which 
inclined more moderate elements to a policy of cooperation.109 Thus, the Chinese 
populations of Southeast Asia presented a paradox: on the one hand, they could be 
potentially valuable collaborators; on the other, they were inherently anti-Japanese 
and might become a threat to the successful mobilisation of resources. Ultimately, 
pre-war planners decided that, while they would be forced to sever ties with Chiang 
Kai-shek’s government, the military should aim at fostering a cooperative 
relationship and outlined guidelines for treatment of the overseas Chinese that were 
commensurate with this outlook.110 
However, as scholars Akashi Yoji and Hayashi Hirofumi have pointed out, 
these were occupation forces coming into Southeast Asia after years of protracted 
conflict in China. 111  The experiences of this war had hardened attitudes and 
reinforced prejudices towards the Chinese people which made them more vulnerable 
to suspicion and more aggressive, discriminatory occupation policies. Within the 
context of the categories of exception established by the leadership, Japanese 
commanders had the freedom and authority to use extreme measures against ‘anti-
Japanese’ or ‘resisting’ peoples. Thus, despite pre-war guidance for a more 
conciliatory approach, in almost all areas, occupation forces, armed with suspect lists 
prepared in advance, began an immediate round-up of leaders of anti-Japanese 
associations, GMD and CCP members, and other men singled out as having engaged 
in anti-Japanese activity by intelligence agents. Their fate varied according to local 
conditions. In Indonesia, where the Japanese had received one of their ‘warmest 
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welcomes’, these men were detained for the duration of the occupation. Although 
investigations and raids were to continue, the Chinese community of Indonesia were 
thereafter afforded the opportunity to cooperate and, as they conformed to Japanese 
demands, later came to be viewed as a relatively pro-Japanese group.112 As a result, 
they were treated comparatively well and in fact Japanese forces had intervened on 
their behalf when they became the targets of violence from Indonesians as a result of 
their past collaboration with the Dutch.113 In the Philippines, where the Japanese had 
met with a cooler reception, policies were similar, although the punishments harsher, 
as small groups of men apprehended by the Kempeitai, including the Chinese 
consular staff, were summarily executed. 114  A military administration document 
outlining policy in Burma, where the IJA were also well-received, suggests that the 
15th Army followed a similar approach in terms of fostering cooperation while 
warning that ‘those [overseas Chinese] who might cooperate with the enemy and 
conspire against Japan shall be sought out and punished.’ 115  Born out of an 
underlying prejudice and mistrust, the IJA implemented a fairly uniform policy of 
pre-emptively striking at those most involved in pre-war anti-Japanese activity 
among the Chinese populations in Southeast Asia.  
Massacres in Malaya and Singapore, counter to the argument of Geoffrey 
Gunn, were not representative of a general policy of ethnic cleansing or genocide 
targeting the Chinese in Southeast Asia, then.116 As the aforementioned examples 
indicate, they were part of a wider military strategy for establishing authority over a 
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potentially problematic population. There was a crucial difference in British Malaya, 
however. In other areas only the leaders and those most involved in anti-Japanese 
activities were targeted, giving the Chinese population as a whole an opportunity 
(though usually under threat of violence) to submit to Japanese rule. With massacres 
beginning just three days after the British surrender, this opportunity was not 
afforded to Chinese men in Singapore and Malaya. The scale of violence as well as 
the indiscriminate targeting of the male population was exceptional in this case. 
Indeed, a military administration document from the 25th Army dated April 1942 in 
which it was stated that the Chinese who refused to cooperate would be ‘dealt with 
by means of extremely severe measures … while hostile elements shall be answered 
with capital punishment’, represented the most ruthless approach of all 
administrations in Southeast Asia. 117  In fact, while anti-Chinese prejudices were 
prevalent among occupation forces across the region, the military administration in 
British Malaya, under the guidance of ‘hardliner‘ Colonel Watanabe Wataru, proved 
especially suspicious and discriminatory.118 Indeed, even after the situation had been 
‘improved’ through the ‘Great Inspection’, there was a general sense that the Chinese 
were cooperating outwardly but were secretly conspiring, if not directly militating, 
against Japanese objectives.119 An intelligence report from the 5th Division’s 41st 
Infantry Regiment in March 1942, for instance, had warned that ‘these Chinese on the 
surface evince complete loyalty, but in view of their propensity to plot behind the 
scenes, strictest caution and vigilance is vital.’120 As a result, the Chinese population 
were to live in constant fear of the Kempeitai who, in their continued search for hostile 
elements, monitored the population closely and had the power to arrest, torture, and 
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execute on the slightest suspicion.121  
This prejudice played a role in driving violence since, as noted earlier, 
Japanese forces were typically more exacting in punishing infractions by Chinese in 
the peninsula. For example, while Malayan doctor T. J. Danaraj was let off with a 
warning for possession of a British calendar, the same for a Chinese man would have 
been a death sentence. 122  An Office of Strategic Services (OSS) research report 
examining the potential effectiveness of US counter-propaganda initiatives observed 
that the Japanese were actively promoting a pro-Malay policy while the Chinese 
were ‘being held in a position analogous to that of the Jews in Nazi-held countries.’123 
Though exaggerated, another military intelligence document assessing the situation 
in the occupied areas in August 1942 confirmed distinct disparities in the Japanese 
handling of the Malay, Indian, and Chinese groups, with the latter experiencing 
overtly repressive policies.124 Immediately after the massacres had come to an end, 
for instance, the remaining Chinese population were coerced into ‘donating’ a fifty 
million dollar ‘gift’ to the military administration as atonement for prior anti-
Japanese acts.125 Any guerrilla activity during the occupation was also answered 
automatically by reprisals against the Chinese population, and though they did form 
the basis of much of the limited resistance in the area, there was no real attempt by 
the Japanese to confirm that they had been involved. Aside from the individual 
personalities of the commanders in British Malaya, the more extreme attitudes of the 
occupation forces in this area were rooted in the unique pre-war circumstances in the 
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peninsula which had contributed to perceptions of the Malayan Chinese as 
manifestly hostile.  
THE ‘TREACHEROUS’ MALAYAN CHINESE 
Although pre-war anti-Japanese activity was ubiquitous among the Chinese 
populations of Southeast Asia, it was most extensive in Malaya and Singapore. There 
were strong ties to China and both the GMD and CCP had established support bases 
in the area. The Malayan Chinese had a long history of providing assistance to the 
Nationalist government, having sent aid and organised boycotts as early as 1915 in 
the wake of the Twenty-One Demands.126 After the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and 
again following the outbreak of war with China in 1937, anti-Japanese activity surged 
becoming expansive and increasingly belligerent. According to statistics compiled by 
Stephen Leong, though the Chinese in the Philippines had contributed more per 
capita, Malayan Chinese contributions were substantial amounting to forty-eight 
percent of the total funds received by the GMD from Southeast Asia. As Anglo-
Japanese relations deteriorated, the British administration grew more and more 
sympathetic to the Chinese, allowing anti-Japanese activities to thrive in the 
peninsula. Boycotts, for example, became particularly effective resulting, between 
1937 and 1938, in a sixty-eight percent decrease in imports of Japanese goods.127 This 
was significant at a time when the Japanese economy was under increasing strain 
due to the war in China and the deterioration of relations with its primary trade 
partners. As might be expected, men involved in these activities were at the top of 
the suspect lists prepared prior to entry into Singapore, indicating a punitive desire 
driving the massacres. More importantly, however, the widespread and pervasive 
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nature of anti-Japanism among the Chinese in this area contributed to a perception of 
this group as ill-disposed to, and supremely likely to oppose, Japanese rule.  
This potential resistance was all the more threatening since the Chinese were 
the largest, most nationally conscious and economically powerful ethnic group in 
British Malaya. The military estimated that seventy to eighty percent of the 
population, for example, was Chinese and that they controlled upwards of eighty 
percent of the economy.128 Figures provided by Paul Kratoska indicate that this was 
slightly exaggerated; prior to the Japanese occupation, around fifty-seven percent of 
the total population in Malaya and Singapore were Chinese.129 Nevertheless, this is 
significant when contrasted to the Philippines where the Chinese, also particularly 
active against Japan in the 1930s, amounted to just one percent of the population.130 
Of greater significance, however, was the uneven racial distribution across the 
peninsula. As Kratoska pointed out, the Chinese typically dominated the urban 
centres while the Malay population, the second largest, were mostly rural. In 
Singapore, the primary financial and industrial zone under the British, the Chinese 
were the largest group amounting to seventy-eight percent of the total population in 
the city.131 As in other areas, it was understood that the economic recovery and 
prosperity of the peninsula, fundamental to the military’s wartime priorities, would 
not easily be achieved without the assistance of this group.132 The Chinese, therefore, 
were well-placed to impede Japanese economic imperatives and any resistance might 
have dire repercussions for success in the war effort. The aforementioned intelligence 
report from the 41st Infantry Regiment, for example, rationalised continued vigilance 
                                                             
128 JM 103, 17. 
129 See table in Kratoska Japanese Occupation, 19. 
130 Li Yuk-Wai, ‘The Chinese Resistance Movement in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation’, 
JSEAS, 23(2) (1992), 308. 
131 Kratoska, Japanese Occupation, 19.  
132 Ibid, 93; Doc. 44, in Benda, et al., Japanese Military Administration, 169.  
217 
 
on account of their sizeable presence in Kuala Lumpur, ‘a particularly important 
political, economic, business and commercial centre’, which would have the effect of 
‘virtually plac[ing] the peninsula under the control of the Chinese.’133 Combined with 
past anti-Japanese activity, their large numbers and considerable influence in the 
economic life of the area made the Chinese population’s overt hostility, past anti-
Japanese behaviour, and associated potential for resistance a particular source of 
consternation.  
In spite of such concerns, testimony by Colonel Sugita Ichiji given at the 
Chinese Massacres Trial reveals that on the outbreak of war in December 1941, the 
25th Army had originally intended to follow a more moderate approach.134 Fujiwara 
Iwaichi, head of the F-Kikan, a unit designed to promote relations with the Indian 
population, concurred during his interrogation. According to him, cooperation was 
the ultimate goal and, in the words of his interrogator, ‘the illusion had only been 
destroyed after the war began’.135 Moderates, like Fujiwara, were especially appalled 
at the extreme policy employed by Army Headquarters because, as far as they could 
tell, the Malayan Chinese were as likely to submit to Japan’s wartime goals, as other 
Chinese communities in Southeast Asia had been. 136  Michael Sasaki, a second-
generation Japanese POW born and raised in the peninsula, similarly maintained 
that based on his experience in the area, the Chinese population would have 
accepted Japanese occupation and carried on with their lives as normal.137 Thus, 
while suspect lists were being made in preparation for a purge of anti-Japanese 
elements as early as 28 December 1941, there is no indication that this was 
substantially different than those of other occupation forces in Southeast Asia at that 
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time. The radicalisation of the more drastic and indiscriminate measures adopted by 
the 25th Army in February 1942 then, occurred during the course of the Malayan 
Campaign. 
CHINESE RESISTANCE DURING THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN  
Contemporary observers collectively pointed to the Malayan Campaign as the 
principle factor in the radicalisation of violence in early 1942. As Low and Cheng put 
it: ‘we [were] nobody’s darlings, we Chinese … The further south he [Yamashita] got, 
the less he loved us.’138 Indeed, in spite of their lightning attack, Japanese forces had 
begun to come up against stiff resistance and encountered setbacks on the approach 
to Singapore. As they advanced through Johore, increasing incidents of rape and 
looting were reported suggesting that fierce combat was radicalising troop 
behaviour.139 The situation was such that after the capture of the city, troops were 
forbidden from entering Singapore. In fact, when it was decided to abolish 
prohibited areas for soldiers on 5 April 1942, Army Headquarters remained 
concerned over the potential for misconduct, warning that every act reflected on the 
prestige of the IJA and would have a ‘profound impression’ on the ‘natives’.140 The 
assault on the city, which Japanese commanders had initially anticipated would 
produce an early British surrender, became a prolonged affair. 141  A number of 
Chinese men had participated in this fighting after the British had established a 
volunteer force, known as the Dalforce for its commander, Colonel John Dalley. 
Given some moderate training and limited supplies, this relatively small unit was to 
hinder the Japanese advance through attacks and fifth column activity behind enemy 
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lines; essentially, through engaging in guerrilla-style tactics. 142  According to 
Shinozaki, those in Army Headquarters were infuriated at this last minute support 
from the Chinese and a number of other contemporary observers attributed this 
activity to the drastic shift in policy in February 1942.143 These statements must be 
treated with circumspect since for the most part these observers overestimated the 
military importance of this unit.144 Chin Kee Onn, for instance, gave the following 
embellished appraisal: the Dalforce had ‘given them [the Japanese] the most trouble, 
killed the greatest number of their men, checked their progress and built up the 
fighting morale of the whole Chinese nation’. 145  Though it is doubtful that the 
Dalforce played such a decisive role in the fighting, they were symbolically 
significant as the only active resistance offered to the Japanese by the overseas 
Chinese in Southeast Asia. Certainly, the Kempeitai showed determination in their 
efforts to locate former members of the Dalforce, even going so far as to trick men 
into coming forward with promises of release and work as policemen. 146  Some 
scholars, like Hayashi Hirofumi, have refuted the idea that massacres were a 
retaliation to Chinese participation in the Battle of Singapore since, contrary to the 
observations of contemporaries, the Dalforce was of limited military effectiveness.147 
However, the fact that more substantial resistance by Indian soldiers who fought 
alongside the British in Malaya and Filipino men who had taken up arms in the 
Philippines was more easily forgiven, in accordance with the more moderate policy 
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in Southeast Asia, suggests that it was more about what this specifically Chinese 
guerrilla resistance represented than its results.148  
According to the defendants at the Chinese Massacres Trial, active resistance 
from this population fuelled concerns over the potential for resistance in the 
peninsula. For instance, Major General Kawamura Saburō, in command of the 
Singapore Garrison, testified that the reasons for the massacres as relayed to him by 
Staff Officer Tsuji Masanobu, centred on the putative preparations for guerrilla 
resistance being made by volunteers and communists who had ‘gone 
underground’.149 Nishimura and Sugita both pointed to the unrest in Singapore as 
further evidence of a ‘grave situation’ developing in the peninsula.150 While Hayashi 
is likely correct that such statements were exaggerated in the context of the war 
crimes trials; it is important to note, as Hayashi has done to an extent, that the 
extreme violence towards the Malayan Chinese was shaped by the recent memories 
of anti-guerrilla warfare in China, of which members of the 25th Army were veterans. 
These troops had first-hand experience of the difficulties and resources required in 
effectively quashing this type of resistance. Since the peninsula was to become an 
integral part of the Japanese Empire and the majority of the invasion force was to 
move on to Sumatra, the possibility that guerrilla resistance might emerge among the 
largest, most economically important group (a possibility raised by the mere fact of 
the Dalforce), likely exacerbated pre-existing concerns over the anti-Japanese 
sentiment of the Chinese in this region. As in China, the established inability to 
identify volunteers cast suspicion on the whole populace placing the males in 
particular within a category of exception as potential anti-Japanese guerrillas. In 
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other words, the experiences, learning, and taboos broken in China had already 
begun the process of radicalisation that allowed for extreme violence towards anti-
Japanese and resisting peoples. However, as consideration of the situation in other 
territories reveals, the decisions of the 25th Army command in February 1942 were 
determined by the unique conditions in British Malaya which caused the Chinese to 
be viewed as a potent threat that, in spite of their significance to the economic 
prosperity of the peninsula, could and would be suppressed by an intentionally 
indiscriminate destruction of part of the male population.151 
*** 
In February 1942 then, the 25th Army implemented a plan of intentional group 
destruction targeting a section of the Chinese male population of British Malaya. 
Massacres were arbitrary, singling out military-aged males regardless of whether 
they had engaged in guerrilla activities or had directly supported them. They were 
also pre-emptive, occurring immediately after the IJA had arrived into Singapore 
giving the overseas Chinese limited opportunity for resistance, or conversely, to 
comply with Japanese occupation. As such, Chinese men were targeted, not for 
proven opposition to Japanese rule, but because they fell into a category of people 
against whom it was acceptable to use extreme measures. The abruptness of the 
massacres also represented a pattern of radicalisation and learning informed by past 
experiences, prejudicial attitudes, and contempt developed during the course of war 
in China. This meant that the Malayan Chinese, as the largest and most actively anti-
Japanese group in the peninsula, were seen as a particularly dangerous threat. 
Furthermore, Malaya and Singapore were essential to Japanese goals in Southeast 
Asia and a section of the 25th Army was soon to leave for Sumatra, leaving just a 
small defence force behind. Such considerations, exacerbated by the perceived 
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‘Chinese problem’, the limited resistance of the Dalforce, and the initial bouts of 
unrest in the peninsula, further triggered the leap to more extreme measures at this 
time. While the emergence of genocidal violence in this instance was related to the 
radicalisation of attitudes towards the Chinese during campaigns in China, the 
breaking of taboos in terms of what constituted acceptable methods for suppressing 
resistance in this area opened possibilities for more exceptional practices towards 
other populations who, in contrast, were not seen as inherently anti-Japanese. In the 
final section of this chapter, I examine one such case through analysing the longer-











‘ALL PEOPLE ON THE BATTLEFIELD…WILL BE PUT TO DEATH’  
Anti-Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines, 1942–45 
As in other areas, the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 
progressed swiftly. By 2 January, Manila had been captured and, while fighting 
continued in Bataan province until May 1942, the surrender of the capital marked the 
beginning of the Japanese occupation. 152  Proclaiming the Islands free of the 
‘oppressive domination’ of the US, Lieutenant–General Honma Masaharu outlined 
Japanese aims of creating a ‘Philippines for the Filipinos’ and implored the people to 
share wartime burdens and cooperate in this endeavour.153 However, such rhetoric 
had limited appeal for a people who were already in the process of transitioning to 
independence. As such, the IJA received a lukewarm reception from the populace 
who were cautious of Japanese intentions in the Islands.154 Rumours of soldiers’ 
brutality in the provinces and an awareness of the IJA’s record in China added, in 
some quarters, to an underlying animosity and caused the people of Manila to be 
apprehensive of, if not outwardly hostile to, Japanese troops.155 Japanese victory, 
then, was far from triumphant. The lacklustre welcome, the ambivalence of the 
populace, and the continued resistance of thousands of Filipino soldiers in Bataan, 
contributed to Japanese suspicions of the people, in contrast to the more welcoming 
Indonesians and Burmese, as pro-American.  
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The short bouts of unrest and looting that preceded the entry into Manila did 
little to assuage concerns and, though this was swiftly suppressed, the 14th Army 
sought to deter further disturbances through terror tactics similar to those employed 
in British Malaya. A declaration on 2 January threatened that ‘offering resistance or 
committing a hostile act against the Japanese Armed Forces in any manner, leads the 
whole native land to ashes.’156 Filipino civilians were soon to discover that such 
warnings were not empty threats. The IJA followed through with fervour and 
brutality to set an example of the perils of non-compliance.157 Filipinos were impelled 
to watch the torture, beating, or execution of their fellow countrymen and soldiers 
would frequently mete out punishments that were disproportionate to, what were 
often, minor infractions.158 One man, for example, was shot in the back in these first 
few days simply for refusing to bow to a Japanese sentry.159 Punishments such as 
these were justified under the broad rubric of ‘resistance’ which allowed soldiers to 
impose penalties for a wide variety of acts including; attacks on Japanese 
installations, the distribution of pro-American flyers, and, as two civilians discovered 
in February 1942, the failure to walk around sandbags.160 Where the perpetrators 
could not be directly identified, Japanese troops took hostages and imposed 
collective punishments. Manuel Buenafe, for instance, was given the impression that, 
for the IJA, ‘the easier thing was to shoot every one suspected.’161 Consequently, José 
Reyes observed, Filipinos ‘lived in constant dread, fear, and anguish brought about 
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by a reign of terror.’162 
Despite the similarities with the techniques employed in British Malaya, 
however, genocidal violence as a means of ensuring compliance from a potentially 
hostile population did not become an option at this stage in the Philippines. In fact, 
the military administration showed a greater inclination towards fostering amicable 
relations through more conciliatory means.163 For the most part, these efforts were 
directed towards co-opting the Philippine elite through accommodation of the 
existing government and loose assurances of future independence. 164  However, 
occupation forces did engage in some limited pacification works and proved 
uncharacteristically forgiving of past resistance by Filipino POWs. 165 Though not 
necessarily treated well, having been forced to walk sixty miles under appalling 
conditions from Bataan to Camp O’Donnell in Tarlac (now known as the Bataan 
Death March), a decision was made to release prisoners rather than subject them to 
‘wholesale extermination’ which, Honma suggested in an address to the people in 
July 1942, might have been ‘simpler’.166 In sum, the administration in the Philippines 
reflected general military policy in Southeast Asia in tending to vacillate between 
violent subjugation and conciliation. As in Malaya and Singapore, such decisions 
were determined by pre-war plans, long-term intentions, and subjective perceptions 
about these groups.   
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‘PHILIPPINES FOR THE FILIPINOS’: JAPANESE PLANS FOR THE ISLANDS 
The inclusion of the Philippines in Japan’s pre-war plans was comparatively last 
minute since the military initially hoped to expand into Southeast Asia while 
avoiding war with the US. As the main US foothold in the Pacific, the Islands were to 
be occupied primarily to destroy the ability of the Americans to fight effectively in 
the area and not on the basis of any perceived strategic or economic value. If 
anything, planners were concerned that the Islands would be a burden to the 
Empire.167 Though the Philippines were to be included as part of the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere in the long-term, early occupation documents indicate that they were to be 
nominally independent guided, not governed, by Japan.168 Thus, the occupation was 
initially envisioned to be more hands-off and collaborative with the primary aim of 
establishing a pro-Japanese government.169  
The belief in the potential for cooperation was grounded in assumptions 
about the Filipino people and their long-standing desire for independence which had 
evolved through pre-war interactions. While Japanese involvement in Southeast Asia 
had generally been limited, there had been some modest pre-war engagement with 
the Philippines and Davao had become home to the largest Japanese immigrant 
community in Southeast Asia.170  Japanese pan-Asianists had also taken an early 
interest in the question of Philippine independence. In fact, they had (unsuccessfully) 
lobbied on behalf of Filipino revolutionaries, such as Emilio Aguinaldo, who had 
appealed to Japan for assistance in their fight against Spain in the 1890s.171 While the 
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US had proved more adept at fostering an amicable relationship with the Philippines 
(the brutal suppression of the Philippine Insurrection notwithstanding) after it took 
control from Spain in 1898, anti-American rebels, like Artemio Ricarte who lived in 
self-imposed exile in Yokohama from 1915, continued to forge connections in Japan 
which, after victory over Russia in 1905, had become something of a role model 
among nationalists in Asia. 172  Having ‘returned to Asia’ in the 1930s, Japanese 
businessmen and diplomats pursued stronger links between the two countries 
through a variety of economic and cultural policies. 173  Such measures found 
moderate welcome in some quarters as Filipino leaders sought to develop a 
Philippine economy and national identity as separate from the US.174  
As a result of these early interactions, it was assumed in 1942 that the Filipino 
people had a robust sense of nationalism which contributed to a strong aversion to 
foreign domination. This meant that, despite the close ties with the US, the Filipino 
people might be amenable to the grand strategy of constructing an ‘Asia for the 
Asiatics’. Furthermore, though typically viewed as a highly westernised and, 
consequently, ‘materialistic, lazy, pleasure-seeking people’ who, having been 
exposed to the ‘degenerating influences’ of the ‘West’ for so long, had lost their true 
‘Oriental character’, they were also understood to be more developed than other 
populations having been governed as a commonwealth since 1935.175 Thus, attitudes 
towards the Filipino people were fundamentally different than those towards the 
overseas Chinese. While the IJA were somewhat distrustful of the Filipino people as 
pro-American and potentially hostile, it was believed that, despite their apparent 
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antipathy, Filipinos were not an irrevocably anti-Japanese threat. They could be 
persuaded to cooperate through cultural policies designed to eradicate European and 
American influence, ‘revive’ Filipino culture, and cultivate stronger links through 
dissemination of Japanese language, customs, and values.176 Such attitudes, coupled 
with the fact that the Islands were not as important in either the long or short term, 
meant that, while the administration was willing to use terror to maintain peace and 
order, extreme violence was not deemed necessary to ensuring compliance. However, 
as resistance developed, necessitating more direct involvement in the Islands, 
Japanese occupation forces began to rely more heavily on violence and terror and, in 
doing so, fuelled further opposition.  
CYCLES OF VIOLENCE:  PHILIPPINE RESISTANCE AND JAPANESE 
RESPONSES, 1942–1943 
Despite the furtive enmity of the populace, resistance activities in the Philippines had 
been negligible at first. Scattered American and Filipino soldiers, after successfully 
evading capture, had formed small bands that operated in the mountainous and 
remote provincial regions. These units were ill-equipped, disorganised, 
inexperienced in guerrilla tactics, and were limited in numbers. 177  According to 
Robert Lapham, an American lieutenant who commanded a guerrilla unit operating 
in central Luzon, they could easily have been wiped out in these first weeks.178 
However, Japanese forces had been preoccupied by continued fighting in Bataan and 
had engaged in only minor mopping-up operations until the American surrender in 
May 1942. After the capitulation, Filipino soldiers continued the fight for a time but, 
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with Japanese forces now able to concentrate their full attention on ‘mopping-up’, 
had mostly been defeated by the end of July. 179  This was a short-lived peace. 
Coinciding with the first Allied offensive in the Pacific at Guadalcanal in August, 
riots on Negros Island began a succession of serious uprisings in the Visayas. Over 
subsequent months, Japanese forces found peace and order more difficult to 
maintain in the Islands as a number of disparate guerrilla groups formed and their 
effectiveness slowly improved.180 
The proliferation of active resistance in the Islands from mid-1942 reflected a 
growing discontent among the Filipino people. Although the military administration 
had been largely successful in co-opting the political elite (more a reflection of an 
alignment of interests than of enthusiasm for Japan’s ‘Philippines for the Filipinos’), 
the limited efforts at winning over the populace were less effective.181 Initially, a 
widespread confidence that the US would return and that Japanese occupation was 
only temporary had encouraged many  to keep their heads down and carry on with 
their lives as best they could under martial law. However, the realities of Japanese 
rule soon provoked further hostility and dissatisfaction.182 The occupation proved to 
be, in spite of Japanese claims to the contrary, based on a fundamentally colonial 
relationship. Filipinos grew resentful of being treated as a conquered people and 
were aware of the hypocritical inequality intrinsic to Japanese ‘co-prosperity’.183 As 
Buenafe wrote: ‘[t]he password of “co-prosperity” worked only one way’.184 Heavy 
handed economic initiatives severely impacted standards of living in the Islands and 
intrusive cultural policies began to impinge on daily life making the populace more 
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determined in their opposition. 185  As explained in an Allied intelligence report 
covering the situation in the Philippines at this time, resistance ‘received new 
emphasis with the hatred engendered by Japanese occupation and ruthlessness.’186 
That is not to say that all entertained the prospect of direct, armed confrontation. 
Filipino resistance manifested in diverse, predominantly passive ways. For many, it 
involved small acts of defiance such as hiding products the IJA wanted to procure, 
secretly listening to American broadcasts, and not accepting military notes as 
currency.187 In some respects, continuing on as normal in spite of the administration’s 
efforts to reorient Philippine society represented a tacit rejection of Japanese rule. 
Some, however, did offer more direct assistance to the burgeoning guerrilla 
movement. This support typically involved providing supplies, shelter, and 
intelligence, in addition to some limited engagement in fifth-column or seditious 
activity.188 
As in occupied China, the success of guerrilla tactics was contingent on a 
close relationship with local communities. Indeed, rising sympathy and support 
among the people was pivotal in transforming what originally were small, straggler 
units into a more developed resistance movement which, though not of a scale akin 
to that in China, proved to be the most sustained and stubborn opposition the IJA 
faced in Southeast Asia. 189  As the aforementioned intelligence report warned, 
however, ‘it was easy to exaggerate the military importance of guerrillas’ and, as 
Reynaldo Ileto has shown, this is an element that continues to be overstated in the 
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post-war narrative.190 For much of 1942, the effectiveness of the insurgents continued 
to be undermined by deficiencies in organisation, experience, and equipment, as well 
as the communication and logistical difficulties associated with the geography of the 
archipelago. Prone to in-fighting and factionalism, they were often impeded by a lack 
of unity. Some groups also had an uneasy relationship with local communities as 
they plundered supplies and enacted violent reprisals to prevent collaboration with 
the Japanese.191 Nevertheless, guerrilla resistance was ‘decidedly significant’ as an 
indicator of public sentiment and intelligence reports from the 16th Division 
garrisoned in Manila reveal that Japanese forces were aware of the importance of 
popular support in sustaining guerrilla resistance in the Islands.192 Accordingly, the 
IJA established ‘neighbourhood associations’ (based on the hokō system utilised, in 
various forms, in other Japanese colonies) to act as coercive spy networks through 
which civilians were monitored and held collectively accountable for disturbances in 
their areas.193 However, these methods proved limited in deterring cooperation from 
the people who had to weigh up fear of reprisal from the Japanese with fear of 
reprisal from the rebels who were more integrated into society than the few sparsely 
populated Japanese garrisons.194  
Although never a threat in a military sense, the pervasiveness of guerrilla 
activity over these months hindered Japanese efforts to consolidate their control 
outside of the main cities.195 More importantly, it forced the IJA to devote further 
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manpower and resources, in spite of plans for an indirect occupation, to the 
maintenance of peace and order across the Islands.196 This was to become more of a 
problem towards the end of 1942 as Japanese forces became more preoccupied with, 
and overstretched by, Allied offensives in the Pacific. 197  As a consequence, in 
November that year, it was announced in the Manila Tribune that the administration 
had exhausted its patience with these ‘ignorant and misguided people’ and, in the 
face of the damage they had wrought, deemed more ‘drastic measures’ necessary. 
Henceforth, the IJA would employ ‘intensive operations … to the end that these 
unruly elements may be completely wiped out.’198 In combating an enemy that was 
mobile and not easily identifiable from civilians, Japanese troops confronted 
difficulties similar to those encountered in Taiwan, Korea, and China. Much as they 
had been in those areas, Japanese troops were advised by their superiors not to rely 
on traditional encirclement techniques. ‘Punitive action’ was deemed to be the best 
method of pacification’. Thus, ‘intensive operations’ were to focus on destroying 
guerrilla bases and severing support from local communities through violent 
reprisals against barangays (villages) suspected of having harboured them.199 From 
then on, areas of guerrilla activity were at risk of bombardment, destruction of 
property, and reprisal massacres.200 However, Japanese troops were to be restrained 
in their efforts lest they incite further resistance among the populace. A 16th Division 
intelligence report documenting these operations in Pampanga, for example, advised 
that ‘although the burning of houses harbouring the enemy is necessary to prevent 
their being used during future attacks, wanton burning of houses should be 
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avoided… Every soldier should realise that the local inhabitants are greatly 
influenced by his slightest action.’201  
Indeed, much like in China, such methods incensed the populations of these 
areas and occasionally augmented guerrilla numbers as, with their homes destroyed 
and livelihoods decimated, more and more men took to the mountains.202 Despite 
these more ‘intensive operations’, Japanese intelligence reports documented an 
escalation in the frequency and nature of guerrilla activities through the first months 
of 1943. At this time, subversive acts of sabotage, espionage, and dissemination of 
propaganda were supplemented with more audacious raids and incendiary attacks 
in areas that were seen to be collaborating with the Japanese.203 This activity appears 
to have peaked around mid-1943. At their most daring, guerrillas attacked Japanese 
installations and murdered soldiers in daylight and, amid a series of strikes 
throughout Luzon in June, made an assassination attempt on José P. Laurel, a 
collaborator and future president of the ‘independent’ Philippine Republic.204  
The boldness of the resistance movement at this time was driven by a number 
of factors. After victory at Guadalcanal in February that year, 1943 had seen the 
Allies go on the offensive placing the Empire under greater strain. As war began to 
turn against Japan, conditions in the occupied territories deteriorated leading to 
severe shortages of food and other essential items. 205  Increased privations, 
expectations of an impending American return to the Islands, and the growing 
ruthlessness of anti-guerrilla measures, contributed further to rising popular 
discontent and strengthened support for the resistance movement. Additionally, 
guerrilla units had become better organised and more efficient after having 
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developed important underground networks. They also received aid from Allied 
intelligence agents who delivered supplies by submarine and helped coordinate 
operations between the disparate groups.206 At the same time, the quality, number, 
and disposition of Japanese forces was constantly fluctuating. The Philippines were 
used as a staging area where ‘green’ troops were sent from Japan to gain experience 
prior to their transfer to the front, hampering attempts to bring the guerrilla situation 
under control.207 Thus, facing serious practical impediments, and fighting a losing 
battle in respect to pacification efforts, Japanese forces met the intensification of 
guerrilla activity with an escalation of their own.  
During the latter half of 1943, punitive expeditions were enhanced with a 
practice similar to that used during the mopping-up of ‘bad elements’ in British 
Malaya in 1942. This practice, known among Filipinos as ‘zonification’, focused anti-
guerrilla operations more directly on the civilian population and placed men in 
particular at risk of more systematic violence. During these operations, Japanese 
troops would suddenly descend on an area, usually between curfew hours of 
midnight and 5am, and would block all access in and out of the area. At dawn, 
soldiers would go door-to-door rounding up all male civilians, and occasionally 
women and children too, forcing them out of their homes to congregate at a nearby 
church or school. While they waited, usually without food, water, or sanitary 
provisions, to be ‘investigated’ by the Kempeitai, thorough searches of houses, often 
accompanied by looting, would be carried out. In some cases, investigations involved 
men passing in front of a ‘magic eye’ – a hooded informant – who would point out 
those who allegedly had guerrilla connections. The Kempeitai supplemented this with 
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torture techniques to force confessions and further accusations.208 Those suspected of 
either being a guerrilla or having assisted them were usually taken away to be 
executed. 209  Such methods had a devastating impact. Life in the provinces was 
considerably disrupted as men began to leave for the mountains rather than risk the 
arbitrary violence meted out by troops who could torture and execute on the 
slightest suspicion. ‘Zonification’ practices were also believed to have been a 
crushing blow to the resistance movement as activity appeared to decline from late 
1943.210 It is important to note, however, that the diminished activity of the guerrillas 
at this time overlapped with a more determined conciliatory effort by the Japanese 
government to secure cooperation from the Filipino people by declaring 
independence on 14 October 1943. Following this, the new Republic had announced 
a period of amnesty which gave guerrillas until 25 January 1944 to surrender with 
full pardon.211 At the same time, punitive expeditions were postponed in all but the 
most troublesome areas providing a short respite and an opportunity for guerrillas to 
extend their underground networks, replenish supplies, and coordinate their 
forces.212 The decrease in guerrilla activity around this time, therefore, may have 
been deceptive, influenced by a ‘wait-and-see’ – or rather ‘wait-and-hope’ – attitude 
to independence which, if truly realised, would have seen an end to Japanese 
dominance in the Islands. It soon became apparent that independence was nominal 
since there were no outward signs of scaling back Japanese control in the Islands.213 
Consequently, the cycle of violence constituted and fuelled by Philippine resistance 
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and the progressively more systematic responses by Japanese forces over the course 
of these years resumed. However, like the intensification of anti-guerrilla campaigns 
in occupied China in 1941, it was a shift in the geopolitical context that instigated the 
radicalisation of anti-guerrilla strategy in 1944 and which laid the foundations for the 
embrace of genocidal violence in early 1945. 
THE RETURN OF THE AMERICANS AND THE RADICALISATION OF 
VIOLENCE, 1944  
By early 1944, it was clear that war with the Allies was progressing badly and, as the 
US continued its advance in the Pacific, an American return to the Philippines 
appeared imminent.214 For the first time, the Islands were to have a decisive role in 
the war as a final opportunity to thwart American forces before they began their 
attack on Japan itself. In short, the Philippines had become an area of utmost 
importance in a war that many troops had come to believe would mean ‘national 
death’ if they should be defeated. A first class seaman captured in September 1943, 
for instance, had told his interrogator that if Japan should lose the war, there would 
no longer be any such country.215 Following instructions received from the Southern 
Expeditionary Army on 15 March, preparations for defence of the Islands began in 
earnest. 216  Since the Philippines had not previously been an area of strategic 
importance having hitherto been used as a supply base, there was considerable work 
to be done in terms of constructing military installations and fortifications ready for a 
decisive front-line role.217 Defence preparations were made all the more challenging 
by the deteriorating peace and order situation in the Islands. In anticipation of the US 
invasion, guerrilla units which had formerly been at odds put aside their internecine 
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struggles to begin preparations of their own for the coming battle.218 Aside from 
obstructing Japanese efforts through disrupting and sabotaging defence works, these 
units also stockpiled weapons, gathered intelligence, and much to the alarm of 
Japanese forces, encouraged popular unrest through dissemination of propaganda.219  
Exacerbating concerns over a potential uprising was an overall perception of 
the Filipino people as resolutely anti-Japanese by this time. Though initially viewed 
as potential collaborators, years of Filipino antipathy and tenacious guerrilla 
resistance (despite the granting of ‘independence’), had contributed to a shift in 
Japanese attitudes. As they began to plan for the US invasion, commanders grew 
more apprehensive of the peoples’ trustworthiness.220 For example, a monthly battle 
report from the 16th Division dated April 1944 warned that the Filipinos ‘secretly 
anticipate a Japanese-American war in the Philippines’.221 First Lieutenant Oishihashi 
Masao, captured in July 1944, told his interrogator that the Americans would likely 
have no problem recapturing the Philippines since the people were ‘definitely pro-
Allied’. 222  Private First Class Yamamoto Shirō, captured in October 1944, also 
observed that the Filipinos had not hidden their dissatisfaction with Japanese rule 
and were evidently very pro-American. 223  The attitude of the populace was 
understood to be a ‘prime concern’ since it was recognised that an uprising would 
seriously hinder efforts to repel the advancing American forces. Indeed, if the 
situation was left unchecked, the already inadequate forces in the Islands would 
soon be fighting a two-front war.224 Thus, conscious that they could not take a ‘light 
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view’ of the increasingly aggressive behaviour of the insurgents or the excitement 
among the populace, the 14th Army launched a more intensive campaign against the 
guerrillas. 225  According to intelligence reports, Japanese units were engaged in 
almost continuous punitive operations from Spring 1944 having launched 939 
expeditions in April followed by no less than 1,037 separate actions in June.226 Based 
on the premise that guerrillas were ‘not good’ for the country and should be 
‘exterminated’, Japanese forces used increasingly indiscriminate methods in areas 
deemed rife with guerrilla activity.227 For instance, on Panay Island where the IJA 
had limited control outside the main city of Iloilo, a situation report to the 
commander of a unit operating in Libacao had advised that the inhabitants were ‘all 
hostile’ and ‘requested not only that, as is normal when a punitive expedition is sent 
out, the houses be burnt, but that even the women and children be killed.’228 
 However, such efforts proved to be of limited success. With the war situation 
critical after the fall of Saipan in July 1944 had placed Japan within striking distance 
of the US air force, the leadership ordered the ‘Tiger of Malaya’, Yamashita 
Tomoyuki (held in high esteem for his defeat of the British at Singapore in 1942), to 
take command of Japanese forces in the Philippines. On his arrival in early October, 
Yamashita judged the situation in the Islands to be serious for, according to 
testimony given at his trial in 1946, there was evidence of considerable anti-Japanese 
sentiment among the people and guerrillas had ‘interfered with military operations 
at quite a few places.’ 229  Second Lieutenant Matsubara Shunji, captured on 23 
December 1944, confirmed during his interrogation that ‘with the approach of the 
American Army, sabotage and stealing increased to a great extent’. He further noted 
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that, with the arrival of Yamashita, ‘more severe measures were adopted’.230 Indeed, 
in laying out his plans for the defence of the Islands at a conference of the Chiefs of 
Staff on 11 October 1944, Yamashita had stressed the importance of a swift and 
decisive subjugation of the guerrillas.231 Coinciding with the first American landings 
at Leyte just over a week later, there was a drastic shift in anti-guerrilla strategy 
which saw an increase in the scale and intensity of violence visited on the Filipino 
populace. 
As a result of the added sense of urgency in suppressing Philippine resistance 
brought about by the American invasion, Japanese forces became less rigorous in 
their efforts to identify insurgents. During punitive expeditions in areas known to 
have a strong guerrilla presence, men were executed en masse. For example, Warrant 
Officer Yamaguchi Yoshimi wrote in his diary on 28 November that the new punitive 
actions were ‘something to look forward to’ since ‘it seems that all men are to be 
killed’. In an entry on 1 December, he further clarified that his unit had received 
instructions for an expedition in Rizal province and, since guerrillas were ‘very 
active’ there, the goal would be to ‘kill all men and also to kill the women who run 
away.’ 232  Mariano Vergara Batungbacal, a Filipino interpreter employed by the 
Japanese, witnessed such actions in practice in Bataan after the commander of his 
unit, having received ‘top secret’ orders in November, began to conduct excessive 
‘zonifications’ which, in one extreme case, resulted in the massacre of almost all male 
residents of Orion on Christmas Day.233   
Violence became even more extreme on Leyte, an island in the Visayas that 
had been plagued by unrest for much of the occupation, after US troops had landed 
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there on 20 October. At Dulag, one of the sites of the landings, for example, 
thousands of civilians were killed by Japanese soldiers as they tried to evacuate.234 
Operation orders received by the 26th Division Field Hospital, active in the area on 
16 November 1944, revealed that such measures had been sanctioned by the Division 
Commanding General who had ordered all ‘natives’ be killed.235 On a small island 
just off the coast of Leyte, where it was believed that three Americans were hiding, 
Japanese troops also escalated their anti-guerrilla operations. According to a US 
investigator, after several visits during December, the ‘slaughter had reached its 
frenzied height’ on the 29th when between eight hundred and one thousand men, 
women, and children were rounded up in a church at Dapdap, given numbers, and 
then taken in batches to secluded places where they were bayonetted.236 An extract 
from a diary belonging to a member of the Fourth Company contained reference to 
this incident and revealed that, as a general practice, this unit had ‘killed people who 
made suspicious moves’.237  
The radicalisation of violence at this point, however, was not universal. For 
the most part, commanders’ decisions to use ‘severe measures’ were contingent on 
their interpretations of local conditions, specifically, the extent of the guerrilla 
presence and the proximity of the US forces. For example, during his interrogation 
following capture in the vicinity of Antipolo, where over 500 civilians were killed in 
February 1945, Osada Teizo explained that in late 1944 his unit had received 
instructions that all Filipinos caught stealing food or supplies, inspecting defence 
positions, aiding the US forces, or harming Japanese troops, were to be put to death. 
He recalled that little had been done about it until early 1945 when the US landed on 
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Luzon. Following this invasion, original orders were revised and a decision was 
made to kill the entire population of Antipolo.238 The testimony of Sakata Yūzō, a 
first lieutenant of the 17th Division, supports this. According to Sakata, orders to 
carry out guerrilla subjugation more ‘aggressively’ in November had not been fully 
implemented since the Americans had yet to land on Luzon and so there was less 
strategic imperative necessitating ‘drastic measures’. 239  After the landings at 
Lingayen Gulf on 9 January, and in anticipation of an assault in Batangas province, a 
second meeting of commanders was called during which, Sakata alleged, they were 
instructed to kill all Filipinos, including women and children.240 As highlighted by 
these examples, the assault on Luzon in January precipitated the most radical 
escalation of violence as Japanese forces gave up attempts to identify insurgents and 
implemented an indiscriminate defence strategy that involved the intentional 
destruction of Filipinos in areas of military importance.  
EMBRACING GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE: MASSACRES AT MANILA AND A 
‘COLD BLOODED EXTERMINATION CAMPAIGN’ IN SOUTH LUZON, 1945 
The US landings at Lingayen Gulf triggered a further escalation of violence largely 
because of the tactical significance of Luzon to Japanese defence strategy. The 
capture of the largest and most strategically important island would signify decisive 
victory in the coming battle.241 As such, commanders placed great emphasis on the 
exigence of the situation and mobilised troops by reminding them that they were 
engaged in a struggle for survival in this war.242 There was a lot at stake in the 
upcoming battle, then.  However, Luzon had not been well-prepared for the assault 
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in January since, against Yamashita’s wishes, Terauchi Hisaichi, commander of the 
Southern Expeditionary Army, had ordered forces redeployed to defend Leyte in late 
1944.243 Thus, Yamashita planned a protracted campaign and focused on fortifying 
his position in the northeast of Luzon while units operating along the projected path 
of the American forces were to focus on slowing, if not thwarting, their progress. In 
doing so, commanders embraced intentionally group-destructive measures to 
prevent Filipinos from providing assistance. 
In Manila, around twenty thousand predominantly naval troops, under the 
command of Rear-Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji, fortified themselves for a last ditch effort 
at repelling the rapidly advancing US forces. This was in spite of Yamashita’s plans 
to abandon the city and engage the enemy in a protracted campaign in the 
surrounding areas.244  As American troops entered the city from the north on 3 
February, Japanese soldiers implemented a scorched earth policy that soon devolved 
into the widespread destruction of businesses, homes, hospitals, educational 
institutions, and places of worship.245 At the same time, troops began rounding-up 
and executing the male inhabitants of the southern districts. In Intramuros on 5 
February, for instance, civilians were required to congregate at Manila Cathedral 
where men were separated and marched away to Fort Santiago (Kempeitai 
headquarters during the occupation) to be killed – a procedure that was repeated at a 
number of locations across the south of the city over the following days. 246 At Fort 
Santiago, already overcrowded due to rigorous arrests conducted by the Kempeitai 
from November 1944, these men were put to death, often through drenching cells in 
                                                             
243 Aubrey Saint Kenworthy, The Tiger of Malaya: The Story of General Tomoyuki Yamashita and “Death 
March” General Masaharu Homma (New York, 1953), 70–5. 
244 Ibid, 74–5. 
245 ATIS: Bulletin, No. 1875: ‘Manila Defence Force Order’. 
246 See NARA, RG 407, Philippines Archive Collection, Entry 1085: ‘Report of Investigation of Atrocities 




gasoline and setting them on fire or by throwing in hand grenades.247 From 8/9 
February, women and children were also included in this wholesale slaughter. 
During the post-war trials, survivors recounted with remarkable consistency terrible 
stories of soldiers shooting on sight; of troops marching into hospitals to kill patients 
in their beds; of sentries waiting by entry points to kill those who tried to flee their 
burning homes; of hand grenades being thrown into air raid shelters; and of bancas 
(boats) being destroyed and machine guns placed along the Pasig River to prevent 
escape to the liberated areas.248 The systematic devastation wrought in the southern 
districts continued unabated until the US had fully liberated the city on 3 March. By 
this time, the south of Manila had been almost completely laid to waste and it was 
estimated that over 91,000 civilians had lost their lives as a result of deliberate 
massacre.249 
During the trial of Yamashita, held responsible for atrocities as commander of 
both IJA and IJN forces in the Philippines at the time, the defence described the 
massacres at Manila as a tragic consequence of soldiers who, facing imminent defeat 
and probable death, simply ‘went berserk’.250 It is true that there was a frenzied 
character to some of the atrocities perpetrated by troops in the city and, though 
Filipinos and Chinese were the primary targets of destruction, civilians of neutral 
countries were sometimes caught up in the violence.251 Furthermore, sources suggest 
that some infuriated and vengeful soldiers took advantage of a context that allowed 
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them to indulge in atrocities, particularly in acts of raping and looting.252 However, 
survivor testimonies, supplemented by captured Japanese documents, also 
underscored an organised and methodical quality to the violence in Manila. As 
summarised by US investigators, ‘[t]he atrocities usually followed a definite and 
familiar pattern, and the dominant element in the pattern was a maximum of 
slaughter with a minimum of gunfire’.253 Indeed, a Manila Naval Defence Force order 
from 8 February had specifically instructed troops that:  
… when Filipinos are to be killed, they must be gathered into one place and disposed 
of with the consideration that ammunition and man power must not be used to 
excess. Because the disposal of dead bodies is a troublesome task, they should be 
gathered into houses that are scheduled to be burned or demolished. They should 
also be thrown into the River.254  
 
Survivors’ accounts reveal that soldiers were abiding by these directions. At St. 
Paul’s College on 9 February, for example, civilians had been gathered into the 
dining room on the pretence of being given food and shelter. Unbeknownst to them, 
chandeliers in the room had been laden with explosives. As they rushed to the drinks 
and biscuits underneath the chandeliers, the explosives were set off and soldiers later 
returned to kill survivors.255 An order issued by the Kobayashi group, an army force 
stationed in the city, on 13 February also revealed that such acts were part of a 
radicalised anti-guerrilla strategy. This order advised troops that ‘there are several 
thousand Filipino guerrillas. Even women and children have become guerrillas …’ 
and, because of that fact, instructed that ‘all people on the battlefield with the 
exception of Japanese military personnel, Japanese civilians, and Special 
                                                             
252 See a compilation of affidavits from Spanish observers in Report on the Destruction of Manila, 21–42 for 
further discussion. 
253 War Crimes Reports, No. 66: ‘Massacre of Civilians in Manila’.  
254 ‘Manila Navy Defence Force Battalion Order (8 February 1945)’, cited in Report on the Destruction of 
Manila, 64. 
255 War Crimes Reports, No. 53: ‘Massacre at St. Paul’s College’; see also Yamashita Trial, Exhibits, Nos. 
100–106 for sworn statements detailing this incident.  
245 
 
Construction Units…will be put to death.’256  These construction units comprised 
members of the Makapili, a pro-Japanese organisation created in 1944 to assist in 
defence preparations and, further suggestive of the deliberate nature of violence in 
the capital, Manila Naval Defence Force orders reveal that they had been given 
passwords so as to identify them as friendly elements to soldiers.257 Amidst the chaos 
of battle in Manila then, Japanese forces implemented orders that involved the 
widespread destruction and mass killings of the residents of the southern districts as 
part of a defence strategy.  
The massacres at Manila were not isolated incidents. In south Luzon, in the 
provinces of Batangas and Laguna in particular, the newly formed Fuji Heidan under 
the command of Fujishige Masatoshi employed a scorched earth strategy reminiscent 
of the Three Alls policy utilised in occupied China in 1941. At Yamashita’s trial, the 
prosecution described the extreme violence in this area as a ‘cold-blooded 
extermination campaign’, an assessment that the defence found difficult to argue 
against.258 Frank Reel, one of Yamashita’s lawyers, for example, wrote of violence in 
the provinces that: ‘there appeared to be a pattern of calculated, cold-blooded 
murder, including what was evidently the planned elimination of entire villages.’259 
Indeed, more so than in Manila, violence had a systematic character in the provinces 
representing a distinctly anti-guerrilla strategy that continued to take the form, albeit 
a more radical one, of earlier punitive operations. Due to a military policy of 
destroying documents and orally delivering orders, conflicting testimonies at the war 
crimes trials held in the Philippines obscured the origins of orders, such as that 
received by a unit operating around Tanuan on 8 March, which had advised soldiers 
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to ‘[s]hoot guerrillas. Kill all who oppose the emperor, even women and children.’260 
For lower level commanders, ‘superior orders’ became their primary defence, while 
higher level commanders claimed that instructions had been so broad as to give 
considerable freedom to those on the ground to implement a policy of ‘thorough’ 
guerrilla suppression based on the situation in the areas they operated.261 What can 
be inferred from these contradictory testimonies is that the intensification of violence 
in early 1945 was part of a policy which saw high command call, perhaps 
ambiguously, for more rigorous suppression of resistance in order to secure the rear 
areas in anticipation of the US advance. 262  On the ground, this permitted 
commanders to direct the intentional and indiscriminate destruction of Filipino 
populations in areas viewed as having strategic importance with apparent impunity.  
As a result, Japanese forces left a trail of destruction in their wake as they 
moved throughout the region burning barangays and towns and massacring 
inhabitants in their path. The diary of an unknown soldier discovered in Luzon on 23 
May 1945, for example, contained the following entry for February: ‘every day is 
spent hunting guerrillas and natives. I have already killed well over 100 … Although 
it is for my country’s sake, it is sheer brutality.’263 The accounts of survivors, echoing 
the horrific tales from Manila, revealed that in numerous locations, men, women, 
and children were assembled in buildings that were then set on fire or, as in Bauan, 
laden with explosives, with soldiers waiting to kill those that tried to escape.264 In 
other areas, such as Lipa where around eighteen thousand civilians were killed 
during February, inhabitants were taken to nearby cliffs or rivers and were 
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bayonetted before being thrown over the edge or into the water.265 On 16 February, 
in the vicinity of Taal, where three hundred and twenty identified and many more 
unidentified Filipinos had been massacred, soldiers threw hand grenades into a 
ravine after finding a group of one hundred and fifty civilians taking refuge, after 
which they proceeded to bayonet survivors. 266  Even after units had begun their 
retreat to the mountains in March, Japanese forces continued their campaign. For 
instance, a unit operating around Lake Taal received instructions to begin their 
retreat on 17 March and were advised that ‘[t]here will be many natives along our 
route from now on. All natives, both men and women, will be killed.’267 The exact 
number of civilian deaths in south Luzon is undetermined; however, estimates by US 
investigators suggest that at least twenty-five thousand Filipinos were killed in 
Batangas province alone.268 
During the trials, the use of these more extreme measures was rationalised by 
commanders as an overly aggressive effort to suppress the putative guerrilla threat 
in the Islands.269 However, as pointed out by the prosecution at Fujishige’s trial, 
while there was an established guerrilla presence in Batangas and Laguna, there had 
been no identifiable activity from insurgents in many other localities – Taal, Bauan, 
and Lipa for instance – decimated by Japanese troops. 270  Furthermore, captured 
Japanese documents indicate that such acts were not just over-zealous reprisals for 
guerrilla activities. For example, Private First Class Matsuoka Itoji of the 23rd 
Division wrote on 27 March 1945 that ‘[t]aking advantage of darkness, we went out 
to kill the natives. It was hard for me to kill them because they seemed to be good 
people. Frightful cries of the women and children were horrible. I myself stabbed 
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and killed several persons.’271 The diary of Fujita Eisuke, a company commander in 
the Fuji Heidan,  further revealed that all inhabitants of Calamba had been killed for 
‘security reasons’ on 13 February, further clarifying the reasons for this in the 
following entry on 17th:  
… because ninety percent of the Filipinos do not feel pro-Japanese but on the 
contrary are anti-Japanese, Army Headquarters issued orders on the 10th to punish 
them. In various sectors, we have killed several thousands (including young and old, 
men and women, and Chinese, in addition to Filipinos). Their houses have been 
burned and valuables have been confiscated.272  
As indicated here, there was a considerable concern over the anti-Japanese sentiment 
of the Filipino peoples at this time. To be sure, defendants had frequently argued that 
their actions had been justified on the basis that almost all of the population had 
become anti-Japanese and were likely to aid the American forces. 273  Thus, the 
changing geopolitical situation, as well as immediate strategic insecurities 
exacerbated by a context of resistance which had fostered a perception of the Filipino 
population as wholly anti-Japanese, contributed to the embrace of extreme violence 
at this time. In other words, in early 1945, facing a decisive battle with American 
forces, which they were not adequately prepared for, and fearing the threat of an 
uprising from a people understood to be anti-Japanese at this point, Japanese forces 
adopted and accepted genocidal measures to mitigate the perceived existential threat 
faced in the Islands.  
***  
More so than in China, the embrace of extreme violence in Southeast Asia was 
concomitant to the experience of resistance from local populations. Japanese 
perceptions of the ‘war of liberation’ as a final east-west clash, a struggle for survival 
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for the Asian races, meant that, while the peoples of this region were not 
fundamentally enemies, their continued right to exist within Japan’s Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was contingent on complete submission to the demands 
placed upon them by the occupation forces. In other words, opposition to the 
Japanese was not acceptable and would be dealt with by methods that allowed for 
the destruction of ‘anti-Japanese’ or ‘resisting’ groups. The centrality of resistance to 
the emergence of genocidal violence in Southeast Asia explains the significant 
variation in treatment of the populations of this area. The Japanese occupation of 
Indonesia, where the Japanese had been welcomed as liberators, for example, was 
relatively devoid of violence. This, of course, was in contrast to those areas discussed 
in this chapter, where Japanese forces had enacted exceptional measures against the 
Malayan Chinese and the Filipino people at certain points during the occupation.  
As the analysis of this chapter has shown, however, it was not simply the 
experience of resistance that produced outbursts of genocidal violence. Indeed, the 
radicalisation process in Southeast Asia was facilitated and driven by a complex 
amalgamation of contextual factors which produced diverse responses throughout 
the Empire and caused the Japanese to behave differently with regard to the various 
population groups they encountered. In both cases examined in this chapter, these 
factors included: the insecurities and needs of the immediate wartime situation; the 
longer-term ideological objectives which shaped Japanese perceptions of, and 
strategies for, Southeast Asia and its peoples; hardened attitudes and learning from 
past experiences of resistance in other areas; and finally, the existential fears that had 
emerged in the geopolitical context of the early 1940s. When particular interactions 
between factors generated a perception of heightened insecurity, the leap to, and 
embrace of, a radicalised notion of violence had become much easier as a result of 




After discovering that the Suluk tribe had assisted a large-scale Chinese uprising at 
Kota Kinabalu (then Jesselton) in British Borneo in October 1943, Japanese troops, 
under the command of Second Lieutenant Shimizu Kiyogi, engaged in punitive 
expeditions against the tribe in February 1944. These expeditions involved the arrest, 
torture, and execution of men as well as indiscriminate reprisal massacres, forced 
displacement, and destruction of property. These actions were of such intensity that 
the tribe was almost completely wiped-out; according to a report by British war 
crimes investigator, Colonel M. J. Dickson, there were only 129 survivors out of a 
population of over 400 and, of those, only twenty or so were adult males.1 In Burma 
during summer 1945, Colonel Ishikawa Seigi led his troops on a series of similar 
expeditions to the village of Kalagon after receiving intelligence that warned of 
British paratroopers having landed in the area and begun training villagers for 
guerrilla resistance. Against the backdrop of a war progressing unfavourably to 
Japan as well as a recent revolt by the Burmese Independence Army, efforts to locate 
those paratroopers were undertaken with a sense of urgency and included torture-
based interrogation techniques. Frustrated with continued failure to locate the 
paratroopers, the violence of Ishikawa’s forces escalated on 8 July 1945 when all 630 
inhabitants, including women and children, were massacred and the village 
destroyed.2  
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Understanding how commanders, like Shimizu and Ishikawa, came to accept, 
rationalise, and employ, what was a morally defunct, and at times, genocidal, 
military strategy has been a primary focus of this thesis. The rationales given by 
these commanders as part of post-war British war crimes proceedings, captures the 
essence of the nature of violence in the Japanese Empire. In justifying the actions of 
his unit in British Borneo, Shimizu, for instance, defended his orders as necessary 
against a hostile and resisting enemy. Furthermore, he argued, these tactics had been 
within the remit of general army directives to execute ‘detrimental elements’ in areas 
under Japanese control, particularly important since, at that time, Allied 
bombardment had begun in earnest in the region. 3  Ishikawa related a similar 
argument and advised that his actions had also been in accordance with instructions 
received from his superiors. Colonel Tsukada Misao, who had ordered the 
expeditions, further rationalised Ishikawa’s behaviour, reasoning that: ‘[t]he people 
of Kalagon village were hostile towards the Japanese, therefore they could be killed.’4 
What these examples draw attention to, and what has been borne out through more 
in-depth analysis of the case studies in this thesis, is that the embrace of such 
extremes was, like Dirk Moses and Dominik Schaller have shown in respect to other 
imperial contexts, shaped more by security than racial logics.5  
Indeed, when and where it emerged, extreme violence in the Empire was 
genocidal in character; that is, it was deliberate, methodical, organised, and involved 
the indiscriminate destruction of peoples on the basis of their group identity. 
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However, the Japanese military did not embark on their campaigns of conquest in 
China and Southeast Asia with extermination in mind. In fact, group-destructive 
violence in the Empire, neither pre-meditated nor part of an overarching sustained 
plan, contradicted pan-Asian strategies for creating a cooperative, if paternalistic and 
essentially unequal, economic and defensive bloc in the region. In coveting 
cooperation or, at the very least, acquiescence in this goal, the leadership’s policies 
towards other Asians were not borne out of racial hatreds or eliminationist desires, 
though prejudice, discrimination, and an embedded sense of Japanese superiority 
would facilitate the embrace of genocidal violence. Whether group-destructive 
measures were adopted by the Japanese forces, as well as the timing of such a 
decision and the extent of the ensuing violence, were affected by particular 
conditions in the occupied territories, the responses from local populations, and the 
demands of the geopolitical context of war in Asia. In other words, genocidal 
violence emerged in the Empire as part of a dynamic process of radicalisation and 
escalation influenced by constantly shifting macro, meso, and micro level contextual 
factors. In tracing the dynamics involved in this process, the methodological 
approach employed in this thesis has underscored a complex and interconnected 
relationship between a number of diverse factors which can be broadly grouped 
under the categories of resistance, ideology, and insecurity. As the analysis has shown, 
the interplay between these elements, crucial in producing outbursts of genocidal 
violence, was determined to a considerable extent by short-term geopolitical and 
local conditions. However, that interplay was also rooted in, shaped by, and 




This is why this thesis began with an exploration of the imperialism-violence 
nexus. Violence was an inherent part of the nineteenth and twentieth century 
empire-building process. The extension of foreign control over resources and the 
maintenance of an unequal power dynamic that divested oppressed peoples of their 
lands, freedoms, and rights made the use or threat of force a pre-requisite for the 
success of the imperial project. Attempts to legitimise such efforts through recourse 
to ideological and spatial arguments created invariably violent, racialized spaces of 
exception where oppressors could operate with relative impunity. Such conditions 
were conducive to violence perpetrated against oppressed peoples who were viewed 
as uncivilised and inferior. It also laid the foundations for the embrace of more 
extreme, genocidal violence within the imperial space. However, that potential was 
rarely unleashed. In fact, ‘excesses’ were thought to be damaging to the imperial 
economy and could be harmful to the prestige and legitimacy of the project.  
Still, it was the specific ideological facets of imperialism that laid the 
foundations for the unleashing of this genocidal potential. The binary ‘us and them’ 
relationship of the imperial space, the trope of ‘vanishing races’, and racist 
evolutionary theories which framed extinction as a natural, indeed, beneficial part of 
human progress, created a context in which oppressors could accept and rationalise 
the use of otherwise morally reprehensible and questionable measures. The 
radicalisation of attitudes that contributed to more and more extreme violence in the 
imperial space, however, was often, if not always, triggered by resistance. Indeed, 
the conflict generated by opposition was central to exacerbating fears and hatreds, in 
undermining perceptions of the oppressed as agreeable to imperialism, and in 
generating conditions that permitted and fuelled the escalation of violence in 
retaliation. Resistance produced vicious responses, especially when oppressors 
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struggled against the guerrilla-style tactics that characterised these asymmetric 
conflicts. Indeed, the nature of imperial struggles facilitated a progressive 
degeneration of conduct, allowing for the use of more objectionable measures, and 
caused a general diminishing of inhibitions in respect to targeting whole populations. 
There was more at work in bridging the moral gulf between legitimate military 
actions and genocidal strategies, however. Resistance brought to the fore latent fears 
and insecurities associated with an imperial system founded on competition and 
rivalry and increasingly understood in Social Darwinian terms as a struggle for 
survival. Thus, it was usually at those times when the imperial project was 
threatened and, particularly, when that threat was perceived to be existential in 
nature, that oppressors developed a ‘destroy them to save us’ mentality in the 
imperial space. While not inherent in imperialism, all imperial powers had the 
potential to engage in genocidal violence given the right impetus. That impetus was 
located, first, in the Social Darwinian ideologies and insecurities which informed the 
fin de siècle imperial system, and second, in the ways in which those broader 
ideologies and insecurities were contextualised and perceived by imperial powers as 
they responded to resistance in their projects. Essentially, instances of extreme 
violence in the Japanese Empire must be understood through interactions with the 
imperial system and, most importantly, the impact this had on perceptions of, and 
responses to, resistance in the areas they occupied.  
Early Japanese responses to opposition in Taiwan and Korea followed 
patterns similar to that of other imperial powers. Operating with increased freedom 
in spaces of exception, Japanese forces met resistance from local peoples deemed to 
be less advanced and invariably inferior, with subjugation techniques that frequently 
involved recourse to violence. Learning from these first encounters with asymmetric, 
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guerrilla-style conflict, Japanese troops refined and progressively adopted practices 
that permitted attacks on the livelihoods and lives of civilians. It was during these 
years that the scorched earth policies, summary executions of prisoners and 
suspicious military-aged males, collective punishments, and reprisal massacres 
(which would be used more frequently and on a larger-scale in China and Southeast 
Asia) became essential components of Japanese military strategy when addressing 
resistance. However, while the military showed a propensity for escalation, typically 
when faced with particularly virulent or large-scale uprisings or when resistance 
brought international embarrassment, violence did not manifest to the same 
extremes as it would in China and Southeast Asia between 1937 and 1945. The 
intensification of the military’s efforts in those years was, to a large degree, due to 
important contextual changes which caused the Japanese leadership at that time to 
perceive Japan’s survival as an independent nation as increasingly threatened.  
From the outset, Japanese leaders saw imperialism as absolutely vital to the 
continued independence of Japan within a competitive and perilous world in which 
the strong seemed to devour the weak. As a consequence, more so than other powers, 
the insecurities of imperial rivalry preoccupied Japanese leaders who viewed 
European expansion in Asia with apprehension. Intensifying these concerns was the 
permeation of European race thinking which positioned Japan as inhabiting a fixed 
place of inferiority in the racial hierarchy as a ‘semi-civilised’ people. Thus, at a basic 
level, the Japanese Empire can be understood as having developed in reaction to 
insecurities and sensitivities derived from their entry into the imperial system of the 
mid-nineteenth century after years of relative seclusion. The result was that, despite 
considerable progress in advancing the nation’s international status, these elements 
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would never be far from the surface as Japanese leaders engaged with that system. 
Indeed, the rhetoric of the 1930s and 1940s reflected the influence of such factors.  
By the time of the outbreak of war in China, the nation was committed to 
forging a path in Asia independent of the international system. Anti-Western and 
pan-Asian undercurrents had been developing for several years as a growing 
number of militarists, politicians, journalists, and intellectuals circulated their 
dissatisfaction with the putative mistreatment of their nation by the other imperial 
powers. In 1932, international condemnation over Japanese aggression in Manchuria, 
which the leadership had characterised as a ‘lifeline’, resulted in a symbolic rejection 
of an international system deemed to be discriminatory to Japan as a non-white, 
resource-poor latecomer to the imperial game. Against the backdrop of popular 
support for the military, the leadership adopted their proposals for a more 
autonomous, pan-Asian regional solution to the economic vulnerabilities and 
concomitant security dilemmas that pervaded the Empire as a result of global 
retrenchment and protectionist trade policies in the wake of the Wall Street Crash of 
1929. Such efforts were focused on the continent where long-held Japanese interests 
were thought, not irrationally, to be under attack from Chinese nationalism and the 
apparent spread of communism as a by-product of the rising power of the Soviet 
Union. The Chinese, however, were not amenable to paternalistic arguments for a 
‘cooperative’ relationship and, in 1937, Chiang Kai-shek stood firm against the 
piecemeal encroachment of the Japanese military into Chinese territory. With the 
Japanese also refusing to abandon their goals for creating an autonomous pro-
Japanese zone in north China, deemed vital for national defence at this point, the 
minor skirmish at Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937 escalated into a full-scale, total 
conflict.     
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Far from resolving perceived economic and defensive quandaries at this time, 
the conflict in China exacerbated them and contributed to a geopolitical context 
understood to be increasingly unfavourable, if not actively hostile, to Japan. Indeed, 
relations with the US and Britain deteriorated rapidly as those powers offered 
support to Chiang Kai-shek’s government and added to the economic strain of the 
war by enacting a series of trade sanctions. The result of this was to intensify anti-
Westernism and pan-Asianism which filtered more and more into official policy as 
several prominent figures advocated the removal of Western influence from Asia and 
the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Thus, when the situation 
became more acute after the US imposed a full embargo cutting off access to oil and 
steel in July 1941, the leadership perceived this to be a potentially existential crisis 
and committed to expansion into Southeast Asia, an area of abundant natural 
resources and vast markets, as the only viable solution to this crisis. When war broke 
out in the Pacific, then, it was widely understood in Japan to be an existential 
struggle. Reflecting a revival of older Meiji discourses, the war was framed as a 
struggle for survival, a long-awaited clash between the East and the West, between 
the oppressed and the oppressors. Thus, rooted in and shaped by the nation’s long-
term interactions with the imperial powers as well as changing perceptions of 
Japan’s place in this system, this war had become a zero-sum game. The by-product 
of this was to make resistance at this time an intolerable threat to the leadership’s 
solutions to maintaining the nation’s independence in this ostensible struggle for 
survival. 
As in other empires then, the experience of opposition would prove to be a 
catalysing factor which sparked the radicalisation of attitudes and the escalation of 
violence. However, it did so against the backdrop of a turbulent context of insecurity 
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and uncertainty which proved conducive to extreme violence perpetrated by the 
Japanese military during their wars in Asia between 1937 and 1945. Indeed, 
unprecedented and fierce, Chinese resistance thwarted efforts to decisively end the 
fighting in 1937. Alarm and frustration at the inability to quickly subjugate the 
Chinese, who were viewed as backwards in comparison to the Japanese, contributed 
to the characterisation of the war as a punitive campaign. In framing war in these 
terms, the leadership established a de facto space of exception where commanders 
were free to use all available means, including illegal methods of warfare, in their 
efforts to force an unequal and inferior people to submit. The result was a battlefield 
context conducive to extreme violence as Japanese forces, under pressure to 
decisively end a conflict that could jeopardise Japan’s long-term security goals, took 
advantage of the atmosphere of impunity and permissibility and utilised 
unconventional, objectionable, and sometimes illegal, practices to terrorise the 
Chinese people into submission. War in the Pacific was only marginally better in 
some localities, despite this conflict being characterised as a benevolent liberating 
mission. While the military leadership placed more constraints on soldiers’ conduct 
in Southeast Asia and commanders were to be more restrained in their methods so as 
to win crucial support from the peoples of this region, there were significant 
exceptions. Much as they had in China, the leadership allowed for, and often 
sanctioned, extreme measures against ‘resisting’ or ‘anti-Japanese’ groups as 
dangerous threats to Japan’s wartime efforts. In doing so, they upheld, though 
restricted somewhat, the impunity and permissibility established in China and 
allowed for those long-established imperial practices of scorched earth policies, 
summary executions, collective, and reprisal violence in this war of liberation. 
Essentially, when they resisted these objectives, particularly given the existential 
security concerns of the war, Asian populations became vulnerable to extreme 
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violence as a putatively reasonable solution to the threat of opposition in the Empire. 
Consequently, in this international climate, genocidal measures were more readily 
used as an acceptable means of smashing, and in some cases, ‘wiping out’ resistance. 
This did not produce a sustained genocidal campaign, however. 
Commanders made decisions to pursue group-destructive policies at specific times 
and under particular conditions. In the four case studies of this thesis, a pattern of 
radicalisation, triggered by resistance, preceded the adoption of genocidal strategies, 
though it varied in scale, intensity, and duration in all cases. The massacres at 
Nanjing in December 1937, for instance, took place in the wake of a campaign of 
cumulative destruction as Japanese forces, already frustrated by the fierce fighting at 
Shanghai, marched through the Yangtze Delta. In British Malaya, massacres of 
Chinese men in February 1942 occurred after a much shorter radicalisation period 
which was fuelled more by past experiences and memories in China. The embrace of 
genocidal methods in occupied China in 1941 and in the Philippines in 1945 was the 
apogee of years of unsuccessful and progressively more indiscriminate and 
systematic anti-guerrilla warfare. In general, however, the radicalisation process in 
each case was premised on similar trends. These involved sporadic encounters with 
guerrilla units, anti-Japanese elements, and hostile civilians which, to varying 
degrees, intensified already existing, if latent, prejudices, hatreds, and fears. Soldiers 
were also primed for greater levels of violence as an atmosphere of impunity was 
cultivated by their commanders, parameters of admissible action were continually 
extended, distinctions between combatants and non-combatants were blurred, if not 
completely obliterated, and taboos in respect to treatment of civilians were serially 
broken. In all cases, then, Japanese forces were mentally prepared and open to 
extreme, otherwise objectionable, measures prior to the adoption of those measures. 
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The embrace of practices that ultimately involved destroying part, or at times, the 
whole, of a group in areas of operation was dependent on further contextual factors.  
Despite a considerable difference in scale, the massacres at Nanjing in 
December 1937 and British Malaya in February 1942 manifested as genocidal 
mopping-up campaigns that specifically targeted the military-aged male population. 
The purpose of these efforts was three-fold. Commanders aimed to punish for 
resistance, eliminate a perceived threat, and pre-empt further opposition by 
terrorising the remaining population into submission. In both cases, Japanese forces 
were under increased pressure to decisively stamp out resistance. In China, the 
Japanese leadership were anxious to avoid a prolonged conflict and, as such, field 
commanders aimed to deliver a symbolic and decisive blow to the GMD’s capital, 
Nanjing, to bring Chiang Kai-shek back to the negotiating table. Similarly, in 
February 1942, Japanese forces were to quickly and decisively establish their rule in 
British Malaya as the strategic and symbolic core of the Empire in Southeast Asia in 
order to begin the process of exploiting the region’s resources before moving on to 
fight in Sumatra. Accordingly, commanders embarked on their campaigns with these 
considerations in mind and genocidal strategies would unfold in response to 
conditions on the ground which intensified the perceived threat of resistance and 
made group-destructive violence seem a practical and rational solution. Indeed, it 
was the unique circumstances in the Malay Peninsula which fuelled a more radical 
policy towards the overseas Chinese in that area than was applied towards them in 
other Southeast Asian countries. The Malayan Chinese had become especially 
vulnerable to Japanese suspicions and ire for having carried out a relatively 
successful anti-Japanese campaign and for being the largest, most economically 
powerful, and therefore, dangerous ethnic group in the peninsula. The activities of 
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the Dalforce during the Battle for Singapore in early February and the state of 
disarray as rioting and looting swept through Malaya and Singapore in the wake of 
the British surrender contributed further to the decision to employ a more extreme 
policy. The confusion and chaos of the Chinese retreat, the practicalities of dealing 
with large numbers of surrendering soldiers, the uncertainties and fear associated 
with an undetermined ‘plainclothes soldier’ presence in the city, essentially, local 
conditions, also contributed to commanders’ decisions to massacre unarmed Chinese 
soldiers and a substantial part of the military-aged men in and around Nanjing in 
1937. Thus, the genocidal mopping-up campaigns in these areas, while influenced by 
the broader geopolitical atmosphere, were fuelled and shaped by conditions on the 
ground.  
The drastic escalation of anti-guerrilla strategy in occupied China in 1941 and 
the Philippines in 1945 was almost the inverse of the pattern observed at Nanjing and 
in British Malaya. For years, Japanese forces operated in an unfavourable and 
difficult battlefield situation in these areas as they combatted guerrilla resistance to 
their consolidation efforts. Analogous to other imperial contexts, Japanese troops 
engaged increasingly in the unconventional measures that were long-established as 
central to this type of warfare. Soldiers moved through the countryside in occupied 
China and the Philippines during the occupation years periodically destroying 
villages, executing suspicious-looking men, and massacring civilians in reprisal for 
assistance provided to the guerrillas or for their attacks on Japanese units. The 
intensity of violence ebbed and flowed during this time in response to periods of 
increased and diminished guerrilla activity. In the Philippines, for example, 
resistance and responses to it constituted and cultivated a cycle of violence which led 
to cumulative escalations. These escalations were not necessarily linear, influenced 
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by changes in the immediate situation and the broader geopolitical context. 
‘Zonification’ practices were implemented, for instance, at a peak in guerrilla activity, 
but also during a turn in the course of the war against Japan. It was the important 
shifts in the international context that fuelled the eventual escalation to genocidal 
measures in both cases. In 1941, a combination of wider geopolitical uncertainties 
and immediate security issues, compounded by the importance of north China to 
Japan’s abiding objectives and the need to eradicate the threat of communism, 
proved the necessity of finally consolidating the occupied areas to make future plans 
possible. Since past experiences and efforts had proven unsuccessful, Japanese forces 
applied ruthless, indiscriminate, and ultimately, genocidal methods to ‘wipe-out’ 
resistance in the occupied areas. Towards the end of 1944, the Philippines had 
become important as the site of the last decisive battle before the invasion of Japan 
itself, a role it was ill-prepared for. At the same time, the Japanese faced an 
impending American return to the Islands within a context of more audacious 
guerrilla activity and a potentially massive uprising from the Filipino people, 
believed to be wholly anti-Japanese at this point. Like in occupied China, past 
failures and new pressures from a geopolitical context that seemed to spell disaster 
for Japan in its struggle for survival, laid the foundations for reasoning that the 
destruction of Filipino populations residing in areas of tactical importance was a 
strategic, and justifiable, necessity. As such, though shaped by the circumstances on 
the ground, changes in the geopolitical context in these cases intensified the 
perceived threat of resistance. These more existential concerns produced even more 
radical responses as Japanese forces in these areas not only targeted military-aged 





An examination of Japanese violence through the conceptual lens of genocide, then, 
can be much more productive and insightful than scholars, like Joshua Fogel 
(discussed in the introduction), have previously suggested. In moving beyond a 
Holocaust-derived framework for analysis, the approach taken in this thesis has 
provided a foundation for understanding instances of extreme violence in the 
Japanese Empire as sporadic outbursts which were contingent on the interplay 
between multifarious contextual factors. To reiterate, the emergence of genocidal 
violence in the Empire was not predetermined; it was bound up with experiences 
and encounters with victim groups on the ground, influenced by the demands and 
pressures of the fluid international context, underpinned by embedded perceptions 
of the Japanese ‘self’ and the Asian ‘other’, and driven by longstanding, yet mutable, 
insecurities of competition and rivalry which were intrinsic to the imperial system at 
that time. In this respect, while there were different dynamics that underlay Japanese 
imperialism, genocidal violence in the Empire manifested in ways that were not 
unlike that of other empires. This underscores the importance of bringing the 
Japanese case further into dialogue with the research of those who explore the 
radicalisation process in other empires as well as the work of Martin Shaw and Mark 
Levene who have begun to explore the broader historical and global trends that 
produce contexts conducive to genocidal violence.6 In other words, as I have shown 
by contextualising my case studies against the backdrop of empire, violence, and 
genocide in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and by situating them within the 
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longer-term context of Japanese imperialism as borne out of the same system that 
influenced genocide in other empires: extreme violence in the Japanese Empire 
cannot be fully understood as a distinctly Japanese phenomenon. As in other empires, 
this violence came about through a dynamic and chaotic process of radicalisation 
which, though specific to each case and point in time, was triggered by resistance, 
intensified by existing insecurities, and facilitated by the ideologies that fed into 
those insecurities and shaped perceptions of those who were resisting.   
In emphasising this point, it is hoped that the benefits and insights of 
examining Japanese imperial violence through the conceptual lens of genocide will 
stimulate further research in the future. This is important because analysis of cases 
where there is no overarching plan for the destruction of races, where there is no 
racial component driving violence, and where genocidal measures manifest as 
counter-insurgency efforts, are pertinent to the current geopolitical climate. At the 
time of writing, a number of conflicts, in Darfur and Syria for instance, are marred by 
outbursts of genocidal violence. However, because the nature of this violence is 
sporadic, inconsistent, and often related to counter-insurgency, some scholars, like 
Alex De Waal, question the ‘applicability’ and usefulness of genocide to 
understanding the situation in those regions.7 Moses has argued that genocide can be, 
at a fundamental level, a form of counter-insurgency, shaped more by security logics 
than racial hatreds.8 The case of Japanese violence analysed in this thesis has yielded 
results that, in my opinion, lend further credence to such arguments.  
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and Genocide’, The British Journal of Sociology, 62(1) (2011), 56–61 for further discussion.  
8 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Revisiting a Founding Assumption of Genocide Studies’, Genocide Studies and 






1. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON D.C.: 
Wartime Translations of Seized Japanese Documents [2,212 microfiches]: 
 
Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS): 
- Bulletins, Nos. 1–2200 
- Enemy Publications, Nos. 1–421 
- Current Translations, Nos. 1–174 
- Interrogation Reports, Nos. 11–783 
- Philippines Series Bulletin 1-10 
- Research Reports, Nos. 70–131 
US Army, Far Eastern Command, General Headquarters,  Historical Section, Japanese 
Monographs (Washington D.C.: Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces 
Far East, c1952). [microfilm 14 reels] 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Publications, Japan and Its Occupied territories during 
World War II [microfilm 16 reels]. 
2. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, 
COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND (NARA):  
Record Group 153 – Records of the Judge Advocate General (JAG), War Crimes 
Branch (WCB): 
- Entry 143 – Case Files, 1944–1949  
 
- Entry 179 – China War Crimes Files, 1945–1948 
Record Group 165 – Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, 
Office of the Director of Intelligence (G-2), Military Intelligence Division (MID):   
- Entry 77 – Formerly Security-Classified Intelligence Reference Publications 
(“Regional File”) Received from US Military Attachés, Military and Civilian 
Agencies of the United States, Foreign Governments, and Other Sources, 1922–
1944: Japan 
 
- Entry 79 – Formerly Security-Classified Intelligence Reference Publications (“P” 
File) Received from US Military Attachés, Military and Civilian Agencies of the 
United States, Foreign Governments, and Other Sources, 1940–1945 
266 
 
Record Group 226 – Records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Research and 
Analysis Branch (RAB): 
- Entry 16 – Intelligence Reports (“Regular” Series), 1941–1945 
 
- Entry 19 – Formerly Security-Classified Reports (“XL” Series), 1941–1946  
Record Group 238 – Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE), 1946-1948 
 
- Entry 14 – Court Exhibits, 1946–1948 
Record Group 331 – Records of the General Headquarters Supreme Commander for 








- Entry 1321 – Japanese War Criminal Case Files, 1945–1949 
 
- Entry 1322 – US vs. Japanese War Criminal Name Files, 1945–1949 
 
Investigation Division:  
 
- Entry 1338 – Records of Trials, 1945–1949 
 
Record Group 407 – Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, The Philippines 
Archives Collection:  
- Entry 1085 – Japanese Atrocities, 1942–1952 
 
3. THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, KEW (TNA): 
War Office (WO):  
- 106: Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence, and 
Predecessors: Correspondence and Papers.  
 
- 203: Southeast Asia Command: Military Headquarters Papers, Second World 
War: Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center (SEATIC) 
 
- 235: Judge Advocate General’s Office, Second World War: War Crimes Case 
Files   
 
- 325: General Headquarters, Allied Land Forces (Southeast Asia) War Crimes 




4. ONLINE ARCHIVES: 
International Criminal Court – United Nations War Crimes Commission Archives:  
http://www.legal-tools.org/en/browse 
National Archives of Singapore (NAS), Oral History Department (OHD), Interviews:  
http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/oral_history_interviews/ 
United Nations Treaty Collection: 
http://treaties.un.org 
University of Wisconsin-Madison Library, Digital Collections – Foreign Relations of the 




Contemporary Accounts and Documentary Collections: 
Abend, H. Chaos in Asia (New York: I. Washburn Inc., 1939). 
 
Amano, Saburō. ‘Letters from a Reserve Officer Conscripted to Nanking’, in Bob 
Tadashi Wakabayashi (ed.), The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: Complicating the Picture 
(2007; pbk edn, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 181–95. 
Barnard, James. ‘Aborigines of Tasmania’, Report on the Second Meeting of the 
Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science (Sydney: Australasian 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 1890), 597–611. 
Beveridge, Albert. The March of the Flag (16 September 1868). 
 
Bisson, T. A. Japan in China (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938). 
Bonwick, James. The Last of the Tasmanians or the Black War of Van Diemen’s Land 
(London: Sampson Low, Son, & Marston, 1870). 
Callwell, Charles E.  Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1896; 3rd edn, London: 
Harrison and Sons, 1906).  
Carlson, Evans F. The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency (New 
York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940). 
Chung, Henry. The Case of Korea: A Collection of Evidence on the Japanese Domination of 
Korea, and on the Development of the Korean Independence Movement (New York: 
Fleming H. Revell Company, 1921). 
268 
 
Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: or, the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859; later edn, New York: 
Appleton, 1882). 
- The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871; later edn, New York: 
Appleton, 1875). 
Davidson, James W. The Island of Formosa Past and Present (London and New York: 
Macmillan & Co, 1903).  
Farmer, Rhodes. Shanghai Harvest: A Diary of Three Years in the China War (London: 
Museum Press Ltd., 1945). 
Fukuzawa, Yukichi. Outline of a Theory of Civilization, David A. Dilworth & G. 
Cameron Hurst (trans.) (1875; later Eng. edn, Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973). 
Hanson, Haldore E. “Humane Endeavour”; the Story of the China War (New York: 
Farrar and Rinehart Inc., 1939). 
Hsü Shuhsi, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone (Shanghai, Hong Kong & 
Singapore: Kelly and Walsh Ltd., 1939). 
- A New Digest of Japanese War Conduct (Shanghai, Hong Kong & Singapore: 
Kelly and Walsh Ltd., 1941).  
Hulbert, Homer B. The Passing of Korea (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1906). 
Kawakami, K. K. Japan in World Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917). 
Kendall, Carlton Waldo. The Truth About Korea (San Francisco: The Korean National 
Association, 1919). 
Kume, Kunitake. Japan Rising: The Iwakura Mission to the USA and Europe, 1871-1873,  
Tsuzuki Chushichi & Jules R. Young (ed. & trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
Kurusu, Saburō. Kurusu Speaks: Addresses November 26, 1942–December 3, 1943 (Tokyo: 
Nippon Times, 1944). 
Ladd, George Trumbull. In Korea with Marquis Ito, Part: II: A Critical and Historical 
Inquiry (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1908).   
Lip, Tan Thoon. Kempeitai Kindness (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal, 1946). 
Low, N. I. & Cheng, H. M. This Singapore: Our City of Dreadful Night (Singapore: City 
Book Store, 1947).  
Mackay, George W. ‘Japanese Administration in Formosa’, Journal of Race 
Development, 2(2) (1911), 172–87.  
269 
 
Mao, Zedong. On Guerrilla Warfare (1937). 
Martin, Newell. Japan’s Attempt to Exterminate Korean Christians (Milford: Unknown 
Publisher, 1919).   
Masaoka, Naoichi (ed.), Japan to America (New York & London: G. P. Putnam’s & 
Sons, 1915). 
McKenzie, Frederick A. The Tragedy of Korea (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1908). 
- Korea’s Fight for Freedom (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1920). 
Merivale, Herman. Lectures on Colonization and Colonies (London: Longman, Brown, 
Green, and Longmans, 1842). 
Mitsuaki, Kakehi. Three Centuries of Aggression and Conquest (Tokyo: Nippon Times, 
1942). 
Nakae, Chōmin. A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government, Nobuko Tsukui 
(trans.) (1887; later Eng. edn, New York: Weatherhill, 1984). 
Nitobe, Inazō. The Japanese Nation (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1912). 
- Thoughts and Essays (Tokyo: Teibi Publishing Co., 1909). 
Okakura, Kakuzō. The Awakening of Japan (New York: The Century Co., 1904). 
- The Ideals of the East (1903; later edn, New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1920). 
Ōkuma, Shigenobu (ed.), Fifty Years of New Japan: Volume I (London: Smith, Elder, & 
Co., 1909). 
Onn, Chin Kee. Malaya Upside Down (Singapore: Jitts and Co. Ltd., 1946).  
Prichard, James C. ‘On the Extinction of Human Races’, Edinburgh New Philosophical 
Journal, 28 (1839), 166–70. 
Reyes, José G. Terrorism and redemption: Japanese atrocities in the Philippines, Jose Garcia 
Insua (trans.) (Manila: Unknown Publisher, 1945).  
Roebuck, John A. The Colonies of England: A Plan for the Government of Some Portion of 
our Colonial Possessions (London: John W. Parker, 1849). 
Rusden, Henry Keylock. ‘Labour and Capital’, The Melbourne Review, 1 (1876), 67–83. 
Rusling, James. ‘Interview with President William McKinley’, The Christian 
Advocate (22 January 1903).  
Salwey, Charlotte M. The Island Dependencies of Japan (London: E. L. Morice, 1913). 
Sanderson, Edgar. Africa in the Nineteenth Century (London: Seeley and Co., 1898). 
270 
 
Selous, Frederick C. Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia (1893; 2nd edn, London: Bowland 
War & Co. Ltd., 1896). 
Snow, Edgar. Scorched Earth (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1941). 
Stead, Alfred (ed.), Japan by the Japanese (London: William Heinemann, 1904). 
Suma, Yakichirō. Where Japan Stands: Addresses delivered in America on the Sino-Japanese 
Conflict (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1940). 
Suematsu, Kenchō. The Risen Sun (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1905). 
Taniguchi, Masaru. The Soldier’s Log: 10,000 Miles of Battle, R. Toombs Fincher & 
Yoshi Okada (trans.) (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1940).  
Takekoshi, Yosaburō. Japanese Rule in Formosa, George Braithwaite (trans.) (London: 
Longmans, Green, & Co., 1907). 
The Korean Situation: Authentic Accounts of Recent Events by Eye Witness (New York: 
The Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches 
of Christ in American, 1919). 
Tietler, Ger. & Radtke, Kurt W. (eds.), A Dutch Spy in China: Reports of the First Phase 
of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1939) (Leiden: Brill, 1999). 
Timperley, H. J. What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China, A Documentary Record 
(London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938).  
Tokutomi, Sohō. The Future Japan, Vinh Sinh (ed. & trans.) (1886; later Eng. edn, 
Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1989). 
Uchimura, Kanzō, Japan and the Japanese: Essays (Tokyo: The Minyusha, 1894). 
Utley, Freda. China at War (London: John Day Co., 1939). 
White, Theodore H. & Jacoby, Annalee. Thunder out of China (New York: William 
Sloane Associates, 1946). 
Wood, John George. The Uncivilized Races of Men in All Countries of the World, Volume 
II (Hartford: J. B. Burr Publishing Co., 1879). 
Oral Histories, Diaries, and Memoirs:  
Ba Maw. Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968).  
 
Buenafe, Manuel E. Wartime Philippines (Manila: Philippine Education Foundation, 
1950). 
Cook, Haruko Taya. & Cook, Theodore F (eds.), Japan at War: An Oral History (New 
York: The New Press 1992). 
271 
 
Danaraj, T. J. Japanese Invasion of Malaya and Singapore: Memoirs of a Doctor (Kuala 
Lumpur: Self-published, 1990). 
Diary of Kido Takayoshi, Vol. I: 1868-1871, Sydney Devere Brown & Akiko Hirota 
(trans.) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1983). 
Frei, Henry P. Guns of February: Ordinary Japanese Soldiers’ View of the Malayan 
Campaign and the Fall of Singapore, 1941-42 (Singapore: National University of 
Singapore, 2004).  
 
Fujiwara, Iwaichi. F. Kikan: Japanese Army Intelligence Operations in Southeast Asia 
during World War II, Akashi Yoji (trans.) (Hong Kong, Singapore, & Kuala Lumpur: 
Heinemann Asia, 1983). 
Fusayama, Takao. Memoir of Takao Fusayama: A Japanese Soldier in Malaya and Sumatera 
(Bangi, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1997). 
Gibney, Frank (ed.), Sensō: The Japanese Remember the Pacific War: Letters to the Asahi 
Shimbun, Clary, Beth (trans.) (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1995). 
He, Wen-Lit. Syonan Interlude (Singapore: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1991). 
Hu, Hua-ling & Zhang, Lian-hong (eds. & trans.), The Undaunted Women of Nanking: 
The Wartime Diaries of Minnie Vautrin and Tsen Shui-fang (Carbondale & Edwardsville: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2010). 
Kathigasu, Sybil. No Dram of Mercy (1954; reprint, Kuala Lumpur: Prometheus 
Enterprise, 2006). 
Labrador, Juan. A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, December 7, 1941–May 7, 1945 
(Manila: Santo Tomas University Press, 1989). 
Lapham, Robert. & Norling, Bernard. Lapham’s Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines, 
1942–1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996). 
Lewis, T. P. M. Changi: The Lost Years: A Malayan Diary 1941–1945 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian Historical Society, 1984).   
Li, Lindsay Hsiao. Bold Plum: With the Guerrillas in China’s War against Japan 
(Morrisville: Lulu, 2007). 
Lichauco, Marcial Primitivo. “Dear Mother Putnam”: A Diary of War in the Philippines 
(Manila?: Unknown Publisher, 1949). 
Low, N. I. When Singapore was Syonan-to (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1973). 
Lu, Suping (ed.), Terror in Minnie Vautrin’s Nanjing, Diaries and Correspondence, 1937–
38 (Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008). 
272 
 
- They were in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre as Witnessed by American and British 
Nationals (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004). 
Masanobu, Tsuji. Singapore, 1941-1942: The Japanese Version of the Malayan Campaign of 
World War II, Margaret E. Lake (trans.) (1960; later edn, Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). 
Pestaño-Jacinto, Pacita. Living with the Enemy: A Diary of the Japanese Occupation (Pasig 
City: Anvil Publishing Inc., 1999). 
Rabe, John. The Good German of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe, Erwin Wickert (ed.), 
John E. Woods (trans.), (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1999). 
Reports of General MacArthur, Volume 1: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific 
(Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1966). 
Shinozaki, Mamoru. My Wartime Experiences in Singapore (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1973).  
- Syonan – My Story: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore (Singapore: Asia 
Pacific Press, 1975). 
Sidhu, H. The Bamboo Fortress: True Singapore War Stories (Singapore: Native 
Publications, 1991). 
The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra (Selections from Nihon Kenpei Seishi), Barbara 
Gifford Shimer & Guy Hobbs (trans.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
Yim, Louise. My Forty Year Fight for Korea (New York: A. A. Wyn, 1951).  
Youth Division of Sōka Gakkai (eds.), Peace is Our Duty: Accounts of What War Can Do 
to a Man, Richard L. Gage (trans.) (Tokyo: The Japan Times Ltd., 1982). 
Zhang, Kaiyuan (ed.), Eyewitnesses to Massacre: American Missionaries Bear Witness to 
Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2001). 
Fiction:  
Conrad, Joseph. Heart of Darkness: Authoritative Text, Backgrounds and Contexts, 
Criticism, Paul B. Armstrong (ed.) (1963; 4th edn, New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2006). 
Hino, Ashihei. Wheat and Soldiers, Ishimoto Shizue (trans.) (New York: Farrar & 
Rinehart, Inc., 1939). 
Ishikawa, Tatsuzō. Soldiers Alive [also translated as Living Soldiers] Zeljko Cipris 




Edited Collections of Contemporary Documents: 
Benda, Harry J., Irikura, James K., & Kōichi Kishi (eds.), Japanese Military 
Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1965). 
 
Brook, Timothy (ed.), Documents on the Rape of Nanking (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2007). 
 
Ike, Nobutaka. Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965). 
 
Lebra, Joyce C (ed.), Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: 
Selected Readings and Documents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
 
Lu, David J (ed.), Japan: A Documentary History, Volume II: The Late Tokugawa Period to 
Present (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).  
Meiji Japan through Contemporary Sources (Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian Cultural 
Studies, 1969–1972) [Three Volumes]. 
Mendl, Wolf (ed.), Japan and Southeast Asia, Volume I: From the Meiji Restoration to 1945 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001). 
Saaler, Sven, & Szpilman, Christopher W. A (eds.) Pan-Asianism: A Documentary 
History (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2011) [Two Volumes]. 
Trager, Frank N (ed.), Burma: Japanese Military Administration, Selected Documents 
1941–1945 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). 
Tsunoda, R., De Bary, W. T., & Keene, D (eds.), Sources of Japanese Tradition, Volume 2: 
1600 to 2000 (New York: Colombia University Press, 2005). 
Legal Documents: 
Ad Hoc Committee Draft (24 May 1948), UN Doc. E/794. 
Boister, N. & Cryer, R. (eds.) Documents on the Tokyo Military Tribunal: Charter, 
Indictment and Judgements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948), 
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 78, 277. 
Pritchard, R. John. & Zaide, Sonia Magbanua (eds.), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The 
Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East in Twenty Two Volumes, (New York: Garland, 1981). 
274 
 
United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. 
IV (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948). 
Official Publications and Pamphlets:  
Address to the Filipino People (Manila: Unknown Publisher, 1942). 
Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Seoul: Government General of Korea, 
1910–1921). 
Annual Reports of the War Department (Washington: Government Publication, 1901). 
Civil Affairs Handbook: Taiwan, OPNAV 50E-12 (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations, 1944). 
Communist Plottings in the Far East, China Incident Series, No. 5 (Tokyo: South 
Manchurian Railway Company, 1938). 
Hideo, Naito (ed.), Taiwan: A Unique Colonial Record (Tokyo: Kokusai Nippon Kyokai, 
1938). 
Japanese Aggression and the League of Nations: 1937 (Geneva: Bureau of the Chinese 
Delegation, 1937) 
- Vol. 5 (Geneva: Press Bureau of the Chinese Delegation, 1938). 
Japan’s Case in the Sino-Japanese Dispute (Geneva: Japanese Delegation to the League of 
Nations, 1933). 
New order in Greater East Asia (Shanghai: The New Times, 1942). 
Office of the Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the United States, Report on 
the Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities (Washington D.C.: US Government 
Print Office, 1945) 
Report on the Control of the Aborigines in Formosa (Taiwan: Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, 
1911). 
Results of Three Years’ Administration of Chosen since Annexation (Seoul: Government-
General of Korea, 1914). 
Sack of Manila (Washington D.C.: US Government Print Office, 1945). 
Secretary Root’s Record: “Marked Severities” in Philippine Warfare (Boston: Geo. W. Ellis 
Co., 1902). 
The China Incident and Japan, China Incident Series, No. 3 (Tokyo: South Manchurian 
Railway Company, 1938).  
The Good Citizen’s Guide (Singapore: Syonan Times, 1943). 
275 
 
The Korean ‘Independence’ Agitation: Articles reprinted from the ‘Seoul Press’ (Seoul: Seoul 
Press Office, 1919). 
The League and the Lytton Report: The Fifth Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict (May 1-
December 31, 1932) (Geneva: Geneva Research Center, 1932). 
Newspapers and Periodicals: 
China Weekly Review 
Contemporary Japan: A Review of East Asiatic Affairs 
New York Times 
Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration 
Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun 
The Japan Chronicle 
The Japan Magazine: A Representative Monthly of Things Japanese 
The Manchester Guardian 
The Manila Tribune  
The Times 
The Syonan Times 
Tokyo Gazette: A Monthly Report of Current Policies, Official Statements and Statistics 
Websites: 
Fordham University - Internet History Sourcebooks Project:  
http://legacy.fordham.edu/Halsall/index.asp 
George Mason University – History Matters:  
http://historymatters.gmu.edu 
Marxist Internet Archive: 
http://www.marxists.org 







Agamben, Giorgio. State of Exception, Kevin Attell (trans.) (Chicago & London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
 
Agoncillo, Teodoro A. The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941–45 
(Quezon City: R. P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1965) [Two Volumes]. 
 
Anderson, Charles R. U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Leyte (Washington D.C.: 
US Center for Military History, 1994). 
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951; 3rd edn, London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1967). 
Atkins, E. Taylor. Primitive Selves: Koreana in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910–1945 
(Berkley: University of Southern California Press, 2010).  
Auslin, Michael R. Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of 
Japanese Diplomacy (2004; pbk edn, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).  
Aydin, Cemil. The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-
Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007).  
Barenblatt, Daniel. A Plague upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan’s Germ 
Warfare Operation (2004; pbk edn, London: Souvenir Press 2006).  
Barnhart, Michael A.  Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 
1919–1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
Beasley, William G. Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 
Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2000). 
Brackman, Arnold C. The Other Nuremberg: the Untold Story of the Tokyo Trials (New 
York: Collins, 1989). 
Brantlinger, Patrick. Dark Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of Primitive Races, 
1800–1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).  
 
Burkman, Thomas W. Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–
1938 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008).  
 
Caprio, Mark E. Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945 (Seattle & 
London: University of Washington Press, 2009). 
 
Césaire, Aimé. Discourse on Colonialism, Joan Pinkham (trans.) (1955; Eng. edn, New 
York & London: Montly Review Press, 1972). 
Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (1997; pbk 
edn, London: Penguin Books, 1998). 
277 
 
Ching, Leo T. S. Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity 
Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
Cheah, Boon Kheng. Red Star over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and 
After the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941–46 (1983; 4th edn, Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 2012).  
Conroy, Hilary. The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868–1910: A Study of Realism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960). 
Coox, Alvin D. Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1990).  
Crowley, James B. Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 
1930–1938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 
Doak, Kevin B. A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People (Leiden: 
Brill, 2007). 
Dorn, Frank. The Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor 
(New York: Macmillan, 1974). 
Doty, Roxanne L. Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South 
Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1996). 
Dower, John W. War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1986). 
Drea, Edward J. Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1863–1945 (Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 2009). 
Drechsler, Horst. “Let us Die Fighting”: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against 
German Imperialism (1884–1915) (1966; Eng. edn, London: Zed Press, 1980). 
Du Bois, W. E. B. The World and Africa (1947; later edn, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
Duus, Peter. The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea (1995; 
pbk edn, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth (1961; later edn, London: Penguin Books, 
1990). 
Felton, Mark. Japan’s Gestapo: Murder, Mayhem and Torture in Wartime Asia (Barnsley: 
Pen and Sword Military, 2009). 
Futamura, Madoka. War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and 
the Nuremberg Legacy (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
278 
 
Gatu, Dagfinn. Village China at War: The Impact of Resistance to Japan, 1937–1945 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008).  
 
Gavin, Masako. Shiga Shigetaka, 1863–1927: The Forgotten Enlightener (2001; London & 
New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 
 
Gerlach, Christian. Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
Gluck, Carol. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985). 
Gordon, Andrew. Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (1991; pbk edn, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
Goto Ken’ichi. Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and 
Postcolonial World (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003). 
Hall, Maxwell. Kinabalu Guerrillas: An Account of the Double Tenth Rising against the 
Japanese Invaders in North Borneo (1949; later edn, Kota Kinabalu: Opus Publications, 
2009). 
Hannoum, Abdelmajid. Violent Modernity: France in Algeria (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010).  
Hechter, Michael. Alien Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
Hogan, David W. Jr., U.S. Army Operations in World War II (Washington D.C.: US 
Center for Military History, 1992). 
 
Honda, Katsuichi. The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s Shame, 
Frank Gibney (ed.), Karen Sandness (trans.) (1987; Eng. edn, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
1999). 
Hotta, Eri. Pan-Asianism and Japan’s war, 1931–1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2013). 
 
Ienaga, Saburō. Japan’s Last War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945 (1968; Eng. 
edn, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).   
 
Joes, Anthony James. Victorious Insurgencies: Four Rebellions that Shaped our World 
(Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2010). 
Johnson, Chalmers A. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: the Emergence of 
Revolutionary China, 1937–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). 





Kallis, Aristotle. Genocide and Fascism: The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe (New 
York & London: Routledge, 2009). 
 
Kang, Man-Gil. A History of Contemporary Korea (Folkstone: Global Oriental, 2005). 
 
Kapuśiński, Ryszard. The Other, A. Lloyd-Jones (trans.) (2006; Eng. edn, London & 
New York: Verso, 2008).   
Katz, Paul R. When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Ta-pa-ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005). 
Kenworthy, Aubrey Saint. The Tiger of Malaya: The Story of General Tomoyuki Yamashita 
and “Death March” General Masaharu Homma (New York: Exposition Press, 1953).  
 
Kerr, George. Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895–1945 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974). 
 
Kiernan, Ben. Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta 
to Darfur (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
Kiernan, Victor. G. European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815–1960 (Leicester: 
University of Leicester Press & Fontana Paperbacks, 1982).  
Kim, C. L. Eugene & Kim, Han-Kyo. Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876–1910 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).  
King, Richard H. & Stone, Dan (eds.), Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: 
Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide (2007; pbk edn, New York & Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2008). 
Kolsky, Elizabeth. Colonial Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
Kramer, Paul A. Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines 
(Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
Kratoska, Paul H. The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997). 
Ku, Dae-Yeol. Korea under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese 
Relations (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch by Seoul Computer Press, 1985). 
Kushner, Barak. Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
Lary, Diana. Chinese People at War: Human Suffering and Social Transformation, 1937–
1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 




Lee Geok Boi. The Syonan Years: Singapore under Japanese Rule, 1942–1945 (Singapore: 
National Archives of Singapore, 2005).  
Lemkin, Raphael. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of 
Government – Proposals for Redress, (Washington D.C., 1944). 
Levene, Mark. Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume I: The Meaning of Genocide 
(2005; pbk edn, New York & London: I. B. Tauris, 2008). 
- Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume II: The Rise of the West and the 
Coming of Genocide (2005; pbk edn, New York & London: I. B. Tauris, 2013). 
Lewis, Jonathan & Steele, Ben. Hell in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbour to Hiroshima 
(London: Channel 4, 2001). 
Li, Lincoln. The Japanese Army in North China, 1937–1941: Problems of Political and 
Economic Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
Lifton, Robert Jay. & Markusen, Eric. The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and 
Nuclear Threat (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 
Lindqvist, Sven. “Exterminate all the Brutes”: One Man’s Odyssey into the Heart of 
Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide, Tate, J. (trans.) (1992; pbk edn, New 
York & London: The New Press, 2007). 
Lone, Stewart. Japan’s First Modern War: Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 
1894–95 (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). 
Mann, Michael. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
Matthiessen, Sven. Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Late Nineteenth 
Century to the end of World War II (Leiden: Brill, 2016). 
Memmi, Albert. The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957; Eng. edn, Boston: Beacon Press, 
1967). 
Metzler, Mark. Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of 
Liberalism in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). 
Midlarsky, Manus I. The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
Miller, Stuart C. “Benevolent Assimilation” The American Conquest of the Philippines, 
1899–1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 
 
Mimura, Janis. Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
281 
 
Mitter, Rana. China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival (London: 
Allen Lane, 2013). 
Mojica, Proculo J. Terry’s Hunters: The True Story of the Hunter’s ROTC Guerrillas 
(Manila: Benipayo Press, 1965). 
Moore, Aaron William. Writing War: Soldiers Record the Japanese Empire (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
1998). 
Nish, Ian. Japanese Foreign Policy, 1868–1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka (London: 
Routledge and K. Paul, 1977). 
- Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period (Westport: Praegar Publishers, 
2002). 
Oguma, Eiji. A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self Images, David Askew (trans.) (Melbourne: 
Trans Pacific Press, 2002).   
Oot, Keat Gin. The Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941–1945 (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2001). 
Peattie, Mark R. Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975). 
Pierson, John D. Tokutomi Sohō, 1863–1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980). 
Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell: American and the Age of Genocide (London: 
Flamingo, 2003).  
Reel, A. Frank. The Case of General Yamashita (1949; reprint edn, New York: Octagon 
Books, 1971). 
Roy, Denny. Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
Rummell, R. J. Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900 (New 
Brunswick: Transactions Publishers, 1994). 
Russell, Edward. The Knights of Bushido: A Short History of Japanese War Crimes 
(London: Cassell, 1958). 
Sansom, George Bailey. The Western World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of 
European and Asiatic Cultures (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949). 
Sarkin, Jeremy. Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His 
Settlers, His Soldiers (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2011). 
282 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Colonialism and Neocolonialism (1964; reprint Eng. edn, London & 
New York: Routledge, 2006).  
 
Scalapino, Robert A. Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1953). 
Schabas, William A. Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2000; 2nd edn, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
Schmid, Andre. Korea between Empires, 1895–1919 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002). 
Selden, Mark. China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
1995). 
Sémelin, Jacques. Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide, 
Cynthia Schoch (trans.) (2005; Eng. edn, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
Shaw, Martin. War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2003). 
- Genocide and International Relations: Changing Patterns in the Transitions of the 
Later Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
 
- What is Genocide? (2007; 2nd edn, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015). 
Shiltz, Michael. The Money Doctors from Japan: Finance, Imperialism, and the Building of 
the Yen Bloc, 1895–1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).  
Shimazu, Naoko. Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London 
& New York: Routledge, 1998). 
Silvester, Jeremy. & Gewald, Jan-Bart (eds.), Words Cannot Be Found, German Colonial 
Rule in Namibia: An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue Book (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
Simons, Geoff L. Korea: The Search for Sovereignty (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995). 
Smethurst, Richard J. From Foot Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan’s 
Keynes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
Suzuki, Shogo. Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European 
International Society (London & New York: Routledge, 2009). 
Syjuco, Ma. Felisa A.  The Kempeitai in the Philippines, 1941–1945 (Quezon City: New 
Day Publishers, 1988). 
Tan, Antonio S. The Chinese in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945 
(Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1981). 
283 
 
Tanaka, Stefan. Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995). 
Tanaka, Yuki. Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II (1993; Eng. edn, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).  
 
Tarling, Nicholas. A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia, 1941–
1945 (London: Hurst & Company, 2001). 
  
Tierney, Robert T. Tropics of Savagery: The Culture of Japanese Empire in Comparative 
Frame (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). 
 
Totani, Yuma. Justice in Asia and the Pacific Region, 1945–1952: Allied War Crimes 
Prosecutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).   
 
Valentino, Benjamin A. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
 
Weiner, Michael A. Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1994).  
 
Weitz, Eric D.  A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003). 
 
Yamamoto, Masahiro. Nanjing: Anatomy of an Atrocity (Westport: Praegar Publishers, 
2000). 
Yoshida, Takashi. The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, 
China, and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Yoshimi, Yoshiaki. Comfort Women: Sexual Violence in the Japanese Military during 
World War II, Suzanne O’Brien (trans.) (1995; Eng. edn, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000). 
- Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People, Ethan Mark 
(trans.) (1987; Eng. edn, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 
Young, Louise. Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
Yu-Jose, Lydia N. Japan Views the Philippines, 1900–1944 (Quezon City: Ateneo de 
Manila University Press, 1992). 
Chapters in Edited Collections: 
Askew, David. ‘Part of the Numbers Issue: Demography and Civilian Victims’, in 
Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (ed.), The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: Complicating the 
Picture (2007; pbk edn, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 86–114. 
284 
 
Andreopoulos, George J. ‘The Age of National Liberation Movements’, in M. 
Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman (eds.), The Laws of War: 
Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 
191–213. 
Barkan, Elazar. ‘Genocides of Indigenous Peoples: Rhetoric of Human Rights’, in 
Robert Gellately & Ben Kiernan (eds.), The Specter of Genocide Studies: Mass Murder in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 117–40. 
Bar-Tal, Daniel. & Hammack, Philip L. ‘Conflict, Delegitimization, and Violence’, in 
Linda R. Tropp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 1–78. 
Benda, Harry J. ‘The Japanese Interregnum in Southeast Asia’, in Grant K. Goodman 
(ed.), Imperial Japan and Asia: A Reassessment (New York: East Asian Institute, 
Columbia University, 1967), 65–79. 
- ‘Introduction’, in Harry J. Benda, James K. Irikura, & Kōichi Kishi (eds.), 
Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: 
Yale University, 1965), i–xiii. 
Brook, Timothy. ‘Occupation State Building’ in Stephen MacKinnon, Diana Lary, & 
Ezra Vogel (eds.), China at War: Regions of China, 1937–1945 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 22–43. 
Bradsher, Greg. ‘The Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records Relating 
to War Crimes, 1942–1945’, in Interagency Working Group (ed.), Researching Japanese 
War Crimes: Introductory Essays (Washington D.C.: National Archives and Records 
Administration, 2006), 151–68.  
Cheah, Boon Kheng. ‘Japanese Army Policy toward the Chinese and Malay-Chinese 
Relations in Wartime Malaya’, in Paul H. Kratoska (ed.), Southeast Asian Minorities in 
the Wartime Japanese Empire (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 97–110. 
 
Clancey, Gregory. ‘The Japanese Imperium and Southeast Asia: An Overview’, in 
Paul H. Kratoska (ed.), Southeast Asian Minorities in the Wartime Japanese Empire 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 7–20. 
Cooper, Frederick. & Stoler, Ann Laura. ‘Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking 
a Research Agenda’, in Frederick Cooper & Ann Laura Stoler (eds.), Tensions of 
Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997), 1–56. 
Curthoys, Ann. & Docker, John. ‘Defining Genocide’, in Dan Stone (ed.), The 




Dedering, Tilman. ‘“A Certain Rigorous Treatment of All Parts of the Nation”: The 
Annihilation of the Herero in German South West Africa, 1904’, in Mark Levene & 
Penny Roberts (eds.), The Massacre in History (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
1999), 205–22. 
Docker, John. ‘Are Settler-Colonies Inherently Genocidal? Rereading Lemkin’, in A. 
Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern 
Resistance in World History (2008; pbk edn, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2010), 81–101. 
Drea, Edward J. ‘Introduction’, in Interagency Working Group (ed.), Researching 
Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays (Washington D.C.: National Archives and 
Records Administration, 2006), 3–20. 
Drea, Edward J.  & van de Ven, Hans. ‘Overview of Major Military Campaigns 
during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945’, in Mark R. Peattie, Edward J. Drea, & 
Hans van de Ven (eds.), The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-
Japanese War of 1937–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 17–47. 
Duus, Peter. ‘Introduction’, in Peter Duus (ed.), Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 6: 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1–52. 
Dwyer, Philip. & Ryan, Lyndall. ‘Introduction: The Massacre and History’, in Philip 
G. Dwyer & Lyndall Ryan (eds.), Theatres of Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing and 
Atrocity throughout History (2012; pbk edn, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2015), xi–xxv. 
Eastman, Lloyd E. ‘Facets of an Ambivalent Relationship: Smuggling, Puppets, and 
Atrocities during the War, 1937–1945’, in Akira Iriye (ed.), The Chinese and the 
Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press), 275–303. 
Evans, Raymond. ‘“Crime without a Name” Colonialism and the Case for 
Indigenous Genocide’, in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, 
Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (2008; pbk edn, New York & 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), 134–61. 
Finaldi, Giuseppe. ‘Method in their Madness: Understanding the Dynamics of the 
Italian Massacre of Ethiopian Civilians, February–May 1937’, in Philip G. Dwyer & 
Lyndall Ryan (eds.), Theatres of Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing and Atrocity throughout 
History (2012; pbk edn, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015), 245–57. 
 
Fogel, Joshua A. ‘The Nanking Atrocity and Chinese Historical Memory’, in Bob 
Tadashi Wakabayashi (ed.), The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: Complicating the Picture 
(2007; pbk edn, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 267–84. 
286 
 
Frei, Henry P. ‘Japan Remembers the Malaya Campaign’, in Paul H. Kratoska (ed.), 
Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese Occupation (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 1995), 148–68. 
Fujiwara, Akira. ‘The Nanking Atrocity: An Interpretive Overview’, in Bob Tadashi 
Wakabayashi (ed.), The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: Complicating the Picture (2007; pbk 
edn, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 29–54. 
Gann, Lewis H. ‘Western and Japanese Colonialism: Some Preliminary Comparisons’, 
in Myers & Peattie (eds.), Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese 
Colonial Empire, 1895–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 497–525. 
Goodman, Grant K. ‘Introduction’, in Grant K. Goodman (ed.), Japanese Cultural 
Policies in Southeast Asia during World War 2 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 1–5. 
 
Goto, Ken’ichi. ‘Cooperation, Submission, and Resistance of Indigenous Elites of 
Southeast Asia in the Wartime Empire’, in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, & Mark R. 
Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 274–301. 
Hara, Fujio. ‘The 1943 Kinabalu Uprising in Sabah’, in Paul H. Kratoska (ed.), 
Southeast Asian Minorities in the Wartime Japanese Empire (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2002), 111–32. 
Harper, Tim. ‘A Long View of the Great Asian War’, in David Koh Wee Hock (ed.), 
Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2007), 7–20. 
Hashikawa, Bunsō. ‘Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to 
Coprosperity’, in Akira Iriye (ed.), The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and 
Cultural Interactions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 328–56. 
Hata, Ikuhiko. ‘From Consideration to Contempt: The Changing Nature of Japanese 
Military and Popular Perceptions of Prisoners of War through the Ages’, in Bob 
Moore & Kent Fedorowich (eds.), Prisoners of War and Their Captors in World War II 
(Oxford: Berg, 1996), 250–76. 
Hayashi, Hirofumi. ‘Massacre of Chinese in Singapore and Its Coverage in Postwar 
Japan’, in Akashi Yoji & Yoshimura Mako (eds.), New Perspectives on the Japanese 
Occupation of Malaya and Singapore, 1941–1945 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
2007), 234–49. 
Hinton, Alexander Laban. ‘The Dark Side of Modernity: Toward an Anthropology of 
Genocide’, in Alexander Laban Hinton (ed.), Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology 
of Genocide (Berkeley: University of Southern California Press, 2002), 1–40. 
287 
 
- ‘Oppression and Vengeance in the Cambodian Genocide’, in Adam Jones & 
Nicholas A. Robins (eds.), Genocides by the Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in 
Theory and Practice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 84–102. 
Howard, Michael. ‘Constraints on Warfare’, in M. Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, 
& Mark R. Shulman (eds.), The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western 
World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 1–11. 
Ileto, Reynaldo C. ‘World War II: Transient and Enduring Legacies for the 
Philippines’, in David Koh Wee Hock (ed.), Legacies of World War II in South and East 
Asia (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2007), 74–91. 
Iriye, Akira. ‘The Ideology of Japanese Imperialism: Imperial Japan and China’, in 
Grant K. Goodman (ed.), Imperial Japan and Asia: A Reassessment (New York: East 
Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967), 32–45. 
Jansen, Marius. ‘Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives’, in Ramon H. Myers 
& Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 61–79. 
Jones, F. C. ‘Japan: The Military Domination of Japanese Policy, 1931–1945’, in M. 
Howard (ed.), Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations 
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957), 117–31. 
Jose, Ricardo T. ‘Accord and Discord: Japanese Cultural Policy and Philippine 
National Identity during the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945)’, in Li Narangoa & 
Robert Cribb (eds.), Imperial Japan and National Identities, 1895-1945 (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2003), 249–69. 
Kasahara, Tokushi. ‘Massacres outside Nanking City’, in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi 
(ed.), The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: Complicating the Picture (2007; pbk edn, New 
York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 57–69. 
Katō, Shūichi. ‘Taishō Democracy as the Pre-Stage for Japanese militarism’, in 
Bernard S. Silberman & H. D. Harootunian (ed.), Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taishō 
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 217–36. 
Katō, Yōko. ‘Pan-Asianism and National Reorganization: Japanese perceptions of 
China and the United States, 1914–19’, in Sven Saaler & J. Victor Koschmann (ed.), 
Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism, and Borders (London 
& New York: Routledge, 2007), 67–81. 
Kim, Yong-Jick. ‘Politics of Communication and the Colonial Public Sphere in 1920s 
Korea’, in Lee Hong Yung, Ha Yong-Chool, & Clark W. Sorensen (ed.), Colonial Rule 




Kimitada, Miwa. ‘Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan: Nationalism, Regionalism and 
Universalism’, in Sven Saaler & J. Victor Koschmann (eds.), Pan-Asianism in Modern 
Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism, and Borders (London & New York, 2007), 21–
33. 
 
Koshiro, Yukiko. ‘East Asia’s “Melting Pot”: Re-evaluating Race Relations in Japan’s 
Colonial Empire’, in Rotem Kowner & Walter Demel (eds.), Race and Racism in 
Modern East Asia: Western and Eastern Constructions (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 475–98. 
Kwartanda, Didi. ‘Japanese Leadership and Organization in Yogyakarta during the 
Japanese Occupation’, in Paul H. Kratoska (ed.), Southeast Asian Minorities in the 
Wartime Japanese Empire (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 65–80. 
Lamley, Harry J. ‘The 1895 War of Resistance: Local Chinese Efforts against a Foreign 
Power’, in Leonard H. D. Gordon (ed.), Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History (New 
York: Colombia University Press, 1970), 23–77. 
- ‘Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism’, in 
Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), Taiwan: A New History (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
1999), 201–60. 
Lary, Diana. ‘A Ravaged Place: The Devastation of the Xuzhou Region, 1938’, in 
Diana Lary & Stephen MacKinnon (eds.), Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on 
Modern China (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 98–116. 
- ‘The Waters Covered the Earth: China’s War-Induced Natural Disasters’, in 
Mark Selden & Alvin Y. So (eds.), War and State Terrorism: The United States, 
Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 143–70. 
Li, Peter. ‘The Nanking Holocaust: Memory, Trauma and Reconciliation’, in Peter Li 
(ed.), The Search for Justice: Japanese War Crimes (2003; later edn, New Brunswick & 
London, 2009), 227–42. 
MacDonald, Callum. ‘“Kill All, Burn All, Loot All”: The Nanking Massacre of 
December 1937 and Japanese Policy in China’, in Mark Levene & Penny Roberts 
(eds.), The Massacre in History (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1999), 223–45. 
Madley, Benjamin. ‘Tactics of Nineteenth-Century Colonial Massacre: Tasmania, 
California and Beyond’, in Philip G. Dwyer & Lyndall Ryan (eds.), Theatres of 
Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing and Atrocity throughout History (2012; pbk edn, New 
York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015), 110–25. 
 
Majima, Ayu. ‘Skin Colour Melancholy in Modern Japan: Male Elites’ Racial 
Experiences Abroad, 1880s–1950s’, in Rotem Kowner & Walter Demel (eds.), Race and 




Mark, Ethan. ‘Translator’s Introduction: The People in the War’, in Yoshimi Yoshiaki, 
Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People, Ethan Mark (trans.) (1987; 
Eng. edn, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 1–38. 
Maybury-Lewis, David. ‘Genocide against Indigenous Peoples’, in Alexander Laban 
Hinton (ed.), Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide (Berkeley: 
University of South California Press, 2002), 43–53. 
Mayo, Marlene J. ‘Attitudes towards Asia and the Beginnings of Japanese Empire’, in 
Grant K. Goodman (ed.), Imperial Japan and Asia: A Reassessment (New York: East 
Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967), 6–30. 
- ‘Introduction’, in Marlene J. Mayo (ed.), The Emergence of Imperial Japan: Self-
Defense or Calculated Aggression? (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1970), 
vii–xiv. 
McCormack, Gavin. ‘Reflections on Modern Japanese History in the Context of the 
Concept of Genocide’, in Robert Gellately & Ben Kiernan (eds.), The Specter of 
Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 265–86. 
McCulloch, Joch. ‘Empire and Violence, 1900–1930’, in Philippa Levine (ed.), Gender 
and Empire (2004; pbk edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 220–39. 
Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. ‘Becoming Japanese: Imperial Expansion and Identity Crises in 
the Early Twentieth Century’, in Sharon A. Minichiello (ed.), Japan’s Competing 
Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900–1930 (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1998), 157–80.  
Moses, A. Dirk. ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of 
History’, in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and 
Subaltern Resistance in World History (2008; pbk edn, New York & Oxford, 2010), 3–54. 
- ‘Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History’, in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), 
Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in 
Australian History (2004; reprint edn, New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2007), 3–48. 
Moshman, David. ‘Conceptions of Genocide and Perceptions in History’, in Dan 
Stone (ed.), The Historiography of Genocide (2008; pbk edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 71–92. 
Myers, Ramon H. ‘Creating a Modern Enclave Economy: The Economic Integration 
of Japan, Manchuria, and North China, 1932–1945’, in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers 
& Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), 136–70. 
290 
 
Nakamura, Takafusa. ‘Japan’s Economic Thrust into North China, 1933–1938’, in 
Akira Iriye (ed.), The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural 
Interactions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 220–53. 
Narangoa, Li & Cribb, Robert B. ‘Japan and the Transformation of National Identities 
in Asia in the Imperial Era’, in Li Narangoa & Robert B. Cribb (ed.), Imperial Japan and 
National Identities, 1895–1945 (New York & London: Routledge, 2003), 1–22.   
Ono, Kenji. ‘Massacres near Mufushan’, in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (ed.), The 
Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: Complicating the Picture (2007; pbk edn, New York & 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 70–85. 
Peattie, Mark R. ‘Introduction’, in Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The 
Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 3–59. 
- ‘Japanese Attitudes toward Colonialism, 1895–1945’, in Ramon H. Myers & 
Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 80–127. 
 
- ‘Nanshin: The “Southward Advance,” 1931–1941, as a Prelude to the Japanese 
Occupation of Southeast Asia’, in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, & Mark R. 
Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1937–1945 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 189–242. 
Saaler, Sven. ’Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, 
Creating a Region, Forging an Empire’, in Sven Saaler & J. Victor Koschmann (eds.), 
Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism, and Borders (London 
& New York: Routledge, 2007), 1–18. 
Satoshi, Nakano. ‘Appeasement and Coercion’, in Ikehata Setsuho & Ricardo Trota 
Jose (ed.), The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction (Quezon City: 
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), 21–58. 
Schaller, Dominik. ‘From Conquest to Genocide: Colonial Rule in German South 
West Africa and East Africa’, in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: 
Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (2008; pbk edn, New 
York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), 296–324. 
- ‘Genocide and Mass Violence in the “Heart of Darkness”: Africa in the 
Colonial Period’, in Donald Bloxham & A. Dirk Moses (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Genocide Studies (2010; pbk edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 345–64.  
 
Selden, Mark. & So, Alvin Y. ‘Introduction: War and State Terrorism’, in Mark Selden 
& Alvin Y. So (eds.), War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-




Stone, Dan. ‘The Holocaust and Its Historiography’, in Dan Stone (ed.), The 
Historiography of Genocide Studies (2008; pbk edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2010), 373–99. 
Tamanoi, Marino Asano. ‘Who Classified Whom and for What Purpose? The 
“Japanese” in Northeast China in the Age of Empire’, in Rotem Kowner & Walter 
Demel (eds.), Race and Racism in Modern East Asia: Western and Eastern Constructions 
(Leiden: Brill, 2012), 431–52. 
 
Thomas, Martin. ‘Introduction: Mapping Violence onto French Colonial Minds’, in 
Martin Thomas (ed.), The French Colonial Mind, Vol. 2: Violence, Military Encounters, 
and Colonialism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), xi–liii. 
Touwen–Bouwsma, Elly. ‘Japanese Policy towards the Chinese in Java, 1942–1945: A 
Preliminary Outline’, in Paul H. Kratoska (ed.), Southeast Asian Minorities in the 
Wartime Japanese Empire (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 55–64. 
Utsumi, Aiko. ‘Japanese Racism, War, and the POW Experience’, in Mark Selden & 
Alvin Y. So (eds.), War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific 
in the Long Twentieth Century (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 
119–42. 
Veracini, Lorenzo. ‘Colonialism and Genocide: Notes for the Analysis of a Settler 
Archive’, in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and 
Subaltern Resistance in World History (2008; pbk edn, Oxford & New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2010), 148–61. 
Weiner, Michael A. ‘The Invention of Identity: “Self” and “Other” in pre-war Japan’, 
Michael A. Weiner (ed.), Japanese Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2009), 1–20. 
- ‘The Invention of Identity: Race and Nation in Pre-war Japan’, in Frank 
Dikötter (ed.), The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical 
and Contemporary Perspectives (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 96–17 
Weiss-Wendt, Anton. ‘Problems in Comparative Genocide Scholarship’, in Dan Stone 
(ed.), The Historiography of Genocide (2008; pbk edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2010), 42–70. 
Yamamoto, Masahiro. ‘A Tale of Two Atrocities: A Critical Appraisal of American 
Historiography’, in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (ed.), The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: 
Complicating the Picture (2007; pbk edn, Oxford & New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 
285–303. 
Yang, Daqing. ‘Atrocities in Nanjing: Searching for Explanations’, in Diana Lary & 
Stephen MacKinnon (eds.), Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 76–96. 
292 
 
Yang, Kuisong ‘Nationalist and Communist Guerrilla Warfare in North China’, in 
Mark R. Peattie, Edward J. Drea & Hans van de Ven (eds.), The Battle for China: Essays 
on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2011), 308–27. 
Zimmerer, Jürgen. Colonial Genocide: The Herero and Nama War (1904–8) in 
German South West Africa and Its Significance’, in Dan Stone (ed.), The 
Historiography of Genocide (2008; pbk edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 
323–43. 
 Articles:  
Akashi ,Yoji. ‘Japanese Policy towards the Malayan Chinese, 1941–1945’, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 1(2) (1970), 61–89. 
Baldwin, Frank. ‘Participatory Anti-Imperialism: The 1919 Independence Movement’, 
Journal of Korean Studies, 1 (1979), 123–62. 
Barta, Tony. ‘Mr Darwin’s Shooters: On Natural Selection and the Naturalizing of 
Genocide’, Patterns of Prejudice, 39(2), (2005), 116–37. 
Blackburn, Kevin & Chew Ju Ern, Daniel. ‘Dalforce at the Fall of Singapore in 1942: 
An Overseas Chinese Heroic Legend’, Journal of Chinese Overseas, 1(2) (2005), 233–59. 
Bloxham, Donald. ‘The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalization 
and the Development of a Destruction Policy’, Past and Present, 181 (2003), 141–191. 
Brudnoy, David. ‘Japan’s Experiment in Korea’, Monumenta Nipponica, 25(1/2) (1970), 
155–95. 
Chae, Ou-Byung. ‘The “Moment of the Boomerang” Never Came: Resistance and 
Collaboration in Colonial Korea, 1919–1945’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 23(3) 
(2010), 398–426. 
Chen, Edward I-te, ‘Colonialism in Korea and Taiwan: A Comparison of the Systems 
of Political Control’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 30 (1970), 126–58. 
- ‘Japan’s Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Ito-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894–5’, 
Journal of Asian Studies, 37(1) (1977), 61–72. 
Curthoys, Ann. & Docker, John. ‘Introduction – Genocide: Definitions, Questions, 
Settler-colonies’ Aboriginal History, 25 (2001), 1–15. 
De Waal, Alex. ‘Reflections on the Difficulties of Defining Darfur’s Crisis as 
Genocide’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 20 (2007), 25–33.   
Dery, Luis C. ‘Japan’s new order in the Philippines, 1942–1945: A blueprint for Asia 
under Japan’, Philippine Social Sciences Review, 48(1–4) (1984), 291–361. 
293 
 
Eskildsen, Robert. ‘Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 
1874 Expedition to Taiwan’, American Historical Review, 107(2) (2002), 388–418. 
 
Finzsch, Norbert. ‘“It is scarcely possible to conceive that human beings could be so 
hideous and loathsome”: Discourses of Genocide in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-
Century America and Australia’, Patterns of Prejudice, 39(2) (2006), 97–115. 
Gewald, Jan-Bart. ‘The Great General of the Kaiser’, Botswana Notes and Records, 26 
(1994), 67–76. 
 
Goodman, Grant K. ‘The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines: Commonwealth 
Sustained’, Philippine Studies, 36(1) (1988), 98–104. 
 
- ‘The Problem of Philippine Independence and Japan: The First Three Decades 
of American Colonial Rule’, Southeast Asia: An International Quarterly, 1(3) 
(1971), 165–90. 
 
Gunn, Geoffrey. ‘Remembering the Southeast Asian Chinese Massacres of 1941–1945’, 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, 37(3) (2007), 273–91. 
Kalman, Samuel. ‘Introduction: Colonial Violence’, Historical Reflections, 36(2) (2010), 
1–6. 
Kennedy, David M. ‘The Horror: Should the Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing be 
equated with the Nazi Holocaust?’ The Atlantic, 281(4) (1998), 110–16.   
Kühne, Thomas. ‘Colonialism and the Holocaust: Continuities, Causalities, and 
Complexities’, Journal of Genocide Research, 15(3) (2013), 339–62. 
Kunreuther, Laura.  ‘”Pacification of the Primitive”: The Problem of Colonial 
Violence’, Philosophia Africana, 9(2) (2006), 67–82. 
Leong, Stephen. ‘The Malayan Overseas Chinese and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–
1941’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 10(2) (1979), 293–320. 
Li, Yuk-Wai. ‘The Chinese Resistance Movement in the Philippines during the 
Japanese Occupation’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 23(2) (1992), 308–21. 
Luttikhuis, Bart & Moses, A. Dirk. ‘Mass Violence and the end of the Dutch Colonial 
Empire in Indonesia’, Journal of Genocide Research, 14(3–4) (2012), 257–76. 
Madley, Benjamin. ‘Pattern of Frontier Genocide 1803–1910: The Aboriginal 
Tasmanians, the Yuki of California, and the Herero of Namibia’, Journal of Genocide 
Research, 6(2), (2004), 167–92. 
 
Mark, Ethan. ‘The Perils of Co-Prosperity: Takeda Rintarō, Occupied Southeast Asia, 
and the Seductions of Postcolonial Empire’, American Historical Review, 119(4) (2014), 
1184–1206. 
 
Mbembe, Achille. ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture, 15(1) (2003), 11–40. 
294 
 
McDonnell, Michael. & Moses, A. Dirk. ‘Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in 
the Americas’, Journal of Genocide Research, 7(4) (2005), 501–29. 
Melson, Robert. ‘Critique of Current Genocide Studies’, Genocide Studies and 
Prevention, 6(3) (2011), 279–86. 
Moses, A. Dirk. ‘Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the ‘racial 
century’: Genocides of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust’, Patterns of Prejudice, 
36(4), (2002), 7–36. 
 
- ‘An Antipodean Genocide?: The Origins of the Genocidal Moment in the 
Colonization of Australia’, Journal of Genocide Research, 2(1), (2000), 89–106. 
 
- ‘Paranoia and Partisanship: Genocide Studies, Holocaust Historiography, and 
the “Apocalyptic Conjuncture”’, The Historical Journal, 54(2) (2011), 577–81 
 
- ‘Revisiting a Founding Assumption of Genocide Studies’, Genocide Studies and 
Prevention, 6(3) (2011), 287–300. 
 
Palmer, Alison. ‘Colonial and Modern Genocide: Explanations and Categories’, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(1) (1998), 89–115. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. ‘On Genocide’, Ramparts (February 1968), 37–42.  
Schmid, Andre. ‘Colonialism and the “Korea Problem” in the Historiography of 
Modern Japan: A Review Article’, Journal of Asian Studies, 59(4) (2000), 952–76. 
Shaw, Martin. ‘Darfur: Counter-insurgency, Forced Displacement, and Genocide’, 
The British Journal of Sociology, 62(1) (2011), 56–61. 
Shimao, E. ‘Darwinism in Japan, 1877–1927’, Annals of Science, 38(1) (1981), 93–102. 
Shimazu, Naoko. ‘Patriotic and Despondent: Japanese Society at War’, Russian Review, 
67 (2008), 34–49. 
Spencer, Philip. ‘Imperialism, Anti-imperialism and the Problem of Genocide, Past 
and Present’, History, 98(332), (2013), 606–22. 
Straus, Scott. ‘Contested Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: A Conceptual 
Analysis of Genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research, 3(3) (2001), 349–75. 
- ‘“Destroy Them to Save Us”: Theories of Genocide and the Logic of Political 
Violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 24(4), (2012), 544–60.- 
Tan, Antonio S. ‘The Philippine Chinese Response to the Sino-Japanese Conflict, 
1931–1941’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(1) (1981), 207–23. 
Taussig, Michael. ‘Culture of Terror – Space of Death: Roger Casement’s Putumayo 
Report and the Explanation of Torture’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
26(3) (1984), 467–97. 
295 
 
Ts’ai, Hui’yu Caroline. ‘The Hoko System in Taiwan, 1895–1945: Structure and 
Functions’, Journal of the College of Liberal Arts, 23 (1993), 126–48. 
Valentino, Benjamin., Huth, Paul. & Balch-Lindsay, Dylan. ‘Draining the Sea: Mass 
Killing and Guerrilla Warfare’, International Organization, 58(2) (2004), 375–407. 
Wilson, Sandra. ‘The Discourse of National Greatness in Japan, 1890–1919’, Japanese 
Studies, 25(1) (2005), 35–51. 
Wolfe, Patrick. ‘Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race’, 
American Historical Review, 106(3), (2001), 866–905. 
Yang, Daqing. ‘Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rape 
of Nanjing’, American Historical Review, 104(3) (Jun., 1999), 842–65. 
 
Yu-Jose, Lydia N. ‘World War II and the Japanese in the Prewar Philippines’, Journal 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 27(1) (1996), 64–81.  
 
Zimmerer, J. & Schaller, D. ‘From the Guest Editors: Raphael Lemkin: The “Founder 
of the United Nation’s Genocide Convention” as a Historian of Mass Violence’, 
Journal of Genocide Research, 7(4) (2005), 447–52. 
Dissertations and Theses:  
Kwok, Wai Keng. ‘Justice Done? Criminal and Moral Responsibility Issues In the 
Chinese Massacres Trial Singapore, 1947’, Genocide Studies Program, Working Paper No. 
18 (New Haven, 2001).  
Film:  
Riben Guizi; Japanese Devils: Confessions of Imperial Army Soldiers from Japan's War 
against China (2001). English Subtitles. Dir. Matsui Minoru, Riben Guizi Production 
Committee.  
Hell in the Pacific (2001). Dir. Jonathan Lewis, Carlton Television. 
People’s Century, 1939: Total War (1995). Dir. John Bridcut, BBC/WGBH. 
 
 
